



**ARMED
VIOLENCE
PREVENTION
AND
REDUCTION** **DCA**
PROGRAMME
POLICY

DCA Programme Policy: Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction

1. Background

The impact of Armed Violence, whether in the context of crime or full-blown conflict, is widely acknowledged by states and civil society as a major constraint to poverty reduction and the enjoyment of human rights. This programme policy aims to set out how DanChurchAid (DCA) can contribute to efforts to reduce armed violence through focusing on the demand, supply and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The policy suggests that interventions should largely focus on non-conflict settings where armed violence and crime is so persistent, effectively undermining human rights and poverty elimination efforts. Responding to current gaps in programming, DCA will emphasize support to interventions at the national and sub-national levels that target a measurable reduction in armed violence. The policy will also outline, however, measures by which DCA can help to prevent or limit armed conflict through targeting the international supply of SALW to troubled areas and addressing other “softer” triggers.

1.1 Armed violence as a human rights and development issue

There are estimated to be around 875 million SALW in the world, three quarters of which are in the hands of civilians and non-state actors. The proliferation of weapons is fuelling a devastating range of armed violence. In 2004, 500,000 approximately were killed in non-conflict violence and every year firearms cause several times more fatal injuries in “peaceful” settings than in war.ⁱ In Honduras, a country of only 6 million people, more than 50 children and youth were murdered every month in 2006.ⁱⁱ In neighbouring Guatemala, the most common cause of death amongst youth is by firearms.ⁱⁱⁱ Demonstrating its status as a major public health and human rights issue, the Small Arms Survey estimates that an average of 1000 people die every day, as a minimum, from SALW worldwide.

The abuse of human rights in armed violence is evident. In both conflict and non-conflict settings, weapons are used to denigrate the right to life, liberty and security of person and can fuel abuses such as rape, torture, disappearance and suppression of political activity. Women in particular, are victimised by situations in which young male, acquire an inordinate amount of authority through membership in armed groups. Sexual violence becomes commonplace predisposing thousands of women and girls to HIV infection, psychological trauma and gynaecological problems. Because the direct victims (and perpetrators) of armed violence are overwhelmingly young men, women frequently shoulder the burden of the social and economic consequences. In Southern Somalia, 40% of families are headed by women.^{iv} In many situations the death of the male means the loss of the main family provider and reduced labour for families depending on subsistence agriculture.

In fragile situations, SALW proliferation skews power balances and creates informal, illegitimate structures that undermine social capital essential to cohesion and cooperation in society. In pastoralist Africa, the availability of weapons has undermined the social control of elders’ traditional authority over young men – a loss that is difficult to reverse – and disrupts non-state mechanisms that maintained a delicate balance between rival groups sharing scarce resources. Neighbours that previously helped each

other protect their property are no longer so inclined to venture outside if they hear shots for fear that they will also be targeted. In the Burundian capital, different ethnic groups regard each other with distrust for they know the other possesses huge numbers of weapons. Trust in the state is also affected: 48% of Latin American and Caribbean cities are considered dangerous or inaccessible to the police and, as in many areas of the global South, rights-holders are left to defend themselves in a vacuum of insecurity.^v

Even when security services do intervene, their behavior often contributes to a further abuse of rights. In Southern Sudan the SPLM made a bloody attempt at disarming militia groups and in that caused hundreds of deaths. Police forces patrolling slum communities in Kenya have used excessive force without legal ramifications or accountability. Particular groups such as immigrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), discriminated groups, gangs or street kids may be targeted, tortured and murdered in state-sponsored campaigns to “clean up” violent neighborhoods^{vi} further undermining public confidence and the rule of law. Inadequate policies and laws or corrupt and incompetent implementation practices can mean that state weapons are used in criminal activity and that poorly-kept stockpiles located in the middle of residential areas can result in deadly accidents. The resulting loss of confidence in the state can lead households and communities to resort to informal security measures, including self-defense groups, vigilantism, or the recruitment of local gangs and armed groups for protection. Armed violence and the weakness of state security provision are therefore mutually reinforcing phenomena that lead to rights abuses.

