Finding entry points: The Final Evaluation of “Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya”

~ CONFIDENTIAL ~

Evaluation

Final Report

June 2014

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1 Executive summary, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1.1 Executive Summary

Background and Introduction
Amidst the wave of uprisings in MENA during the "Arabic Spring," the 42-year rule of Gaddafi ended, pushing Libya into a new stage of its history. Despite the very weak institutional, political and social environment left behind by the Gaddafi era, some political progress is taking place and some structures are emerging. The signs of progress are hampered by an adverse security environment marked by a high rate of arms proliferation among citizens, the emergence of and struggle between armed groups, and the presence of land mines from WWII, and of ERW from the recent revolution. It is in this challenging context the DanChurchAid (DCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) initiated the 18-month programme under evaluation, Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya, with funding from the European Union.

The Evaluated Programme
The Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya was initiated by DCA-DRC on September 1, 2012. The programme’s overall objective is to support the conflict affected population by creating a safe and secure environment enabling the reconstruction of Libya. The programme aimed to achieve its overall objective through four different types of interventions: 1) Rehabilitate infrastructure through ERW removal, 2) Build the national mine clearance capacity, 3) Support small arms management and 4) Provide protection to vulnerable groups and minorities. DCA conducted work on ERW removal, small arms management and protection provision in Misrata and on capacity-building of a national mine clearance in Tripoli, while DRC conducted its work on ERW removal, mine action capacity-building and protection provision in Sabha.

Evaluation Approach
The evaluation utilized two analytical approaches: Utilization Focused Evaluation (UFE) and Result Based Management (RBM). The understanding of the criteria imbedded in the RBM (i.e., relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) follows the guidelines established by the OECD DAC. The data for the evaluation was collected through initial desk research and review of programme documents, followed by interviews at DCA’s and DRC’s headquarters, and interviews on location in Libya (in Tripoli and Misrata; staff from Sabha were interviewed in Tripoli).

Evaluation of the programme objectives
The Libyan social, political, and mine action context
The current context in Libya is shaped by the pre-revolution era and the conflict itself. The pre-revolution era shaped Libya’s weak political institutions, and left a legacy of land mines from WWII and the conflicts with Egypt and Chad. For its part, the revolutionary conflict left behind a high number of ERW as well as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). These weapons, coupled with a relatively open border allowing new imports of SALW, have jointly translated into quick proliferation of SALW among the general population.

Libya’s institutional setting for mine action is weakened by poor collaboration
Numerous actors are involved in Libya’s mine action: the state actors (e.g. the military and police), UN bodies (e.g. UNSMIL and UNMAS), local and international NGOs, and commercial mine clearance companies. The Libyan Mine Action Centre, LibMAC, created in 2011, is responsible for the coordination of all actors and related activities. The coordination by the LibMAC has been weak and the collaboration between mine action operators not systematic. These two factors have been obstacles to the work of both DCA and DRC.
**The overall programme and DCA-DRC's presence in Libya**

Overall, the programme objectives are highly relevant, as there is a need for the type of interventions that the programme aims to implement in Libya. The programme's effectiveness was hampered by the challenges encountered when trying to manoeuvre the Libyan political context. The consortium partners were unable to implement planned interventions according to schedule, which has meant that some outcomes have not been achieved. The programme efficiency was negatively affected by frequent personnel changes as well as a harsh environment for personnel recruitment. In terms of impact, the programme activities have potential, but at this stage it is difficult to know if impact is attainable due to both the short timeframe of the programme and the reduced ability to carry out all tasks as planned. Despite the various limitations that have challenged the programme's ability to attain the overall objectives, the programme has carried out a number of meaningful activities that are relevant to the Libyan context and that have the potential for positive impact.

**Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW**

The limited ERW capacity in Libya makes the project highly relevant; indeed the need far exceeds what can be achieved in a short-term programme as the one under evaluation here. In terms of effectiveness, the project was hampered by delays, however the project activities that have been carried out were individually effective interventions. The project efficiency was also negatively affected by the inability to conduct work due to lack of authorization by the Libyan government. Efficiency was further hampered by high staff turn-over and difficulties in attracting staff familiar with, and willing to work in, Libya. Overall, the project was not sufficiently adapted to the Libyan context prior to its start. This has meant that many lessons were learned during implementation. The overall delays have influenced the ability to secure positive outcomes. Related, it is not possible at this time to clearly evaluate what, if any, will be the long-term impact of the intervention as many currently unknown factors could influence this.

**Capacity building of the military and police**

Enhancing the national clearance capacity is a relevant activity, as the government is in need of support to be able to meet Libyan clearance demands. The effectiveness of the DCA activities was hampered by a lack of baseline material that could be easily adapted to the specific training needs in Libya and difficulties in attracting training participants. The project struggled to attain results in an efficient manner due to the general difficulties in working in the Libyan environment. It is too early to assess the impact of the intervention, as it remains to be seen if the capacity generated will be utilized. However, if the capacity is utilized, the potential for impact is substantial.

**Small arms management and armed violence reduction**

SALW and AVR intervention is relevant due to the high level of arms proliferation amongst the civilian population in the aftermath of the revolution. At this point in time, there are indications that the intervention has had positive effects, e.g. the population is voluntarily requesting trigger locks to secure their weapons.\(^1\) In terms of impact, anecdotal evidence suggests that project participants are beginning to accept the importance of AVR. Like other interventions, the efficiency of the AVR-SALW was weakened by constraints placed before DCA by the local authorities.

**Protection of vulnerable groups**

The protection of vulnerable groups consists of two projects: a DCA Misrata-based project that focuses on providing psychosocial support to students in primary schools and high schools, and a DRC project in Sabha aimed to provide social protection to minorities.

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\(^1\) The provision of trigger locks was terminated when it became clear that the intervention was not in line with EU regulations. The trigger locks were subsequently taken out of the project.
Despite having a relatively limited scope, the carried out DCA PSS interventions were relevant for the partner schools. Overall, the PSS outcome matched its objective to provide psychosocial support to students, and the work was thereby effective. The high level of efficiency of the efforts was in large part due to well-functioning collaboration with the local authorities, such as the Ministry of Education. However, the potential for the project to generate long-term impact is relatively limited as the project design only allowed for superficial interaction with the individual students. In terms of the DRC social protection project, the work changed its focus during the implementation period. Initially, the work was focused on increasing the social protection of minority groups, by e.g. providing legal support and better access to health and education services. As minority groups are in need of support in Libya this was a relevant aim, but due to the sensitivity of the issue of minority groups’ rights in Libya, the project struggled to gain authorization to work from the local authorities. Due to the implementation constraints of the initial focus to conduct direct protection monitoring of the minority groups, the focus of the social protection work was shifted to the protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) one year into the project. This work is not as relevant as the focus on minorities, as IDPs receive a general level of support from the Libyan government. The work with IDPs also suffered from implementation constraints, and as such the programme outputs were less than those anticipated.

1.2 Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Lesson learned: Having relevant aims is insufficient to ensure good outcomes and impact. Aims must be both relevant and need to be coupled by an operational approach that fits the local context.

Recommendation: For future programmes, allocate sufficient time to develop a thorough programme design. Do not rush programme inception, but allow time to create a design that reflects the organizations’ knowledge of the context and context needs. The programme development and design should also inform the recruitment strategy for the programme staff.

Lesson learned: Unforeseen contextual changes can hamper programme effectiveness and applicability.

Recommendation: In addition to ensuring that the project design is built on well-founded, realistic assumptions about the contextual challenges, the programme design should also have a built-in mechanism that allows it to respond to changing needs and a changing environment. While it would be expected that the programme is adequate at the start it may be that things change during implementation, particularly if the programme spans multiple years.

Lesson learned: A short timeframe for the project, combined with broad objectives, truncates programme effectiveness.

Recommendation: Align project objectives with project timeframe. As the timeframe is often donor-set, it is important that donors are cognizant that change requires long-term interventions.

Lesson learned: Programme efficiency in Libya hinges on well-functioning collaboration with local authorities. Such collaboration requires staffs that understand the local contents. Significant program resources have been spent on gaining authorization to work, rather than implementing the program.
Recommendation: In recruitment of international staff increase focus on skills-sets (e.g., management and local knowledge) adequate for enabling collaboration with national authorities in addition to technical skills.

Lesson learned: Frequent personnel turnover limits continuity and the ability to build rapport with the local counterparts - obstructing programme efficiency.

Recommendation: Develop strategies to keep personnel changes to a minimum: continue the initiated review of international staff’s pay package and R&R policies; explore opportunities to have staff on roster with a retainer system and explore opportunities to utilize more local staff that are less prone to turnover. Be especially attentive to the succession plans of key staff in the program. Allow long term (1-3 months) overlap periods to ensure that lessons and experiences are passed on.

More activities over a sustained period of time are needed in order for the programme to achieve long-term impact.

Recommendation: Within the Libyan context a focus on building institutional capacity locally rather than conducting activities directly (in-house technical operational competence) are more suited for ensuring long term sustainability.
2 Background and Introduction

Starting in December 2010, a wave of uprisings swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In the wake of the uprisings some countries, such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, experienced fundamental changes to both the regime and society. On February 17, 2011 Libyans took to the street in a revolt against the Gaddafi regime that had ruled Libya since 1969. Following months of violent battles and NATO bombings, the Gaddafi regime fell and Libya entered a new stage in its history.

Since the revolution some positive developments of Libya’s political and social situation has taken place: elections have been successfully held, political parties have been established, CSOs have emerged, and independent media is gradually gaining a foothold. These developments have, however, taken place in a highly fragile security situation. The Libyan security situation is unstable due to the formation of armed groups during the revolution and the high level of arms proliferation among ordinary citizens, and it is further hampered by the presence of land mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The presence of land mines and ERW in Libya is a legacy from the recent revolution, from the three-day-war with Egypt in the 1970’s, the conflict with Chad in the 1980’s, and from World War II. During the revolution and throughout 2011, the heavy fighting between the pro-Gaddafi and revolutionary forces left the country exposed to ERWs including unexploded ordnance (UXO) and storages of arms and munitions, especially in the areas of Misrata, Brega, Khusha, and the Nafusa Mountains. Together with the landmines laid during the war with Egypt and WWII, the mine situation in Libya plays a significant role in the current adverse security situation. Concerning the high arms proliferation among ordinary citizens, this is an issue introduced in Libyan by the revolution. The fighting during the revolution enabled the proliferation of small arms among the wider population. During the Gaddafi regime holding weapon was illegal, but during the war that ultimately deposed him the anti-Gaddafi population secured weapons to fight pro-Gaddafi soldiers and also to protect themselves given an increasingly precarious security situation. Many of these weapons now remain in civilian hands.

It is in this challenging context the DanChurchAid (DCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) initiated the 18-month programme under evaluation, Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya, with funding from the European Union. This report presents the findings from the final evaluation of the programme. The report utilizes the OECD-DAC’s evaluation criteria of project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

The evaluation report is structured in the following way:

- Brief summary of the evaluated program, including its sub-objectives.
- The analytical framework of the evaluation and the evaluation criteria.
- An account of the Libyan social, political, and mine action-related context.
- The programme evaluation:
  - The Libyan context
  - Overall programme evaluation
  - Sub-objective 1: Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW clearance
  - Sub-objective 2: Capacity building of national authorities
  - Sub-objective 3: Prevention and reduction of armed violence
  - Sub-objective 4: Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities
- Evaluation conclusions
- Lessons learned
- Annexes

2 (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013)
3 Due to security concerns and delays in getting permission to operate, a no-cost extension was granted by the European Union, taking the project duration to 2 years and the end date to 31 August 2014.
4 The OECD DAC’s criteria are specifically developed for evaluating development assistance, and are use in line with DCA-DRC’s evaluation frame.
3 The Programme Under Evaluation

On September 1st 2012, the DanChurchAid (DCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) initiated the Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya, with a total budget of 5 million Euros. The programme had the overall objective of supporting the conflict affected population by creating a safe and secure environment for the reconstruction of Libya.