In terms of development and economic and social rights, the impact of armed violence is deep and wide ranging. Most of the world’s current armed conflicts are occurring in the global South, and more than one-third of all countries caught-up in poverty have experienced armed conflicts since the late 1990s. The same patterns are true for criminal violence: many poorer countries and a large number of middle-income states are exposed to high rates of homicide, armed assault, and victimization associated with collective or criminal violence. A report for the Geneva Declaration states that “where armed violence reaches near epidemic levels, as in major cities in El Salvador, Honduras; Guatemala, South Africa, or Nigeria, it distorts livelihoods, sustains cycles of poverty, permeates a culture of violence, diverts spending to increased security, and often undermines local confidence in state institutions.”^{vii} The report also stated that the cost of armed violence in non-conflict countries is estimated at 163 billion USD annually, more than the total annual spending on development assistance.^{viii}

The cost of SALW misuse alone on health spending is staggering. In Burundi, a country with per capita government expenditure on health of \$5, each firearm injury costs the health system \$163. Even since the 2006 ceasefire, treating gunshot wounds accounts for 75 per cent of medical spending on violent injuries.^{ix} In El Salvador, 7% of the public hospital system’s budget is spent on treating gunshot wounds.^x For countries that have committed to providing free child health care and the right to health these costs represent a huge burden. Research conducted by Oxfam found that “every one of the Millennium Development Goals is undermined by armed violence and the systematic misuse of armed force. This is true both of direct effects such as deaths by armed violence, which can leave a family without income, and indirect effects, such as when schools are closed, health care overburdened, or access to food or markets prevented.”^{xi} The message from the research is clear: development and economic and social rights are undermined by armed violence.

To make matters worse, poor countries continue to spend scarce resources on arms deals that are frequently tainted by corruption, a lack of transparency and are of questionable value to the population. Approximately one fifth of developing world debt in 1994 was estimated as being linked to arms purchases^{xii} but this demand (and the willingness to extend credit) fuels a global weapons industry that produces around 7 million guns a year.^{xiii} The international production line of SALW, 75% of which are made in the USA and the European Union,^{xiv} itself represents a huge threat to human rights. A lack of joined-up and international regulation on SALW means that weapons easily end up in the hands of criminal gangs, non-state armed groups and oppressive regimes with few questions asked. Private arms traders are able to circumvent what little controls on weapons transfers do exist and frequently defy international embargoes aimed at stemming conflict or human rights abuses. An independent evaluation found that vast majority of UN embargoes imposed since 1990 were ineffective in stopping the flow of SALW and ammunition to embargoed targets and stopping the continuation or spread of conflicts and the undermining of legitimate governments^{xv}. Estimates of the black market trade in SALW range from US\$2-10 billion a year.^{xvi} Even when a sale is considered legitimate, weapons-producing governments may exploit loopholes, turn a blind eye or otherwise fail to ensure that their products are not put to unethical or illicit use. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was the first regional instrument of its kind to attempt to apply human rights criteria to arms sales. However, ten years on further work needs to be done to ensure that all member states respect the text and do not undermine each other by picking up deals that more conscientious governments have refused.^{xvii} Experience has shown that, in the arms industry, a willing seller will always find a willing buyer and vice versa. Efforts to curb SALW proliferation at international level are of primordial importance.

A number of current human rights instruments provide standards and some degree of protection against SALW availability and misuse. They include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.

In addition, specific political international instruments have been formulated to improve national legislation and controls and to facilitate increased international co-operation on Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction. The most significant to date are The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. However, the UN Programme has a number of alleged weaknesses, including that: a) it is not a legally binding instrument; b) it does not adequately reflect on the broader impact of SALW on development and human rights; c) it does not sufficiently propose gender-specific responses. The Geneva Declaration is a far more holistic process based upon the needs of vulnerable populations but is only at an early stage of implementation. The above-mentioned UN Programme has been complemented by The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition which requires states to implement measures of control on the firearms trade and to regulate activities of brokers.