The aim and objectives of the programme are specified in a number of DCA-DRC documents: the initial proposal to the European Commission in 2011, the first amendment finalized in April 2013, the second amendment (the addendum) finalized in January 2014, and interim report of the programme which was provided to the EU Commission by DCA/DRC in December 2013. During the implementation of the programme, the objectives have changed and been adapted to the reality of working in the Libyan context. The most notable alterations to initial proposal were: the no-cost extension which allow the programme to continue for 24 months instead of 18, the reduced focus on on-the-ground ERW removal, the increased focus on national capacity building and training provision to national mine action actors, the change of location for the mine action component from Misrata to Tripoli, and the shift in focus from minority groups to Internally Displaced Persons for the protection component in Sabha.

More specifically, the programme pursued the following four key objectives:

- **Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW.** Security is enhanced among the general population through the physical removal of ERW. The local and national infrastructure is rehabilitated and socio-economic growth facilitated through clearance of urban and rural areas.

- **National mine clearance strategy.** The Libyan mine action authorities have established a strategy for mine action, and implement national standards and a quality management system. Existing national clearance capacity is enhanced through training and mentoring, operational procedures are standardized facilitating national ownership of quality management, and training processes are developed.

- **Small arms management.** The number of accidents related to, and the visual presence of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) is reduced. There is increased awareness of risks related to SALW and ERW among civilian population, bringing about a reduction in armed violence. The local authorities implement weapons management.

- **Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities.** Protection of vulnerable groups is increased through: a needs assessment of populations; improved access to education and basic health care with improved quality and capacity of local schools and clinics; acquisition of personal documents; repairs of dangerous houses; psychosocial support to children and knowledge/skills transfer to their teachers; increased capacity of local NGOs/CBOs and other stakeholders and duty bearers on protection needs and responses.
Table 2: DCA programme objectives/methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Objective</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Implementing agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW</strong></td>
<td>• ERW removal</td>
<td>• On ground EOD activities</td>
<td>• Misrata/Tripoli</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Capacity-build local ERW removal efforts</td>
<td>• Provision of trainings on mine action and EOD to local agencies</td>
<td>• Misrata/Tripoli</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Provision of Mine Risk Education</td>
<td>• MRE provision to local agencies, including provision of MRE toolkits</td>
<td>• Misrata</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National mine clearance strategy</strong></td>
<td>• Support the establishment of a national mine action strategy</td>
<td>• Support Libyan mine action authorities to establish mine action strategy with national standards and a quality management system</td>
<td>• Tripoli</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhance existing national mine clearance capacity</td>
<td>• NSA capacity building</td>
<td>• Sabha</td>
<td>• DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Small arms management</strong></td>
<td>• Increased risk awareness of SALW and ERW</td>
<td>• Risk Education through public information campaigns and school programs promoting armed violence reduction</td>
<td>• Misrata</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduction of armed violence</td>
<td>• AVR programs to reduce the use of weapons</td>
<td>• Misrata</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities</strong></td>
<td>• Social protection provision for minorities and migrants</td>
<td>• Improved access to education and basic health care, and help with acquisition of personal documents • Increased capacity of local NGOs on protection and needs responses • Needs assessment of minority populations</td>
<td>• Sabha</td>
<td>• DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Psycho-social support provision to children</td>
<td>• Psycho-social support in schools • Knowledge and skills transfers to teachers, parents and students regarding psychosocial support</td>
<td>• Misrata</td>
<td>• DCA</td>
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4 Evaluation Approach

In order to carry out a systematic and exhaustive evaluation of the programme, the evaluation has been guided by an analytically developed evaluation approach. The approach has relied on two frameworks: the Utilization Focused Evaluation (UFE)\(^5\) frame and the Result Based Management (RBM) framework.

**Utilization Focused Evaluation Approach and Result Based Management**

Utilization Focused Evaluation (UFE) is an approach to evaluation that begins from the premise that evaluations gain their value by virtue of how they will be and are used, meaning that the evaluation process is only relevant if the end user finds the end product useful. To fulfil this aspect, the end user should be considered throughout the course of the evaluation, which the current evaluation has done by continuously having an open discussion with the DCA-DRC management, at the headquarters and in the field, prior to and during the field visit. In addition to the UFE approach, the evaluation approach has been informed by the Result Based Management (RBM) framework. RBM proposes a systematic examination of projects from their initial conceptualization to the final impact, where the needs, objectives, inputs, activities, and outcomes of the programme are considered. Using RBM is as such a tool to establish a common understanding of both the goals of this evaluation and what the findings will reflect.

**Evaluation Criteria**

To ensure that the evaluation criteria meet the needs of the DCA/DRC, the RBM framework has been further informed by considering the OECD DAC’s evaluation criteria, which have been specifically developed for evaluating development assistance:

- *Relevance*
- *Effectiveness*
- *Efficiency*
- *Impact*
- *Sustainability*.

**Table 3: Evaluation Criteria**

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<th>Overall objective</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Key Questions</th>
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| Measure the achievements of the DCA/DRC programme on security, protection and stabilization in Libya and give recommendations for future project development and improvement in risk education, armed violence reduction, protection and psychosocial support. | Relevance  | - Has the DCA/DRC secured the relevant capacity to carry out the project activity?  
- Is the activity relevant in relation to the needs and priorities of the intended beneficiaries in the local context? |
|                                                                                  | Effectiveness | - What are the outcomes of the outputs that the project has generated?  
- Did the DCA/DRC activity achieve the planned outcomes? |
|                                                                                  | Efficiency   | - Did DCA/DRC use the financial resources in an efficient way?  
- Did DCA/DRC use the provided timeline in an efficient way?  
- Could the same results have been achieved with fewer resources? |
|                                                                                  | Impact       | - What long term impacts, such as shifts in behaviors, has the project generated?  
- Did DCA/DRC conduct a baseline study to which the impact can be measured? |
|                                                                                  | Sustainability | - Will the benefits that the project generated for the target population continue after project termination?  
- Is local ownership established? |

Data collection
The data collection consisted of two parts: the initial data collection prior to the field visits, and the data collection in the field. The initial data collection included review of the programme documents, literature review of the Libyan context and initial key interviews in Denmark with the DCA/DRC HQs, in line with the UFE framework. The main data of the evaluation was collected during the field visit to project sites in Tripoli and Misrata. Here, key informants for the programme were interviewed. Representatives from the Sabha projects were interviewed in Tripoli. In addition to the interviews, data in the form of relevant reports and field documents were also collected during the field visits.
5 Evaluation of programme objectives
This section of the report provides the main findings of the evaluation. First, contextual information of the current Libyan context and the current institutional setting is provided. This is followed by an overall assessment of the DCA-DRC programme as a whole, and then by the evaluations of each of the four programme objectives.

5.1 The Libyan Social, Political, and Mine Action Context

Libya's historical and current political context include a country marked by pre-revolution land mines, ERWs inherited from the revolution and a current high rate of arms proliferation

The current political context in Libya is largely shaped by the 42-year long rule under Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi, which left the country with a general lack of actionable institutions. Following the military coup in which he gained power in 1969, Gaddafi suspended the parliament and the constitution, and imposed a law banning the establishment of political parties as well as civil society organizations (CSO). This ruling was made infamous by the quote from the Green Book “man thazb khan” (he who joins or forms a party is a traitor). The crime of establishing a CSO or a political party was considered so grave it was punishable by death. This, in turn, resulted in the extreme and long-lasting suppression of all political opposition and the complete absence of public involvement in political and social life. The law further prohibited the activities of all political opposition groups and restricted rights such as the freedom of speech. The complete ban of political activity in Libya during the 40-year Gaddafi regime resulted in a population with very limited experience of political and popular institutions. This left behind a Libya of weak institutions with little practice in good public decision making. The Gaddafi era's legacy of political actors unused to making decisions perpetuates the problem of weak institutions.

In terms of the mine action context of Libya today, this has also been affected by the pre-revolution era – primarily through the legacy of the land mines placed during WWII and the conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980 - 1987, which resulted in mines being laid along these borders. Even seventy years after the WWII land mines were laid, there are still knowledge gaps concerning their placement. As late as 2009, seven cluster munition remnants were discovered by a commercial oil company's survey team. As such, the legacy of land mines prior to the revolution form a part of the current mine context in Libya. In terms of the political institutions in charge of mine clearance prior to the revolution, the Ministry of Defence and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, were tasked with the responsibility of mine action. Under the Gaddafi-regime, sporadic mine clearance was conducted, but in the political turmoil during the revolution these institutions lost most of their political power base. As such, the pre-revolution era left a context of mine contamination and weak political institutions.

The time after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 has further shaped the political and social context, as well as the landmine context. The fighting between revolutionaries and pro-Gaddafi groups left behind extensive ERWs, and the NATO bombing during the revolution contributed to the spread of munitions, and resulting spread of ERWs. In order to prevent the loss of munitions during the conflict, a large number of the munitions storages were accessed and emptied by Libyan forces before NATO bombed them. The munitions were moved to surrounding, often populated, areas. The presence of munition depots in populated area adds to the threats posed by ERW in Libya because of their high volatility and potential for depot explosion. In addition, the general population often loot UXO for items of value

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6 (POMED 2012)
7 (UNSMIL interviewee)
8 (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013)
9 (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013)
(i.e., metal). Overall, the knowledge on the location of ERW is limited, and the difficulties in accessing sensitive geographical areas due to the political turmoil restrict the opportunities for international operators to survey mine and ERW contamination. So far no large scale, systematic survey effort has been conducted in Libya by either the Libyan authorities or the UN system.

In addition to the issue of ERWs, the revolution era also contributed to the proliferation of SALW. During the revolution a number of armed groups formed to protect local areas and battle the regime. This, coupled with a high level of arms proliferation amongst civilians following the revolution as a response to low levels of security and increased availability of weapons, has led to a very insecure environment in most parts of the country.

In summary, the scope of the current ERW context in Libya consists of three aspects: the landmines left behind from the Gaddafi-era, the UXO from the heavy fighting during the revolution and the weakness of the political institutions to address the mine issues.

Libya's institutional structures are weak and the weakness is exacerbated by poor collaboration between key actors

During the Gaddafi-era Libya, the police, the military and the civil defence were responsible for carrying out mine action activities. NGOs and non-state actors played no role, since civil society organizations were outlawed during the time.\(^\text{10}\) According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, few mine action activities were carried out during the Gaddafi era.\(^\text{11}\)

In the post-revolution era, the institutional setting of Libyan mine action has been expanded considerably with the arrival of a number of new mine action players. As the ban on civil society organizations was lifted, a number of both local and international NGOs have taken up mine action work, and UN bodies have also become involved in the mine action efforts. In order to oversee ERW related activities, including mine action, the Libyan Mine Action Centre, LibMAC was established by the Libyan post-revolution government.