To address gaps in current international instruments, an overwhelming majority of states voted in 2008 at UN General Assembly in favour of work to move forward on a legally-binding international instrument, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Only the United States and Zimbabwe abstained. This latter development was supported by a major international campaign: Control Arms Campaign, including development, human rights and humanitarian civil society organisations.

Regional instruments also exist such as the Nairobi Protocol.

However, in order for these international instruments to have any real effect on security on the ground, there is a need for more action to hold governments to account for their obligations and to ensure that rights-holders voices are heard. The Nairobi protocol is a good example of the continuing challenge of transforming laudable paper targets into real improvements in security on the ground. Eight years on from the signing of the original document most of the text has still to be put into practice and very few weapons have actually been collected.

In this policy, DCA recognises that Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction (hereafter referred to as AVR) must be addressed as a specific area of policy and programming in order to create a safe environment in which vulnerable and marginalised groups can realise their rights to physical security and development. This focus arises from recognition of the new and overlapping types of armed violence in the world, characterised by non-state armed groups, economic wars, prevailing “conflict” levels of violence in countries under reconstruction or at peace and uneven geographic distribution of security levels within countries. Various global crises (climate changes, financial and rising food prices) result in an increased competition for access to natural resources triggering or exacerbate conflicts and insecurity. This calls for innovative methods in working with e.g. political space, food security and HIV/AIDS in areas with a potential or unfolding conflict due to pressure on resources.

DCA's entry point for engaging in AVR will be to address the supply, demand and misuse of SALW at international, national and local level in direct and indirect interventions. DCA acknowledges that violence does occur where weapons are not present but that also recognises that it is more likely to be lethal, wider ranging and have even graver consequences if SALW are involved. For this reason, a great emphasis will be put upon the demand and diversion dimension in order to prevent SALW becoming a trigger for conflict.

AVR is a development and human rights issue and through AVR programming, DCA will aim to empower vulnerable populations to realise their rights to life, liberty and security of person. Although linked to peace and reconciliation interventions, these activities are not envisaged in areas undergoing conflict. DCA is able to promote AVR only in countries, regions or cities where rights holders can realistically expect the state to uphold its duty to providing public security and where its monopoly on the legitimate and non-abusive use of violence is both a desirable and feasible goal.

An overriding importance will be placed upon gaining an understanding of the context before designing, funding and implementing AVR measures. This will be achieved through empowering rights holders to take the central role in achieving their personal security.

1.2 Definitions

Armed Violence: This policy refers to the Geneva Declaration's description of: "the intentional use of illegitimate force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives against a person, group, community, or state, which undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development."^{xviii}

SALW: are defined by the UN as "all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability."^{xix} They include handguns, semi and automatic weapons, shoulder fired rockets and mortars and landmines.

SALW Control: refers to measures that address the supply, demand and misuse of illicit SALW.

DCA Added Value

Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction is a relatively new area of focus for the international community. While much good work has already been done on the supply side and publicising the impact of SALW there has been much less focus on addressing the demand and misuse dimensions at the local level and on integrating human rights and gender in responses. Efforts by civil society organisations are frequently piecemeal and stymied by a lack of access to technical expertise, resources and examples of best practice from other contexts. In this context, DCA possesses a number of comparative advantages that enable it to better assist and add value to partner initiatives on AVR:

- 1) A global outlook enabling DCA to support innovative AVR interventions, compile and share best practice with partners and act as a clearinghouse of expertise for interested rights-holders;
- 2) A rights-based approach enabling DCA to address the human rights and humanitarian law issues and the structural and institutional practices and weaknesses that allow armed violence to continue unchecked;
- 3) Technical expertise in weapons management and destruction enabling DCA to build capacity of security services and intervene directly where necessary;
- 4) Experience of direct advocacy and supporting regional advocacy networks;
- 5) Focus on participation of rights-holders in the design and the response that allows programmes to more effectively address the impact of armed violence on different groups according to the context.
- 6) Potential for creating linkages between armed violence reduction and other programme types (humanitarian relief, HIV/Aids, Food Security, Gender, Political Space)

2. Objectives

The **overall objective** of this programme is to enhance the fulfilment of the right to life, liberty and security for vulnerable and marginalised groups by addressing the specific threat posed by small arms and light weapons.

This objective will be achieved through

- Supporting local approaches to armed violence reduction led by rights-holders
- Enabling greater effectiveness of public security services to prevent and reduce armed violence in respect of human rights and humanitarian law
- Advocating for the creation of legally-binding international laws to control arms transfers and for the effective implementation of existing international instruments.
- Increasing capacity of partners through capturing and disseminating best practice
- Enhancing the capacity of state institutions to safely manage state-owned weapons and prevent their diversion into criminal violence

3. DCA Focus

3.1 Actors

Rights-Holders

Under this programme type, DanChurchAid primarily focuses on communities that are most vulnerable to the effects of armed violence. Communities may be urban or rural, but often share the same characteristics of political and social marginalisation, high levels of poverty, a lack of public services and infrastructure and ineffective and/or abusive public security providers. Attention is given to communities out of recognition that armed violence often affects the entire population of a given area and that a collective and holistic response offers the best approach to finding solutions.

Within vulnerable communities, DanChurchAid may focus further on groups or individuals whose rights are particularly threatened or affected by armed violence, whether because of ethnic, gender, social or economic status, or who may be at greater risk of participating in armed violence. This programme type opens the door to working directly with people, frequently young men, who are drawn into violent livelihoods that harm other rights-holders. Interventions will focus on the push and pull factors, social, cultural, political, legal and economic, that lead certain actors to take up weapons and undermine efforts at reducing Armed Violence.

Armed violence is highly gendered in both patterns of perpetration and victimisation^{xx}. Young men are overwhelmingly the most common victims and perpetrators of armed violence^{xxi} but women are arguably more vulnerable to its indirect consequences. Male-dominated armed groups may victimize women through psychological or sexual abuse, while girls may drop out of school or cease livelihood activities due to the fear of travelling through dangerous public spaces. The likelihood of lethal domestic violence is also raised in weapons-owning homes.^{xxii} It is however too simplistic to only see female rights-holders as potential victims. Women can perpetrate armed violence and human rights abuses and reinforce masculine stereotypes of weapons ownership and use. They can equally use their influence of male weapons-owners to fight against SALW proliferation and misuse.

Interventions exacerbate gender inequality if they are gender blind or gender stereotype. Framed in an equitable way, they may also help redefine gender relations, especially in a post-conflict or transitional situation. To ensure that AVR activities are responsive to gender concerns a good understanding must be acquired of gendered

power relations and the role of gender in local norms and practices. Programmes should pay attention to international norms such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which calls for greater involvement of women in disarmament amongst others.

Age is another factor that defines rights holders particularly affected by armed violence. In Guatemala, the most common cause of death for youth is by firearms^{xxiii} yet young people are frequently ignored by state decision makers when considering security interventions.^{xxiv} Interventions should therefore be based on practices relating to youth participation and aim to reinforce the positive influence that young people can have over their peers; frequently the most common victims and perpetrators of SALW abuse.

Duty bearers

At the international level, DCA focuses on SALW producing nations that participate in the global arms trade and have a responsibility for the end-use of their products. DCA targets weapons and weapons sales that contribute to rights-violations through advocating for legal controls and the improved implementation of current international instruments, most notably the Firearms Protocol, the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. DCA also recognises the moral responsibility that arms producing companies, their shareholders and hosting governments must take for the end-use of their products.