The idea to create LibMAC was born during the revolution. The LibMAC replaced the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team, J-MAC, which was a partnership institution between the UN and international non-governmental organizations.\(^\text{12}\) According to Colonel Mohammad Tjudman, the current Director of LibMAC, LibMAC’s responsibility is to supervise all mine action activities and preside over all landmine needs in Libya.\(^\text{13}\) This includes coordinating with the various actors, including the official state actors (mainly the Army Engineers), the international community representatives (e.g. UNSMIL and UNMAS) and the mine action NGOs. The agency has approx. 20 staff and was modelled on Lebanon’s Mine Action Centre, LMAC.\(^\text{14}\) While the aim of the LibMAC was to ease the coordination among the mine action actors, it does not appear to have achieved this aim thus far. The LibMAC has experienced some obstacles to having its authority recognized, which have limited its coordination ability. Furthermore, NGOs must attain LibMAC approval for all activities, which can take many months, thereby reducing the outputs of individual mine action actors.

The UN’s mine action in Libya is carried out through UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission to Libya), with the support of the UNMAS (United Nations Mine Action Service). UNMAS is the focal point the UN’s mine action worldwide and collaborates with 11 UN agencies in 33 locations towards a world free of landmines and unexploded ordnance.\(^\text{15}\) UNSMIL seeks to have a close collaboration with LibMAC, evident by the launch of their

\(^{10}\) POMED 2012

\(^{11}\) Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2013

\(^{12}\) United Nations Radio 2011

\(^{13}\) LibMAC interview

\(^{14}\) LibMAC was initially also abbreviated as LMAC, but later changed its abbreviation to LibMAC, to avoid confusion with the Lebanese counterpart.

\(^{15}\) (UNMAS 2014)
The joint '2014 Portfolio for Assistance in Humanitarian Mine Action and Arms and Ammunition Management.' The portfolio seeks to raise US$17 million for this year to support efforts to rid Libya of ERW.

In addition to the state actors and the UN bodies, local and international NGOs also form a part of the mine action landscape in Libya. NGOs involved in mine action in Libya include both international actors, such as the DCA-DRC, Mine Advisory Group (MAG), the Swiss Foundation for Mina Action (FSD), and Handicap International (HI), and local Libyan NGOs. Lastly, a number of commercial actors, such as MECHEM Deming Group, Blue Energy and Africa, are involved in mine action. Together, the state actors, the UN, NGOs and commercial actors make up the institutional setting in which the DCA and DRC's Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya has been implemented.

The changing political and security climate after the revolution
Since the end of the Libyan revolution on the 23 October 2011, the political climate has been complex and the security situation fragile. The political leadership has been weak, the formal security channels have not been able to ensure safety, and numerous armed groups and militias have been present in the country. This unstable political and security climate has been generally present throughout Libya's post-conflict history. However, the first part of Libya’s post-conflict history (October 2011 – August 2012) was relatively more secure and politically open compared to the following period (August 2012 – present). After the summer of 2012, the presence of armed groups has become more prominent, the security situation has deteriorated and the political space has tightened. Events that have caused these developments include the besieging of several ministries in the spring of 2013 to force the parliament to adopt a political isolation law, the occupation of Eastern oil facilities during the following summer, the short abduction of the Prime Minister in October 2013, and the disturbance of the elections for the Constitution Drafting Assembly in February 2014. The adverse political and security climate has made it difficult for many NGOs to operate in post-conflict Libya, particularly after 2012. Respected international NGOs, such as Medicine Sans Frontieres have been forced to close their activities from time to time, and other international agencies and UN agencies have struggled to remain active in the context.

The DCA-DRC programme was first implemented in August 2012, and has as such operated in a challenging political and security context.

5.2 The overall programme, DCA and DRC presence in Libya
Relevance: The programme objectives are highly relevant but the programme approach could have better and quicker at adapting in the Libyan context
The evaluation of the DCA-DRC programme showed that while the programme objectives are relevant, the approach for achieving the objectives has been less so. The four sub-objectives are all relevant in the sense that they address problems that needs to be solved: land mines/ERW do pose an obstacle to safety, the national mine action agency’s capability is low, the arms proliferation is high, and there are groups in Libya that are in need of protection services – corresponding to the programme objectives. The three first sub-objectives in particular, regarding mine clearance, increased mine capability and small arms, are perceived as relevant by the large majority of the interviewed stakeholders (see Annex 2 for a list of the respondents).

Prior to the current programme, DCA-DRC conducted work in Libya for a year. Through this experience, the consortium partners gained knowledge on the Libyan needs related to this programme, and this knowledge is reflected in a concept note that was produced at an early stage of the programme. The concept note was also carefully aligned together with the

\[\text{(UNS MIL 2014)}\]
\[\text{(Urban 2012)}\]
\[\text{Interviews: DCA AVR team, DCA PSS team, DCA Training and Development team.}\]
LibMAC. However, the knowledge and context-alignment of the concept note was not fully translated into the programme document, as the process of writing the programme document was rushed, in part due to donor demands. The programme document was written in only four days – a process that the DCA HQ at this point recognizes could have taken four weeks.

Some of the assumptions that were made in the programme design changed during implementation which may account for many of the implementation difficulties the program experienced:

- **The security situation:** The design assumes that the security context will be permissive enough to allow access to the areas that must be reached in order to implement programme activities. The change in context after the program document was submitted meant that this assumption did not hold and instead hampered implementation.

- **The capability of the national authorities:** The programme documentation is built on a number of assumptions related to the capability of Libyan authorities, particularly related to LibMAC. It is assumed that there will be continued efficient tasking and coordination by LibMAC and that Libyan politics will allow the growth, stabilization and management of the LibMAC to continue unhindered. This assumption also changed after the submission of the program document as the collaboration with Libyan authorities deteriorated due to political conflicts.

- **The social and political acceptance of sensitive work:** To some extent, the project documentation recognizes that some of the sensitive aspects of the programme work might not be political and socially accepted, e.g. the aspects related to AVR and protection monitoring of minorities. It recognizes that there is a risk that the Government may try to prevent the profiling from being undertaken, and that there is a social risk that topics may be perceived as too sensitive by minorities so that they do not want to take part.

**Effectiveness: The programme effectiveness was hampered by the obstacles placed by the local authorities to do project work, and by recruitment issues**

Overall, the programme was effective in the sense that it generated a number of outcomes per each objective. However, this programme effectiveness was hampered by two aspects: the difficulties for DCA-DRC to implement project work in the local context, and by some recruitment issues.

Across the programme objectives, DCA and DRC staff has highlighted that the programme effectiveness was limited by the obstacles placed by the local authorities to do project work. The issue was further exaggerated by the fact that these obstacles were not recognized in the initial programme document, leaving the programme staff underprepared for how to implement work in Libya. Part of the reason why the challenges of the political climate are not specified in the documentation – in addition to the rush it was written in described above – is that the programme document was drafted in 2011, at a time when the political climate was not as adverse as it came to be during the time the programme was implemented. At the time of implementation, the design did therefore no longer fit the context. This contributed to reduced programme effectiveness, as the programme was not prepared to manoeuvre in this challenging political climate.

Regarding recruitment and personnel aspects, DCA-DRC have generally struggled to attract and retain qualified staff. In some instances there have been delays in hiring key staff, whereas in other cases the programme has experienced problems with the staff hired. Continuity in staff is important to keep the work focused and effective, to build rapport with the local community, and to ensure a certain level of institutional memory. The delays in filling key positions and the instances of personnel change have limited the opportunities for this, and thereby for programme effectiveness.
Efficiency: The programme efficiency was limited by the adverse security situation and delays in programme implementation

The efficiency of the programme has been affected by both external and internal reasons.

Externally, the adverse security situation in Libya has obstructed the efficient implementation of both DCA and DRC work. The security situation has hindered some elements of the DCA mine action work, and the DRC’s work in Sabha has from time to time been suspended due to security threats. As described above, the Libyan security situation is adversely affected by a number of armed groups and militias, high arms proliferation, weak formal security channels and reoccurring clashes between various actors in society. During the implementation period there have been times of intense fighting, which has obstructed the opportunities to conduct work. The security situation has been particularly adverse in Sabha, were the DRC at points have worked in a near war-like situation. The security situation has also affected DCA’s work in Misrata, and to a lesser extent the work in Tripoli. The lack of security has limited the efficiency of the programme.

Internally, the programme efficiency was limited by a number of delays in programme implementation, across the four objectives. The implementation delays of the project activities mainly arose from the long time that needed to be spent on preparing and setting up project work. The consequences of the implementation delays were to some extent mitigated by the no-cost extension, which extended the programme from 18 to 24 months. This addendum, submitted by DCA-DRC, was an effort to mitigate the limited programme efficiency by proving the programme respite to re-align to the changing environment. The addendum was successful in improving the efficiency, as it allowed the project to reap benefits from the extensive time spent on project preparations. Without the addendum, a number of the project interventions would have needed to be terminated just a few months after they became operational.

In addition to the operational delays, the programme also suffered from some delays in reporting. These reporting delays arose from the fact that the collaboration between the DCA and DRC from time to time was slow or held up, which in turn affected the reporting to the EU donor. The no-cost extension is one example of a reporting delay: the sign-off on the extension was delayed because the DCA-DRC consortium was delayed in reporting a comment in the interim report to the EU, a delay that was caused by a DRC delay to respond to DCA, which in turn was due to leave rotation and staff turnover within both DCA and DRC.

Impact: The potential for impact was limited by challenges to operate in the Libyan context and the short timeframe

To the extent that it is possible to evaluate the impact of the programme at this time – which can only be done by evaluating the potential that has been established for the programme to have an impact in the time to come – the overall programme impact is likely to be limited. The limited impact is tied to the inability to implement the programme components effectively and efficiently in the Libyan context, as has been delineated earlier. However, concerning the interventions that have been implemented, each of the four objectives has generated outcomes that have the potential to have positive impacts.

The programme timeframe of 18 months is a second limiting factor that has affected the overall potential for programme impact. The majority of the objectives require a much longer timeframe. This is recognized by the DCA and DRC HQs as well by the as project staff in the country. While the donor-set timeframe of 18 months limited the potential for impact, the

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19 These delays refer to reasons other than security reasons, as the delays caused by the adverse security situation should have been covered by the 6 month long no-cost addendum.

20 Interview: DCA Training Team
timeframe was known to DCA and DRC since the initial stage of the programme. The potential for impact would have benefited from an alignment of the programme aims and the programme timeframe – either by extending the timeframe or adjusting the objectives to fit the set timeframe.

**Sustainability:** The programme benefits have the potential to be sustainable and some efforts were taken to establish local ownership

The sustainability of DCA-DRC programme, or elements therein, includes two aspects: that there is a continuation of the programme benefits after the programme is terminated and that local ownership of the programme work is established.

Overall, the benefits generated by the programme are likely to be sustainable. In terms of the first objective, the direct clearance benefits generated by the programme will be sustained, in the case that there is no renewed fighting. The following three objectives – the national mine strategy, the AVR and MRE, and the protection-project, have their greatest potential for sustained benefits in terms of the trainings the projects have provided to local beneficiaries. Throughout the programme, trainings have been provided to representatives to various national and local authorities (Objective 2 and 3), and to teachers and parents (Objective 4).