DCA's primary focus is on the state, its interior ministries and security services that have the primary legal responsibility for protecting the individual from armed violence and are generally considered to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. DCA will direct interventions towards states that are either unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibilities to provide public security or that use excessive force and abuse human rights under the moniker of security. DCA will base its engagement with state duty bearers on international standards and any existing national laws and frameworks that provide the space for increasing public security.

At sub-national level, DCA will emphasise the potential role of local government and policing structures in preventing and reducing localised armed violence and translating international and national laws and standards in concrete action. The emphasis on the sub-national is in response to the geographic specificity of armed violence, which is rarely spread evenly across a country. In practical terms, it is possible to engage local-level duty bearers to address armed violence even while other parts of the country are undergoing conflict (or peace). A sub-national focus also recognises that local government, through closer proximity to rights holders, may have a more progressive view of security than national-level duty bearers and so can advocate for AVR programming to be more responsive to the needs of the people they serve.

At community level this programme type can also focus on other relevant non-state actors and institutions, such as religious leaders, traditional leaders, youth and women's groups and the media that are strategically placed to play a constructive role as change agents but may, in some situations, be directly involved in armed violence. .

3.2 Focus Areas

3.2.1 Actions for Increased Accountability

Advocacy

Two types of advocacy are needed to combat the use of SALW in armed violence, vertical and horizontal. Interventions may enter at international, regional, national or local levels. Vertical advocacy is addressed to state and multilateral duty bearers to demand formal controls on the transfer, sale and use of SALW. Horizontal: addressed to civilian weapons owners whose possession or use of SALW threatens the rights of vulnerable populations.

Examples of existing frameworks and instruments

| Level | Examples of Normative or Programming Frameworks |
|---------------|--|
| International | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (particularly Articles II, VI, VII and IX), UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions Geneva Declaration, UN Programme of Action, Firearms Protocol, International Tracing Instrument, UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1612, |
| Regional | The ECOWAS Protocol, The Nairobi Protocol and NEPAD |
| National | PRSP, UNDAF, CFA, National Development Strategies and National Laws on SALW Control |

Advocacy actions may be conducted by DCA or through its partners at the international, national and sub-national levels. Examples of actions may include:

- Campaigning for an international arms trade treaty that inter alia prevents transfer of arms that are likely to be used for committing human rights violations
- Advocating at the national level for binding national laws containing export criteria that prohibit transfer of SALW where these arms are likely to be used for committing human rights violations
- Supporting regional church networks to monitor the implementation of regional arms trade agreements and act as watchdogs
- Advocating for national laws governing weapons ownership and their use
- Behaviour change campaigns aimed at challenging masculinity norms linked to the use and misuse of weapons
- Increase implementation and enforcement of UNSCR 1325 as it relates to gender dimensions of AVR programming.

- Advocating for state or international interventions to bring development gains to neglected areas affected by armed violence

Capacity building of duty bearers

These actions are addressed to duty-bearers that are responsible for protecting rights holders from armed violence. In most cases, these duty bearers will be government structures and its security services but in others may refer to private security companies and international forces. Where the practices of the duty bearer demonstrate a disrespect of human rights or humanitarian law and a lack of safety or professionalism that may put the rights of vulnerable populations at risk, DCA undertakes to build their capacity in order to fulfil their technical responsibilities more effectively.

Examples of actions to build capacity of duty bearers could be:

- Training the police to collect, store and destroy SALW transparently and safely
- Training of law enforcement and private security forces on relevant principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law with regard to the use of SALW
- Dissemination of relevant technical standards (OSCE, SEESAC and BICC guidelines) to enable creation of national guidelines for SALW management and destruction
- Improving storage facilities and practices in Police armouries to reduce possibility of accidents or use of police weapons in human rights abuses
- Enabling security services to establish a national register of their own weapons
- Empowering national institutions to better address the rights and needs of women in disarmament processes and access their potential as positive change agents.

3.2.2 Actions for Political and Legal Empowerment

In many areas of the global south, state duty bearers demonstrate a lack of political will to protect the rights of vulnerable populations to life, liberty and security of person. The abdication of responsibility is mainly seen in the absence of effective police and justice systems but is itself linked to the neglect of other rights (e.g. food, education, development). A security vacuum is created in which armed violence flourishes. The lack of opportunity that leads rights holders to take up weapons in pursuit of livelihoods creates a vicious reciprocity between physical insecurity and underdevelopment, reinforced by other rights holders who have to arm themselves in self-protection. Even when state security services are physically present, their legitimacy and monopoly on violence can be put into question by corrupt or discriminatory practices and their effectiveness undermined by a lack of accountability towards the communities that they serve.

These actions aim to empower rights holders to approach and make clear to duty bearers how to be more accountable to them. They aim to build the critical consciousness and confidence of communities to engage state duty bearers in a constructive dialogue over how armed violence can be addressed and who should play what role. Priority will be given to enable rights-holders to analyse and bring forward the causes of armed violence, which may be more holistic and far-reaching than that of

security services, and an emphasis placed on locating their (non-violent) role in bringing about physical security. By engaging the state as partners in this process, vulnerable communities also acquire greater power to monitor the behaviour of duty bearers and ensure that other rights are not abused in the struggle for better security. Power imbalances will therefore need to be addressed, either explicitly or covertly, and overcome deep-seated mistrust between community and security services. The analysis of power relations will also take account of gender and age roles in the community and the input of women and youth in community empowerment processes. Special emphasis will therefore be given to privileging equal participation and advocating for political recognition of gendered and age dimensions of armed violence.

Examples of political and legal actions may include:

- Empowering rights holders to develop and implement safer community plans with police and local government
- Creating formal measures for greater police transparency and accountability to vulnerable communities
- Conducting and publicising action research on armed violence, paying particular attention to gender and human rights abuses
- Supporting communities to establish weapons-free zones
- Enabling marginalised youth take up non-violent livelihoods
- Assisting men and women from vulnerable groups to provide input on security aspects of urban planning with special emphasis on gender and age dimensions of Armed violence
- Training of communities on human rights law or national frameworks relevant to SALW control and use.
- Renovate contested public spaces to make them safer and accessible
- Measures to combat “pull” factors leading young people to join organised criminal gangs
- Strengthening organisation and networking at local, national and international levels to advocate for SALW controls and share best practice of AVR programming

3.2.3 Actions for Security and Protection

In some situations, DCA may need to intervene either directly or through partners to protect vulnerable populations from the threat of armed violence in two ways. The first type of intervention will utilise the technical knowledge of the Humanitarian Mine Action department to remove the immediate danger posed by the weapons themselves. Interventions will be implemented by DCA where the capacity building of state duty bearers is unfeasible or where the safe management of SALW is a humanitarian priority. As a “neutral” third party, DCA is able to intervene more effectively than state security forces in contexts where civilian SALW possession is politically or culturally sensitive. The second type of protection is aimed at survivors of armed violence through legal, psychosocial or other economic support. These activities will be implemented through partners.

Actions may include:

- Destroying SALW collected in a disarmament campaign;
- Improving security and safety at state weapons storage facilities;
- Operate roving EOD teams that rights-holders can call upon to collect their unwanted weapons without fear of legal or social consequences;
- Conducting technical surveys to assess the risk that management of SALW by state institutions poses to rights-holders.
- Providing legal aid to individuals/communities whose human rights have been abused due to the misuse of SALW by the security forces or other private actors
- Psychosocial counselling to survivors of armed violence

4. DCA's work with Partners

DCA works in partnerships and alliances with civil society from community to international levels, ensuring as much as possible strategic and operational coordination, alignment and harmonisation among the various actors involved. To enhance State capacity for armed violence partners may also include state ministries or security services insofar as the relationship does not obstruct the organisation's primary responsibility to rights-holders.