In terms of establishing local ownership, it is recognized that this is an important feature of the programme, and some efforts have been made to establish local ownership. This has been done through collaborating with a local NGO 3F (Free Fields Foundation), and efforts to build the capability of institutions.  

**Stakeholder collaboration: DCA, DRC and the EU**

The *Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya* was implemented by the DCA-DRC consortium, with funding from the EU. Throughout the implementation process, some collaboration challenges between the three programme stakeholders emerged. These challenges have primarily concerned delays in receiving information. The EU has expressed that the DCA and DRC have been slow in submitting needed information. Similarly, DRC appears to have been slow in providing key information to DCA thereby contributing to the aforementioned delays. As described above, these information delays were apparent in the process of the no-cost extension. The extension process was initiated in May 2013 and finalized in January 2014. In addition to the reporting delays previously mentioned, part of the explanation for this is that what started out in May as small changes to the project later developed into significant changes that required a contract addendum – a development that came to delay the process.

The DCA-DRC consortium was not the result of voluntary collaboration, but rather donor-driven. Therefore there was no tradition for collaboration and hence no standard mechanism in place. This may have resulted in the slow collaboration between the two institutions. The intention of the donor-initiated consortium was to increase programme efficiency, but instead the efficiency was limited due to the slow collaboration within the consortium. As for the delays in delivering information from DCA to the EU, DCA aimed to hire a Programme Officer to handle the DCA-EU activities, but delays in recruitment, staff turnover and challenges experienced with the hired staff (lack of competence) negatively affected DCA’s ability to meet the demands.

Concerning the collaboration between the DCA HQ and the DRC HQ with their respective local offices in the field, some concern on the amount of support provided by the HQs arose during the evaluation. The EU delegate perceived that the local organizations needed to be (too) pro-active in getting response from the HQs, e.g. to get contracts signed. The delegate further highlighted the importance for the local staff to get the 'right' HQ support, in terms of both financial and operational support, and questioned whether this local staff had in fact

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21 Interview DDG
received this. However, overall the evaluation did not find that the local DCA-DRC staff perceived that there had been a lack of support from the HQs.

5.3 Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW

DCA and DRC have been involved in a series of initiatives under the EU funded programme. According to the programme document, the objective of the Rehabilitation and infrastructure through ERW component of the programme was to ensure that:

Security is enhanced among the general population through the physical removal of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The local and national infrastructure is rehabilitated and socio-economic growth facilitated through clearance of urban and rural areas.

Relevance: The limited ERW capacity in Libya makes the project highly relevant.

As was detailed in the previous section on the Libyan mine action context, the need for support with ERW challenges is undeniable. The country has both UXO littered throughout the battle fronts, which often included densely populated areas, as well as numerous unsecured weapon depots varying in size and location. Some of these are stored in areas that are close to, or even within densely populated urban locations. In addition, there are landmines which were not cleared during the Gaddafi era as well as new ones.

The national capacity to respond to the ERW threat is hampered by the following factors. First, there is limited in-country knowledge of how the majority of the ERW that are found in Libya can be safely disposed of. Some of the weaponry used during the revolutionary war (15th February – 23rd October 2011) is highly volatile and hence UXO clearance demands a skill set that is not yet available in country. Second, there is a limited institutional capacity to respond to the administrative and operational needs of a large ERW threat. This issue is further explored in the next section (see section 6.4) in relation to mine clearance.

The clear contamination with ERW coupled with a very limited national capacity to respond to the problem makes a programme very relevant in terms of the activities that were planned to be undertaken. Moreover, the general population does not have experience with ERW, making knowledge dissemination important and relevant. The project objective itself, however, is very broad and demands for an activity set that is far more extensive both in scope and time frame than what is delineated in the project document. Still, the activities noted in the project document could have a clear potential to contribute to the goal outlined.

Effectiveness: The project effectiveness was hampered by numerous challenges to operationalization of programme activities, but the activities that have been carried out were effective

The programme objective, as noted above was a very broad one, particularly given the very short time (initially 18 months, which was extended to 24 months) given to achieve it. Given this, measuring effectiveness (i.e., the relationship between objectives and outcomes) is premature. If we adapt the constraints of the definition to a more realistic objective of increasing security through the removal of ERW and make less claims to the socio-economic impact that could take a considerable time in materializing, one can say that the potential for effectiveness is very present.

The constraints to achieving effectiveness are not tied to lack of relevance of this programme objective, but rather to a myriad of challenges which have hampered the work undertaken. The principal challenge has been the inability to secure tasks from the LibMAC. In some cases, tasking has taken many months to attain, and once attained includes work that could take many years to complete. In the case of DCA, work was moved from Tripoli to Misrata because attaining tasks was easier in the latter. In the case of DRC, after getting tasked by LibMAC in April, it took eight months (December 2013) to receive a second set of
authorisations from the Army Engineer’s HQ in Tripoli. After receiving the second permission, local security conditions (i.e., armed conflict) truncated their ability to operate until February. Aside from attaining tasks, the work is also hampered by limited information regarding the type of contamination. Lastly, the ability to complete tasks is also limited by the lack of explosives with which to dispose off ordnance once it is found. The government authority is responsible for making explosives available for the destruction of ordnance found. However in some cases they are unable to provide the explosives or provide them at the time requested. It seems this is a logistical and organizational issue more than an availability issue, as it is claimed that the explosive is available in the country.

It is important to underscore that despite the aforementioned challenges some activities have taken place and these have generated outcomes that are in line with project activities.

**Efficiency: Efficiency was limited by challenges to gain access to operational work and turnover of project staff**

One of the principal challenges to meeting the demands of the proposed activities has been the ability to gain access to operational work. The Libyan governmental environment is complex and still lacks a solid foundation which has meant that gaining permission to carry out activities has been problematic, as was noted above. As it currently stands, all activities must be tasked by the LibMAC. The LibMAC is charged with securing approval from all local agencies that are concerned with any one given task. In this sense when an organization, such as DRC or DCA, gets tasked to carry out an activity this should be approved by both the national and relevant local authorities. However, in some cases this has not been so. Organizations have received tasks that were not approved locally and this required additional time. Some claim that NGOs are too passive in waiting for tasks, while the organizations themselves point out that even when they are not passive in the least the process is still very time-consuming. Related, respondents stressed that being able to know the people and the politics locally is a central asset to both DCA and DRC alike, but even then it is hard to get activities tasked. DRC, for example, has been given a total of 13 tasks. The process of approval of tasks, including both the national government and the relevant local authorities, took 9 months to arrange. Moreover, a review of the tasks indicates that they have been tasks with every single activity in the Sabha area and that jointly these activities could go on for many years. Moreover, the activities which are most pressing in terms of the threat they pose to human populations have not been authorised locally. Similarly DCA has found that working in Misrata has been far easier than in Tripoli in terms of gaining approval for tasks. These are just a couple of examples of the cumbersome and time consuming engagement required to get to a point where work can commence.

The experience in Libya shows that both consortia partners, DRC and DCA, have amply benefited from having staff on the ground that were familiar with the different personalities and both willing and able to manoeuvre the political landscape. Although the current DRC Operations Manager is new to DRC he has previous experience in Libya, having worked for another NGO locally before joining the DRC team. This has proved to be a solid asset to the DRC activities.

In addition to the broad challenges that can be attributed to the political environment in Libya today, other factors have negatively impacted the consortia partners’ ability to meet their programmatic obligations. First, the inability of both DRC and DCA to secure staff with the adequate competencies, or to recognize which competencies were required to ensure progress towards expected goals. DRC, which works in the Sabha area, a part of Libya where insecurity has been and remains a continual threat, has faced pervasive problems trying to recruit staff that was willing and able to work in the field. This has meant that there have been multiple operations managers with tenures lasting from a few weeks to a few months. The lack of continuity was a serious hindrance to ensuring progress in securing the approval
of tasks (see above). The retention of staff posed less of a challenge to DCA’s project work within the objective.

Concerning the recruitment of staff within the MRE component of the project, the component did not benefit from a Community Liaison and MRE Advisor until late in 2013. The late recruitment of the international MRE Advisor was due to a shift in focus: at the onset, the MRE component did not call for a MRE Advisor, but the MRE team was intended to be deployed with the clearance teams and managed by the Technical Advisors. In connection to the budget revision submitted in December 2013, the focus of the MRE project shifted from activities in support of the clearance teams, to stand alone MRE projects with immigrant workers, teachers, mosques and police outside the area of clearance operations. In connection to this budget revision, the recruitment of the MRE Advisor became possible and the MRE was deployed in January 2014. The shift in approach to MRE activities resulted from a realization that the areas the clearance teams were tasked to work in had been deserted by their inhabitants. In the case of MRE, once the advisor was recruited, the project works experienced delays caused by the lack of material to be used on the ground. The MRE Advisor chose to use her own training materials rather than using materials from the DCA toolkit or the materials previously used by the MRE Consultant hired earlier by DCA because she felt that the materials she was provided were not optimal. The material for the leaflet campaign was also adjusted: the existing leaflet material targeted children so additional leaflets targeting adults were developed for the settings where the previous leaflets were not appropriate. Since the shift in focus in December 2013 (from supporting clearance operations to working outside the area of clearance operations), the MRE activities have not been used as an integral part of the ERW activities, but rather as an additional and separate set of objectives. The following activities have been carried out since January 2014:

- One CLO recruited to join existing CLO. Two-week training completed with team.
- MRE Toolkit created and Mine & UXO recognition banners designed and printed.
- Adult leaflet designed and printed.
- MRE to 449 migrant workers / safety briefings to 150 migrant workers / MRE to 10 scrap dealers & their employees / MRE to 25 farm workers / safety briefings to 8 farm workers. Due to delays in gaining access to beneficiaries, migrant workers have been targeted as securing permissions is not required for this target group.
- HA reports: 22.
- At the time of the data collection for this evaluation, permission had recently been secured to conduct MRE sessions with the police in Misrata, so plans to conduct the activities were being finalized.
- Permission has also been granted for the training of teachers. Plans for delivery of training were conducted with an expected date of delivery in June.

Prior to these activities, the MRE Consultant carried out a number of activities in March-April 2013:

- Recruitment of 3 CLOs
- MRE training conducted for AVR, PSS and MRE national staff
- Development of MRE methodology
- Development of Child Friendly MRE material
- Development of KAPB survey format; of a system to store MRE data; pre- and post assessment formats
- Training of MRE staff to use IMAS compatible activity form
- Field training to the Clearance team (while the teams still deployed in Dafnya)

DRC’s MRE-related output includes:

- Provision of direct MRE lessons to 7325 beneficiaries.
- MRE Media campaign that reached 3,487 unique Facebook users.
- MRE Material distribution to 4,000 beneficiaries.
In terms of direct clearance accomplished so far by DCA and DRC, the following has been achieved during the programme:

- **DRC Clearance:**
  - A comprehensive General Mine Action Survey of Sabha
  - HA Reported: 15
  - HA Cleared: 13
  - Cleared m²: 3,600
  - ERW marked: 12
  - ERW removed: 437
  - SAA removed: 240

- **DCA Clearance:**
  - Cleared m² in Tripoli: 176,591. This includes specific requests for verification of land for construction of temporary mobile power plants to counter the shortage of electricity during summer 2013.
  - 30 UXOs including a 12,000lb Mark 84 NATO bomb.
  - 49,5 88mm projectiles (WWII) at the east end of the runway at Tripoli international airport.

Overall in relation to direct beneficiaries and access to infrastructure through clearance, the data provided by DCA and DRC suggest that their combined work benefited some **1,501 people** (landowners and users of a well that was cleared).

**Impact:** The project activity has not fulfilled its potential for impact as the project approach was not cognizant of the timeframe required to achieve expected outputs

The efforts in Libya have generally underachieved due to delays in the ability to carry out tasks, due to both challenges emerging from within the consortia partners (i.e., inability to recruit staff) and external challenges (i.e., political environment). Still despite these challenges the potential for impact is clear, although contingent on the ability to conduct tasks. Exploring the potential for impact, however, and the conditions on the ground suggest that the possibility to secure a positive outcome relative to investment requires a re-thinking of approaches. How DCA and DRC best respond to the needs in Libya appear to differ from models that have been successful elsewhere. Libya has a strong network of authorities that are responsible for authorising and overseeing the conduct of activities; the country also has an established institutional capacity that could take on ERW removal and safe storage activities if they counter with the adequate skill set (see sustainability). Overall, much remains to be accomplished still in terms of threat removal. Nonetheless, clearly the activities that have been conducted do have a direct impact on the population that inhabits or otherwise uses/accesses the contaminated areas. Thus far, as was noted above an estimated 1,501 persons have directly benefited from having access to their lands land or access to common infrastructural resources such as wells from activities carried out by DCA. Additionally some 790 people have been direct beneficiaries from activities carried out by DRC (land and homes) and an addition 50,000 from enabling access to the power plant. Benefit from ensuring the airport is safe, for example, and the support to clear depots is harder to quantify because the number of people that could be negatively affected is huge, but the direct users of the resource as such are somewhat limited.

**Sustainability:** The threat of re-contamination may affect the sustainability of project benefits, and the level of local ownership of MRE and the local knowledge to deal with ERW is limited

In terms of sustainability there are two issues that are worth considering. First, is the current model used by the consortia partners (i.e. conducting activities themselves) the most
well suited to the environment? Second, does Libya have the financial capacity to respond to the operational financial demands of the activities to be undertaken? As its stands, the sustainability of ERW removal carried out by DRC and DCA is sustainable in so far as renewed fighting does not materialise in the cleared areas in Sabha, Misrata and Tripoli. This is a factor worth considering since the political environment is very fragile at the time. Indeed, there was fighting in the Sabha region as late as early this year. Any fighting could contribute to the creation of new ERW-ridden dangerous areas. In terms of the sustainability of the MRE component, the shift in focus to target teachers and police officers offers the potential for sustainability. The focus on immigrant population does not offer a similar potential for sustainability as this group could be less consistent. However, the need for the intervention amongst this vulnerable group is highly relevant and pertinent, particularly since the likelihood of this population group securing support from the Libyan government directly is reduced. Given these factors, the current model for intervention can be examined and explored: first it may be more sustainable to invest more energy on training a local national capacity (see next section) than on the conduct of weapon removal. Similarly, in the field of MRE training, increase in the national capacity could be a solid and important asset. However, it may also be the case that MRE is required from an external actor in order to provide services to vulnerable groups such as illegal immigrants. In reference to funding, it is important to note that Libya does have the financial resources to maintain a national capacity that can respond to the needs of ERW; what it lacks is a trained capacity able to carry out the full range of activities.

In terms of availability of information, respondents spoke about an existing database that contains all the relevant information on the area contamination and activities in Libya. The data is, we were told, stored within an IMSMA system that is theoretically accessible to NGOs. The DCA and DRC have submitted data for the IMSMA database. Aside from providing data for inclusion in the database neither DCA nor DRC have been actively involved in the strengthening or use of a common database system generally or IMSMA in particular. Thus far the information from the database is not routinely shared with operating agencies. Indeed neither DCA nor DRC have had access, but ideally this will be the case once the political and institutional situation is more stable.

Overall, despite all the challenges faced and difficulties encountered, the consortia partners can be commended for securing some outputs which are clearly in line with their objectives. Mainly enabling affected population to access their lands and commercial areas (i.e., shops), ensure that the airport and surrounding safety areas are safe, permit access to an electrical power plant, without fearing landmines or UXOs. The efforts have also served to educate populations (MRE) that are at risk of landmines and UXO about the locations and threats of these type of device. Lastly the effort has, although tacitly, contributed to supporting and furthering the use and implementation of IMAS by ensuring that all activities carried out meet the IMAS standards and refusing to engage in activities which do not.

### 5.4 Capacity building of the military and the police

In the area of supporting the National mine clearance strategy/capacity building of national entity the programme document delineates the main goal as ensuring that:

*Existing national clearance capacity is enhanced through training and mentoring, operational procedures are standardised facilitating national ownership of quality management, and training processes are developed.*

**Relevance:** Enhancing the national clearance capacity is a relevant activity, as the government is in need of support to be able to meet Libyan clearance demand.
Like with the support in the field of ERW, here too there is a clear need to support the establishment of capacity to ensure that the Libyan government is able to comply with the clearance demands it now faces. First it is important to underscore that the landmine (and ERW) threat in Libya is not only a result of the most recent conflict, but also of WWII minefields, and of the three-day war with Egypt. In addition, there are minefields that are attributed to the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, the landmines that were there from earlier military activities have been under clearance for many years. These clearance efforts have been conducted by a combination of national governmental agencies and private companies contracted by extractive industry firms.

The main difference between Libyan government authorities (military and police) conducting these activities and humanitarian NGOs appears to be a regard for the safety of the deminer. However, this view appears to be changing, at least in rhetoric, following an increased awareness of relevant international standards.

Second, Libya has a national authority, currently known as LibMAC, which has been tasked with coordinating all landmine and ERW related activities. The LibMAC was originally conceived by the revolutionary forces during the recent revolution, but its establishment has not been without tumult. The power dynamics between institutions in Tripoli and institutions in Misrata has contributed to the continued power struggle within the LibMAC. UNMAS is by some seen to have stronger ties to the personalities in Misrata than Tripoli, which feeds into the power politics in both cities. At the time of the field visit, LibMAC was in the process of re-shuffling people and positions and hence it was impossible to ascertain its role, authority or composition with any level of clarity or exactitude.

The LibMAC receives support from UNMAS, though UNSMIL. The UNMAS support intends to ensure that progress moves along more swiftly, but thus far there is little evidence that the contribution to speeding up the process has been fruitful. The majority of support to LibMAC, both by UNMAS and other actors, appears to be on issues related directly to landmines and ERW, while most generic institutional administration aspects have been overlooked. The latter is an evident omission, which requires attention since in Libya there is a clear lack of knowledge at the administrative level. This can be partly attributed to an institutional culture that learned to conform to authoritarian rule and had little opportunity to effectively coordinate. Therefore much of the current issues relate to power struggles that are not related to mine action in particular, but which affect LibMACs ability to effectively coordinate activities.

Clearly technical support is also important. Assisting the Libyan counterparts to ensure a shift from a military (i.e., accepting of casualties) to a humanitarian approach to mine action is an important contribution. This includes both understanding, adaptation and adoption of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and utilisation of the newest technical approaches to mine action, including for example, the use of IMSMA as an information management tool. At the very least, direct technical training is needed to ensure that Libya has a skilled group of staff that is able to respond to the mine action threat (landmines and ERW), to provide adequate information to affected populations and can respond to the medical needs of potential accident victims (demining or ERW removal accidents). All of these needs make the programme very relevant to the needs on the ground.

**Effectiveness:** The effectiveness was hampered initially by the lack of Libya-specific training material and later by difficulties in attracting training participants, however at the end of the project cycle the program shows promise.

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22 It was previously JMAC and LMAC.
The effectiveness of the programme, understood as the relationship between inputs and outcome, has been hampered by the ability of the consortium partners to work. As delineated in relation to the work on ERW (result 1), being able to provide the assistance delineated in the programme document has been a challenge. In the case of technical capacity building the challenge has been two-fold. First, like with MRE, while the DCA headquarters provided a standard training curriculum for the EOD level 1 trainings, it was not implemented on the ground. From the perspective of the field staff, the DCA provided material that needed to be adapted to the Libyan environment, and therefore hired trainers to develop a training curriculum. As such, the first challenge to the technical capacity building was posed by not implementing the standard DCA training material in the field.

The second challenge to technical capacity building was that the training has been delayed due to a lack of requests or ability to access trainees. Here the government of Libya must be actively engaged in making requests for training. This requires that both the training be understood as relevant and valuable and that the organization be willing to allocate staff time to it. All this requires a close relationship between the organization providing training and the organization receiving training, again pointing to the importance of having a person on the ground that has the skill and knowledge to navigate the political theatre of the time. At this time both consortia partners possess this asset, but it cannot be expected that the current staff (managers) stay in Libya indefinitely. Given the importance of personal relationships and understanding the environment, the future success of interventions will rely heavily on an adequate and lengthy handover between staff in order to ensure the highest possible level of continuity.

DCA decided early on to not provide financial incentives for participation in training. This is viewed as a positive step as it underlines and places emphasis on the training content as the reward rather than encouraging participation through a financial gain for participants. Trainers noted that this approach has not always been welcomed by participants, but that in the long term led to a group of participants who was more committed and interested in the subject of the training itself. Despite the challenges encountered in getting access to participants and having them engage with the training in the absence of a financial reward, the trainings that have taken place appear to have proved successful. Anecdotally it was noted that as training progressed participants became more and more interested in the subjects discussed.

**Efficiency:** Due to implementation constraints, the programme staff was not able to use the time efficiently

During the implementation there have been extensive periods when the staff has had to sit idle - not by choice but because it had few choices to engage in order to progress towards their project goals. As noted in relation to MRE, being unable to meet targets and unable to make progress can be very demoralizing for staff and lead to employee fatigue, which ultimately can also have a negative impact on the quality of work provided. This is especially so because the Libyan environment is not an easy environment to work/live in given the socio-cultural and security constraints that regulate daily life.

Despite the challenges in being able to conduct trainings and the delays encountered, the following number of personnel was trained:

- 34 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- 88 Search
- 40 First Aid
- 56 Ammunition Storage Management
- 8 Manual Demining

**Impact:** While it is too early to assess long-term impact there are signs of progress
The degree of impact of the intervention cannot be assessed yet. While staff from both the military and civil defence has been trained (see earlier section) their current level of training does not enable them to adequately respond to the current threat. The trainings that have been provided have been useful and have enabled the participants to acquire needed skills, but the limited number of provided trainings limits the potential for the project to have long-term impact. More training is planned, which should enable the clearance and disposal of ERW and landmines found in the country – increasing the potential for positive impact. However, the degree to which this capacity will be utilised remains to be seen.

In terms of utilization of general standards such as IMAS, and promoting a shift towards a humanitarian mine action thinking, it appears that progress has been made. At least there is evidence that the rhetoric is shifting. Officials interviewed confirmed that they do consider the international standards applicable to the Libyan context. Local authorities interviewed in Sabha and Misrata agreed that international standards must be applied. However, the degree to which this materialises into a shift in how the different groups (i.e. Army and Civil Defence) conduct their activities still remains to be confirmed. The consortia partners have not been involved in advocating for the use of IMAS in particular as a special effort, however they have passively advocated for IMAS in so far as they apply it to their own tasks and activities and make this known to the authorities and in that their training apply IMAS also. The consortia partners have refused to be part of any effort that did not meet the IMAS standards.