While DCA's first preference is to support local structures, the particular mix of technical, political and cultural dimensions to this programme type mean that a flexible approach to intervention should be considered, ranging from direct implementation to fully working through partners. The precise formulation of DCA's approach will depend upon the nature of the armed violence problem in each setting and will be further outlined in operational guidelines. However, as a rule of thumb, interventions concerning the management of SALW will require greater input from DCA technical staff to ensure compliance with international safety standards.

The types of contribution DCA may make to add value to partners' work include:

- Providing technical assistance to partners in project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation with specific sector competencies in public awareness, tailoring development initiatives to reduce armed violence, safer management and destruction of SALW, community policing, weapons collection campaigns and other;
- Co-implementing projects, where relevant;
- Facilitating methodological and capacity development support to partners as required;
- Promoting South-South cooperation on mobilization, legal enforcement and advocacy strategies;
- Linking national advocacy agenda to relevant international and supranational institutions and bodies where these can have an impact and influence on the national or local level;
- Linking up to humanitarian assistance or longer term development activities

To keep to its rights based commitment, DCA will also work towards ensuring that partners are involved and influence DCA programme development. In the longer term, an accountability mechanism shall be developed to involve both partners and rights

holders themselves in the planning, monitoring and assessment of humanitarian assistance projects.

5. Conclusion

The present policy represents DCA's current overall organisational understanding of the issue and outlines the corresponding strategic decisions taken by DCA. Various tools and guidelines to make operational the policy already exist and/or will be developed. Further information can be found in the DCA Intranet (Programme & Project Manual) or by contacting the Programme Development Unit.

Although it is not the intention to revise this policy on an ongoing basis, it is certainly also not carved in stone. As experience develops, new insights are gained, and the world changes around us, there will be a need to also further develop DCA's policies, strategies and related tools. Thus, from time to time they should be the subject of discussion both with partners and between staff at different levels. Please feel free to contact the Programme Development Unit with any pertinent ideas, needs, experiences or points of view you feel might enrich DCA's policy and practice in attempting to support the poor and excluded in having their rights fulfilled.

NOTES

ⁱ *Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction: A Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals*, Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2006), p.14

ⁱⁱ *Human Security For An Urban Century: Local Challenges- Global Perspectives*, humansecurity-cities.org (2001), p.37

ⁱⁱⁱ *Freedom from Fear in Urban Spaces*, Human Security Research and Outreach Program, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p. 17

^{iv} *The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development*, University of Bradford (2005A), p. 24

^v Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2006) p.2

^{vi} Humansecurity-cities.org, (2001) p.17

^{vii} Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2006), p.27

^{viii} *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, (2008)

^{ix} *Shooting Down the MDGs*, Oxfam (2008), p.2

^x *Gun Violence and Poverty*, International Action Network on Small Arms: IANSA (2006)

^{xi} Oxfam (2008), p.10

^{xii} Ibid.

^{xiii} *Small Arms are Weapons of Mass Destruction*, IANSA, accessed at <http://www.iansa.org/media/wmd.htm>

^{xiv} Ibid.

^{xv} *United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact On Arms Flows And Target Behaviour*, SIPRI (2007)

^{xvi} IANSA

^{xvii} *Good conduct? Ten years of the EU code of conduct on small arms*, Saferworld (2008)

^{xviii} Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2006), p.10

^{xix} See for example SEESAC "RDMS/G 02.10"

^{xx} Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2006), p.9

^{xxi} Source Viva Rio

^{xxii} IANSA

^{xxiii} Human Security Research and Outreach Programme, (2006). p.17

^{xxiv} *Young people's views on how to tackle gang violence in post- conflict Guatemala*, Winton, Ailsa, in Environment and Urbanization (2004)