**Sustainability: Working with national agencies has provided potential for sustainability**

In terms of sustainability, there are two central aspects that should be considered: First, the sustainability of the model of intervention (capacity building at the institutional level). Second, the risks to sustainability of the DRA and DRC programme itself and how this can hamper the ability of achieving sustainability of the intervention (i.e. first point).

First, in relation to sustainability of the model of intervention: it is important to stress that Libya has a military and a civil defence corps who are the agencies that would be charged with mine action and ERW activities, therefore providing training to these existing bodies is securing a long term national asset. This clear relevance and potential sustainability of the target actors should not preclude the opportunity of identifying other actors who can also support the mine action effort locally. National civil society, for example, is generally weak. However, it could be an asset to supporting training and interventions at the field level as it is potentially better placed to understand and manoeuvre the local political and cultural dynamics. Unlike in other countries, in Libya moving national staff from one region to another is no small feat. Indeed, in some cases staff cannot work in certain areas due to their ethnic heritage. In this sense being able to partner with a national civil society organization that both understands the sensitivities and is able to manoeuvre around them could be an asset. Engaging national civil society partners could also be an asset in relation to carrying out softer activities, such as MRE, which are not currently under the domain of either the military or civil defence and could be overlooked. Overall, the consortia have worked with multiple national agencies and it is too early to say if one is better than another in terms of output and impact (see impact above).

Second, in relation to the consortia partners themselves, as has been noted earlier, Libya, as other environments where mine action is needed, is not an easy environment to work in. This mean there is a potential, and in the case of Libya, plenty of actual, fast staff turnover. In Libya where relationships with key individuals and agencies in the government rely heavily on individuals, having staff continuity could be a central factor in determining the overall ability to generate a sustainable impact. Therefore, options to engage additional national partners, such as civil society, provide a more flexible approach to staffing that could be an asset to progress long term.
5.5 Small arms management/Armed Violence Reduction

According to the programme document, the goal of this component of the programme has been to:

*Provide for the “introduction of Risk Education (RE) and armed violence reduction (AVR) programmes focused on SALW and ERW.”*

Relevance: SALW and AVR intervention is relevant due to the high arms proliferation that has followed the revolution

Interventions in the field of SALW and AVR as well as general RE in relation to ERW are highly relevant to the Libyan context today. After four decades of an extremely oppressive regime where weapons were completely prohibited, Libyans were able to secure access to weapons through the revolutionary movement. Weapons that came into the country to be used by the revolution, as well as arms held by the Gaddafi regime, are now part of the public domain. An environment where the government authorities are yet to be properly established and are currently unable to provide adequate security to the general population, coupled with a sense of freedom which is symbolised by the ability to carry weapons and high levels of insecurity, has led to a highly armed society. Unlike other environments where there is a long history and culture of carrying weapons such as Yemen and the USA, in Libya this is a new phenomenon. How it will develop both culturally and governmentally remains to be seen. Libya does provide a unique opportunity, however, to explore options of how best to control weapons in an insecure environment. Under these circumstances, accessing children and young adults to educate them on the dangers of weapons, the alternatives that remain at their disposal to increase their security and the measures that can be taken to ensure that the weapons are more safely stored are relevant areas of engagement.

At the onset of the programme, a Knowledge Attitude Practice and Behaviour (KAPB) survey was conducted. The survey generated 411 responses from roughly 50% men and 50% women ranging from ages 18-50. The survey focused on different areas of Misrata and targeted public spaces in an effort to get a wider view of the problem and challenge faced. Although the survey was of a sample that is too small to enable the identification of trends within specific groups, the survey result does show that the society has been largely weaponised. Even if perceived as marginally better than during the previous years, still most people felt that the number of weapons made them feel less rather than more insecure. This specific finding opens up an opportunity to both discuss the issue and find alternatives.

Effectiveness: There are indications that the intervention has had positive effects

The ability to measure the outcome of the current intervention is very limited. The problem is new and hence knowing how to best tackle it in the Libyan context is a challenge. While the approaches used are ones that have been used elsewhere and shown results, Libya is in many ways a test case. How do children and youth react (i.e., modify their actions) as a result of the knowledge they gain? What is more alluring, a new weapon or the threat of injury and death? How has the conflict contributed to a culture that sees injury and death as permissible threats? All of these questions are open ones which require responses.

However, there are some positive indications. The population is voluntarily requesting trigger locks to secure their weapons; schools have voluntarily invited presentations on the subject. And following an initiative by a local NGO, a campaign inviting young people to adhere to an ethical code which includes not utilising weapons has had some early success, which shows that there is some degree of openness to defining weapons as a problematic area that requires attention. Still there is no presumption at this time that disarmament will be possible in the foreseeable future.
Efficiency: The programme was initially efficient, as it enjoyed the approval of the local authorities, but has there was a loss of efficiency when approval was revoked.

Like in other areas of intervention, the consortia partners have also encountered challenges here. Originally they were permitted to work with schools and had the approval of both the local council and the ministry of education. Although these activities are not planned and approved through the LibMAC, they do require institutional approval. This early authorisation enabled seminars on AVR and SALW to take place in schools, as well as enabling the exchange of guns for Lego. The project invited children to turn in their toy weapons in exchange for Lego boxes for all the children in the classroom. For the Lego project, DCA also used funds from the Lego charity, in addition to the EU-funded budget. The project appeared to be successful in having children turn in their weapons, however the degree to which the Lego was used at the schools thereafter varied. This project also led to a commemorative statue that holds all the weapons collected. The principal aim of the initiative was to raise awareness and initiate a dialogue. Sadly, however, the interventions at the schools have been discontinued due to the removal of authorisation by the local council in Misrata, where the project was being implemented. Upon this development DCA sought of new venues and pursued the conduct of seminars at local colleges where the decision is left to the individual school director rather than requiring ministerial and council approval.

At the time of the field visit, in the context of this evaluation, the main focus was, therefore, on young adults. This is the group, particularly the males, who are at most risk judging by the experiences in the AVR area in other countries. Since our visit, however, there has been an indication that the local authorities will again permit the programme to focus on children in schools. Based on interview data it appears that the Ministry of Culture in Misrata views the project favourably. The project is perceived to have helped its beneficiaries to move in the right track concerning AVR, and the MoC expressed that it is important that projects of this type are long-term. The representative did not provide the reason why the programme permit had been revoked, but the positive view could be indicative of renewed permission.

Thus far the following activities have been carried out (January –April 2014):

- **Lego activity**: Symbolic disarmament in 49 schools. 4,621 students were targeted and a total of 145 boxes of Lego distributed. The weapons collected led to the creation of a disarmament installation at the airport of Misrata. A total of 12 schools were visited thereafter to verify use of material.
- **Workshop with community members**: On Jan 26, the AVR team organised a workshop with 17 community members (4 women and 13 men – young adults and adults) to brainstorm ideas for a media campaign.
- **Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs and Practices (KABP) survey on SALW in Misrata**: A survey of the general population was conducted and relevant training of data collection staff conducted.
- **TV spot and Radio spot**: The spots have been developed and are ready for deployment (will be broadcast from May 1 to the end of August 2014).
- **Billboard**: A billboard was designed and created.
- **Material distributed**: 5,335 leaflets and 170 foam posters, 252 T-shirts, 40 caps.
- **Theatre presentations**: Plans for theatre presentations at the community level have been made.
- **Discussions/presentations in colleges**: Presentations were made in colleges targeting 458 students (254 males and 204 females).
- **Trigger locks**: 11 distribution events have been held. A maximum of 3 trigger locks are provided per person. A voluntary survey is being conducted in tandem.
Impact: Anecdotal evidence suggest that project participants are beginning to accept the importance of AVR
It is very early to be able to determine or assess the levels of social change in perception and attitudes that have resulted from the interventions. However, there appears to be a degree of acceptance amongst youth and young adults (the projects conducted at this time) that weapons are a threat to society in the long term or that AVR is sufficiently important. This is indicated by the participation in presentations and the discussions that emerge at these meetings. However, this data is very anecdotal.

At the time of the evaluation, the team was conducting a limited survey to identify main concepts/ideas of the population in relation to armed violence. However, the target population were people who seek trigger locks and, therefore, while interesting, there is a clear bias towards people who are already aware of the threats and willing to identify mitigating practices to reduce it. However, the potential for impact is highly present, although it is very much contingent on access to target populations, long-term engagement and the ever changing security conditions in the country.

Local interviews with AVR stakeholders, such as staff at one of the schools that have participated in AVR activities, confirm that there are indications that the project will have positive impacts in the long term. The interviewees highlighted that while it is too early to observe long-term effects from the AVR intervention, they have seen that the activities have helped students/young adults be interested in AVR education. The interviewees envision that this new interest for AVR will reflect in the young adults’ attitudes, which in time could affect the peers around them – leading to a long-term impact. However, while these are positive indications, is it at this time too early to assess the levels of social change in perception and attitudes that may result from the intervention.

Sustainability: The work is currently not sustainable as DCA holds the total capacity to training delivery
Currently the effort is not sustainable because DCA holds the total capacity to training delivery. The sustainability of the knowledge delivery requires far more time to be able to generate a level of knowledge at the local level that is sustainable and replicable at the local level. However, this should not be understood as a flaw of the programme, rather it is a characteristic of the environment and the needs tied to AVR generally. One option for sustainability could be exploring the opportunities with local civil society counterparts. This could be one way of securing sustainability in the absence of local governmental approval. However, this assumes that approval would be obtained by local counterparts.

5.6 Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities

The initial aim of the fourth objective of DCA-DRC programme, the protection objective was to ensure that:

Protection of vulnerable groups is increased through: a needs assessment of populations; improved access to education and basic health care with improved quality and capacity of local schools and clinics; acquisition of personal documents; repairs of dangerous houses; psychosocial support to children and knowledge / skills transfer to their teachers; increased capacity of local NGOs/CBOs and other stakeholders and duty bearers on protection needs and responses

The objective consisted of two main work areas: the provision of psychosocial support in schools, and work conducted to provide social support to vulnerable groups. The psychosocial support work was implemented by DCA in Misrata, and the social protection work was carried out by DRC in Sabha. The two projects have been evaluated separately, and their evaluations are outlined below.
5.6.1 Psychosocial Support

Relevance: The project work was based on an initial assessment of the needs of the intended beneficiaries, which ensured a certain level of project relevance

The work to achieve the project sub-objective to provide psychosocial support to children and youth was primarily carried out by the DCA Psychosocial Support Team (PSS) in Misrata. The work of the team experienced an initial delay, and it commenced in January 2013. The first task of the PSS team was to carry out an initial assessment of the schools in Misrata to find out the demands of potential partner schools. The assessment included two steps: first the DCA PSS team made an initial selection of potential partner schools, and secondly the DCA PSS made an assessment of the selected potential schools. The initial selection of potential partner schools was based on three criteria: the location of the school, the amount of boys and girls (to achieve gender balance), and the extent the school was affected by the conflict. In the second step, the DCA PSS team made an assessment of the schools’ needs by interviewing school staff. The assessment enquired about what the schools perceived to be their main issues in terms of psychosocial support for their students, what activities they thought their students would need, and how many students they thought would benefit from participating in the DCA PSS activities. While the assessment was basic, and not a full-scale needs assessment, it enabled the project work to originate from a local need, as the project activities were subsequently planned around the findings of the assessment. However, it should be noted that the selection of the participant schools was not solely based on the level of need, as the assessment also took into account which schools would be willing to work with the DCA and as the list of partner schools (developed after the assessment) needed to be approved by the Ministry of Education before work could commence.

There are examples of schools that have continued to build on the efforts that DCA’s work introduced them to through the PSS project, suggesting that the project was relevant to their needs. One of the participating schools was so inspired by their participation in the DCA PSS team’s sports activity that they decided to build their own sports field. They applied and received a small grant from the MoE to then proceed to build a sports field, so that the activities introduced by the PSS team could be continued. Furthermore, interviews with two head teachers at two of the participating partner schools confirm there was a local need for PSS type activities in Misrata. The interviewees highlighted the psycho- and social stress caused during the conflict, and the importance of providing students with help to deal with that stress.

Overall, the DCA PSS has had a limited scope due to the short timeframe (most of the project activities were implemented during April 2013 - April 2014). In this sense the findings of the current evaluation of the PSS relevance in Misrata to a certain extent echo the findings of the evaluations carried out by the Church of Sweden on October 2013: ”Findings showed a psychosocial program functioning well but with limited scope.”

Effectiveness: Overall, the PSS outcomes matched its objective and the work was thereby effective.

The target output for the DCA PSS work was to reach 5,000 students and train 250 adults in PSS – which the project has done. The DCA PSS team reached the largest number of students through the first larger activity that the team carried out, a televised quiz competition where all the 28 partner schools participated. The total number of children

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23 (Tanner 2014)
24 (Angi & Kharchenko 2013)
25 (Tanner 2013b)
that participated in DCA PSS activities was 7,754, and 290 teachers/parents/social workers received training.²⁶

The output of the PSS work has primarily been five larger activities and two smaller activities:

- Televised quiz in April 2013: 28 DCA PSS partner schools participated
- Sports event in June 2013: 264 children aged 9-11 participated
- Two-day leadership training in June: 17 young people aged 15-16 participated
- Creative training film throughout the fall: 28 DCA partner schools participated
- The "Creative Project" which ran from October to December: 28 DCA partner schools participated
- Two smaller activities:
  - Mother-daughter sessions in the early spring of 2013
  - Supported the DCA AVR team's "International Mine Risk Awareness Day" on April 4, 2013.²⁷

The above described output generated outcomes that were in line with the objective of the work: to provide PSS to students and to provide PSS trainings to their surrounding adults. As such, the project was effective. The DCA PSS has carried out ongoing monitoring and evaluation of its activities throughout the implementation, and the result of this has been used to evaluate the project outcomes. The participating partner schools (the schools where the project output was provided) were asked to conduct a self-administered evaluation of the outcome of the activities. The analysis of these evaluations suggests that the schools are pleased with the results. The schools report that the students learned creative ways to express themselves and that the activities allowed students to become more active and engaged, and also that the project provided teachers with new skills in how to engage with the students in a supportive way.²⁸

The PSS have attempted to keep the various project activities effective through basing all work on a set of founding principles. According to these principles, all PSS related activities should be underpinned by: 1) increased parental and teacher engagement 2) provision of non-violent tools for conflict resolution and self-expression, 3) supported skill development, to provide both adult and young people with new opportunities.²⁹

**Efficiency:** The work efficiency was aided by a well-functioning collaboration with the local authorities

In terms of the efficiency of the DCA PSS work in Misrata, two separate features have been found: 1) the 24-month timeframe was not used efficiently as work was mainly carried out during 12 months, and 2) during the 12 months that the project was working, it did so efficiently.

The first feature is a constraint to project efficiency: during the 24-month timeframe, output was generated during April 2013 - April 2014. During the project's first six months, no new output or activity was conducted, aside from a small number of mother-daughter sessions in schools, and continuation of previous project work to provide 'Friendly corners' in schools. The first larger output dates back to April 2013, when the televised quiz was carried out.³⁰

The reason for the lack of efficiency during the project's first year is primarily attributed to staffing issues: during the first six months of the project there was no Project Manager in place to lead the work, and hence few activities were carried out. Following the arrival of a Project Manager in January 2013, personnel issues continued to constrain efficiency, at this

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²⁶ (Tanner 2014)
²⁷ (Tanner 2013a)(Tanner 2013b)(Tanner 2013c)
²⁸ (Angi & Kharchenko 2013)
²⁹ Interview: DCA PSS
³⁰ (Tanner 2013b)
point due to the challenges of finding qualified local staff. The DCA PSS team consists of five local Libyan field officers, in addition to the international Project Manager. The Libyan staff primarily consists of recent university graduates. As the recruited team is young and had relative little experience, a large share of the time and resources in early 2013 had to be spent on internal training. As a result, the first half of the project timeframe constrained project efficiency.\textsuperscript{31}

The second feature concerns the efficiency of the work during the 12 months that activities were actually carried out. During this time, the project work was carried out efficiently. In April - June and October - December 2013, numerous activities were implemented and the work appears to have been efficient in terms of time and resources. The higher level of efficiency during the second phase of the project can be attributed to the fruitful collaboration with the local authorities. In contrast to the work related to other objectives, the DCA PSS were not been constrained by the local authorities. The team did not experience extensive resistance from the authorities, but rather reports that it has felt free to implement its work.\textsuperscript{32} This good relationship with the local authorities, primarily the MoE, can be tied to the fact that similar (non-EU funded) projects have been in place in the area since November 2011, which had built up a level of good relationship with the MoE that the DCA PSS could benefit from.

Interviews with local stakeholders in the PSS project – head teachers at the participating schools and representatives from MoE – confirm the above two features. The interviewees stress that the time of cooperation was short, often only a few months, but that during the times work was carried out it was done so in a good and efficient manner.

**Impact: Due to the project design, the project has more potential to generate outcomes than long-term impact**

Given the short implementation time, the large target group of 28 schools and the few implemented activities, the project work has a relatively limited potential for impact. This is further underscored by the fact that the project work did not meet the same students across activities, meaning that the 7,000 project participants engaged with the DCA PSS work once. This does not allow for the project work to provide individual support and generate an impact on the individual’s PSS need. The head teacher of one of the participating schools also highlighted that the potential for impact is relatively small due to the large number of students in each activity. At his school, 700 students participated in DCA PSS activities, and while he believes that the students enjoyed it and benefited from it, he does not believe that the intervention has the potential to cause change in the students’ behaviour or need for PSS. However, while the project design does not enable the work to fulfil the individual’s PSS need, there are merits to the chosen design: it enabled the project to introduce PSS work to a broad target group.

In addition to providing PSS activities to 7,000 project participants, the project also provided PSS trainings to 290 teachers, parents and social workers. This type of activity has a larger potential for impact, as it aims to change the adult’s behaviour towards children and youth in terms of psychosocial support. According an MoE representative who was interviewed, the DCA PSS has been successful in establishing the potential for impact in this aspect, as he sees that the trainings provided by the PSS team provided the teacher with both the tools and resources needed and the motivation to work with PSS issues.

**Sustainability: There is potential for sustainability as schools are replicating the work and teachers receive training**

In addition to the above mentioned example of a school choosing to continue with the activity after the DCA PSS’s activity, one more element is speaking in favour that the project

\textsuperscript{31} Interview Helen Tanner
\textsuperscript{32} Interview DCA PSS
benefits could be sustained after the project termination: the PSS staff provides resources to the participating schools for use after activities. The distribution of the resources is coupled with training for the teachers, to ensure the proper use of the resources.\(^{33}\) Coupling resources with training is crucial, as a survey that the PSS undertook showed that only 4/16 schools that had received resources during the project that was in the area before the current project (the non-EU project) used the resources in the appropriate way.

### 5.6.2 Protection provision for minorities and the internally displaced

**Relevance: Protection work for minority groups is relevant: protection work for IDP is less relevant**

The social protection element of the programme has been carried out by the DRC's Protection Team in Sabha. The project aimed to monitor the protection of minority groups and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), and to increase the social support of minorities by supporting their access to obtain personal documentation, enable access to health and education services and addressing the immediate threats that the minority groups are facing in their accommodations; especially the dangerous wiring and electrical installation. In the initial phase of project implementation, the majority of the project activities focused on the minority groups, while the second part of the project implementation focused on the needs of IDPs.

The initial focus of providing social support to minorities was specifically aimed at protecting the stateless population in South Libya. The work was aimed at supporting the Tebu and Tuareg minorities. The UNHCR has noted that there is a need to map and address the protection and humanitarian needs of these populations. The populations lack a legal identity, the Libyan health system does not have the capacity to cope with their needs, the populations struggle to access even primary education and their housing situation is poor.\(^{34}\) The initial protection work was aimed to provide legal protection, social support (including access to health care and education) and repair houses, and the initial aims were therefore highly relevant in the context of South Libya. However, the initial aims were ambitious and far-reaching, and did not take into consideration the local context and the political factors that were at play. Given the political complexities, the local authorities did not support the DRC's planned interventions, and it was not possible to carry out the proposed activities in this adverse political climate.

One year into the project implementation, very few activities had been possible to implement related to the Tebu and Tuareg minorities. As a consequence, the focus on the work towards IDPs increased, as this type of work was more possible to implement. The IDPs in Sabha are made up of persons that were forced to leave Libya's northern regions due to the 2011 conflict. The IDPs that were targeted for the DRC project had escaped from Twarge and were unable to return due to the hostility from people of the neighbouring Misrata.\(^{35}\) While the need of Libyan IDPs should not be diminished, their needs are not as extensive as the needs of Libyan minorities. Libyan IDPs are recognized by the national authorities, and in 2013 then Prime-Minister Ali Zeidan created a bureau within the PM-office with the aim to protect IDPs in the legislation and respond to the needs of the group, by e.g. providing a monthly stipend. While elements of these aims are yet to materialize, the situation of Libyan IDP is relatively favourable in a global perspective, compared to the situation of IDPs in other countries.

Throughout the implementation period (including both the first and second focus), a number of assessments were made on the local needs, as further described below. As such, the project did not lack relevance in the sense that the needs were not understood – rather

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\(^{33}\) Interview DCA PSS

\(^{34}\) (DanChurchAid 2011)

\(^{35}\) (DanChurchAid 2014)
the project lacked relevance due to the limited understanding of the dynamics of the context and the best suited implementation models to address the needs.

**Effectiveness: Due to the implementation challenges, little work could be carried out which limited efficiency**
The social protection work has not been effective. The outputs have been few and delayed.

Concerning the initial focus – to provide social support to the minorities – close to no output was produced during the time of the initial aim (August 2012 - October 2013). Prior to June 2013, the work suffered from management problems as the work had no project manager. When the new project manager arrived, some output was produced during the fall of 2013. Resources were spent to build up a work profile and establish the direction of the work. This work included developing the methodology for the assessment of populations at risk of statelessness and training of mobilizers. It included a number of assessments: a settlement assessment outside Sabha, a shelter assessment of homes and community facilities in Tayuri, technical assessments for rehabilitation for a total of 17 schools and 12 health clinics in Sabha. Further, data collection was initiated on the community’s perception of statelessness and research was conducted on people at risk of statelessness, through Focus Groups Discussions. A team of local staff was also recruited. However, in the phase transitioning from the preparatory assessment work to activity implementation, the project ran into obstacles. The local authorities did not approve of the planned interventions, and it was not possible to conduct any work. By October 2013, the focus of minority groups was stopped, and the focus altered. As the initial aim did not produce output, the work did not generate outcomes for the intended beneficiaries, the minority groups.

For the second part of the implementation period – after the main focus was shifted to IDPs – some output has been produced. Over the last six months, since November 2013, the produced output includes: transfers of monthly sub grants to local partners working with vulnerable persons, purchasing of 4 libraries in Sabha, minor rehabilitation work (done by local contractor based on tendering process) and purchased equipment for 6 health care centres. The main activities has concerned the rehabilitation of schools, health centre support and conducting workshops for national authorities on protection-related proposal writing, management, and financial management. Those outputs that focus on purchasing facilities are perhaps not in line with Libya’s most pressing need. Overall, Libya lacks know-how and knowledge about financial resources, and therefore the project output on training provision is likely to lead to outcomes that are more suited for the context than the generated materialistic output. That being said, there are gaps in the provision of public facilities in the Sabha area, so the need for materialistic support should not be diminished.

**Efficiency: The efficiency to provide social protection was severely hampered by the complete lack of support from the local authorities**
Overall, the work to provide social protection in Sabha was not efficient. The DRC was not able to carry out work in the context, and due to the large obstacles in implementation little was accomplished. There were two main challenges to the project implementation and the following lack of efficiency: the obstacles set up by the local authorities and the project’s miss-assessment of the applicability of its activities in the specific context.

The first challenge was a lack of support for the work from the local authorities in Sabha. Unlike the work on psychosocial support, the social protection work experienced large barriers in the collaboration with the local authorities – more similar to the experience of the mine action and SALW work, as discussed above. Throughout the implementation period, DRC took steps to adjust their work to the challenges introduced by the local authorities. The DRC staff report that the collaboration with the local authorities developed positively over time. In Sabha, the tribal divisions are more pronounced than in other parts of Libya, and it took time for the DRC to learn how to interact with this informal power structure.
The second challenge to the implementation of the protection work arose from a lack of understanding of the context when the activities were planned. Despite the relevance of the objective, the plan for how to accomplish that objective was miss-matched for the context in Sabha and Libya. The DRC did undertake preparation work, but the preparation failed to recognize the sensitivity of doing protection work in Libya, a context where even human rights issues are considered sensitive. As such, the goals were formulated in a manner that was not applicable, even though they were theoretically relevant.

Despite the challenges, the project did generate a number of outputs towards the end of the implementation phase, in addition to the above mentioned assessments. These outputs include:

- Nine focus group discussions and two key informant interviews took place as a part of the qualitative research on statelessness in Sabha. The FGDs conducted with members from the Twareg, Hasawna, Tebus, Awlan Soliman and Mahameed tribes.
- DRC distributed medical supplies purchased in collaboration with MSF to the Sabha central hospital. The items included two fixators used for bone surgeries, wound dressings and bandages.
- Tenders and purchase orders for providing medical supplies to six health centres in Sabha have been finalized.
- Distributing 88 DRC kits + 200 IOM blankets + 200 IOM kits + 40 mattresses.
- Purchasing of 4 school libraries in Sabha.
- 4 capacity building workshops with local authorities and partners.

**Impact:** The impact of the programme is small, due to the obstacles faced by DRC to carry out the work

Concerning the phase of the implementation, the programme generated little impact for the intended beneficiaries, the Tebu and Tuareg minority groups. Beyond project preparations and initial assessments, the project was not able to provide social protection to these groups. As such, no impact was generated.

In terms of the second phase of the implementation, to provide social protection for IDPs, the potential for impact is also small. The IDP work was implemented during a short time span, and the work that was conducted during this timeframe does not have the potential to generate long-term impacts on behaviours. The main activities involved the purchasing of health equipment and libraries – output that does not possess the potential to alter internal behaviours.

**Sustainability:** As the output, outcomes and impact of the social protection has been very limited there is little scope for project sustainability

In the light of the limited output, outcomes and impact that the project has generated during its short implementation time, little attention has been focused on how to sustain the project after its implementation. However, there is potential for sustainability in the areas that DRC has focused on: providing training and capacity-building. As mentioned above, the DRC offered trainings to local authorities on various aspects within protection work such as grants writing, tendering and quality control. The outcomes generated from these activities have the potential to be sustainable after the termination of the project.

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36. DRC Protection interview
37. (DRC Protection 2013) (DRC Protection 2014a) (DRC Protection 2014b)
6 Conclusions

Rehabilitation of infrastructure through ERW

Relevance
The Libyan domestic ability to carry out ERW clearance to the extent needed is weak, and the objective to support this clearance is as such relevant for the Libyan context. However, the needs far exceed what could be achieved by a project of 18 or 24 months.

Effectiveness
In the light of the broadness of the objective, it is premature to assess its effectiveness yet. However, the project does have the potential to be effective – especially to effectively contribute to improving the current security situation and contribute to a safer situation through the removal of ERW. The objective did also aim to contribute to socio-economic improvements, but given the limited scope of the output, the project’s potential to impact is small. The largest constraint to program effectiveness, and it ability to provide outcomes in line with the objectives, has been the securing tasks from the national authorities. When the project has been allowed to implement activities, the activities have been effective.

Efficiency
The complex Libyan government environment and cumbersome collaboration with LibMAC hindered both DCA and DRC from performing efficient ERW removal, which limited the efficiency with which the project was implemented. Furthermore, DCA-DRC struggled with attracting and retaining qualified staff familiar with the Libyan political landscape. As having staff that is able to manoeuvre in the political landscape is crucial for efficient ERW work, this limited the efficiency.

Impact
The mine action efforts in Libya have generally underachieved due to delays in the ability to carry out tasks, and the project work has thus not fulfilled its potential for impact. To fulfill the potential for impact, the DCA/DRC need to re-think the program approach: the approaches need to be adjusted so that authorization for work is obtained from the local authorities prior to putting all resources on the ground. In terms of the impact that the project work did generate, the on-the-ground removal that the DCA/DRC did carry out had direct and positive effects on the populations that live on and use the cleared areas.

Sustainability
The direct clearance benefits that the work generated will be sustained, given that there is no renewed fighting in Libya.

National mine clearance strategy

Relevance
There is a clear need to support the establishment of capacity to ensure that the Libyan government is able to comply with the clearance demands they face. The relevance is further underscored by the Libyan need for technical support, if the country is to build up its national mine clearance capability.

Effectiveness
The DCA was not able to effectively provide support and trainings as planned, due to two technical problems: the training material had to be developed from scratch and difficulties in accessing training-participants. Attracting training-participants could have been eased by providing financial incentives for training participation, but the evaluation team supports the DCA’s decision not to do so as that places emphasis on the training content as the reward instead of financial gain.
Efficiency
Due to implementation constraints, the program staff was not able to use the time efficiently. The staff was unable to carry out the trainings for extensive periods of time. The implementation constraints arose from a lack of cooperation between DCA and local authorities: DCA did not receive the proper authorizations to carry out their work.

Impact
It is too early to assess the potential for impact. Staff from both the military and civil defense have been trained, but their current level of training does not enable them to adequately respond to the current mine action need in Libya. However, one sign of a longer term impact is that there has been a shift in rhetoric towards the use of IMAS. While it is not possible to assess if this shift in rhetoric will be followed by a corresponding shift in behavior, it is an indication that the project have the potential for impact.

Sustainability
The project objective to build the national mine action capacity has the potential to be sustainable and secure long term national benefits, as it focuses on providing training to existing national bodies, such as civil and military defense entities. However, in the delivery of the capacity building, there is room for increased engagement with national partners, which would further enhance the project sustainability. Throughout the project, DCA has struggled to attract and retain qualified staff, and working with national partners would enable a more flexible approach to staffing which could be an asset in the long term.

Small arms management
Relevance
Due to the high arms proliferation among the general public that has followed the revolution, SALW and ARV interventions are relevant. As carrying arms is a new phenomenon in Libya, in the aftermath of the revolution, the targeting of children and young adults is relevant.

Effectiveness
In the areas that the project has carried out its activities, the intervention has had positive effects and been relatively effective.

Efficiency
The AVR intervention was initially efficient, when it enjoyed the approval of the local authorities. However, the efficiency was hampered when approval was revoked. As evident from the other projects as well, this shows that good collaboration with the local authorities is crucial to be able to carry out the work.

Impact
Anecdotal evidence suggests that project participants are beginning to accept the importance of AVR, which would indicate a long-term impact of the intervention.

Sustainability
As DCA holds the total capacity to training delivery, the knowledge and ownership transfer to the local community is limited. As such, the potential for project sustainability is low.

Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities
Relevance
The PSS team conducted a needs assessment prior to implementing their activities, contributing to the establishment of project relevance.

The aim of the social protection work in Sabha was relevant, but the plan for how to achieve this was not relevant for the local context. There is a need for social protection in Sabha, but the political conditions did not allow for the DRC to address these needs.
**Effectiveness**
Psychosocial support was provided effectively overall within the timeframe, but was limited by the lack of experienced staff.

In terms the social protection in Sabha, the project has not been able to have an effect on social protection provision. The project produced output during a very limited time frame, from November 2013 onwards, which hampered its effectiveness.

**Efficiency**
The 24-month timeframe was used inefficiently by the DCA PSS work, but the interventions that were implemented were implemented efficiently.

The efficiency of the DRC’s work in Sabha was hindered by the implementation obstacles placed by the local authorities.

**Impact**
The psychosocial support projected generated broad, but not in-depth, impact. Thousands of students were reached through work in 28 schools, but the project was not able to provide thorough psychosocial support to children that needed it.

Due to the obstacles to carry out the planned work – obstacles that led to that the aim of proving social support to minorities was abandoned one year into the project and replaced with a focus on IDPs – the program impact on social protection has been small, and has not fulfilled its planned aims.

**Sustainability**
The psychosocial support has the potential for sustainability as some partner schools are replicating the activities, and as training is provided for how to use the resources provided.

The outcomes generated by providing training to local authorities in Sabha have the potential to be sustainable.
7 Lessons learned
Lesson learned: Having relevant aims is insufficient to ensure good outcomes and impact. Aims must be both relevant and need to be coupled by an operational approach that fits the local context.

Recommendation: For future programmes, allocate sufficient time to develop a thorough programme design. Do not rush programme inception, but allow time to create a design that reflects the organizations’ knowledge of the context and context needs. The programme development and design should also inform the recruitment strategy for the programme staff.

Lesson learned: Unforeseen contextual changes can hamper programme effectiveness and applicability.

Recommendation: In addition to ensuring that the project design is built on well-founded, realistic assumptions about the contextual challenges, the programme design should also have a built-in mechanism that allows it to respond to changing needs and a changing environment. While it would be expected that the programme is adequate at the start it may be that things change during implementation, particularly if the programme spans multiple years.

Lesson learned: A short timeframe for the project, combined with broad objectives, truncates programme effectiveness.

Recommendation: Align project objectives with project timeframe. As the timeframe is often donor-set, it is important that donors are cognizant that change requires long-term interventions.

Lesson learned: Programme efficiency in Libya hinges on well-functioning collaboration with local authorities. Such collaboration requires staffs that understand the local contents. Significant program resources have been spent on gaining authorization to work, rather than implementing the program.

Recommendation: In recruitment of international staff increase focus on skills-sets (e.g. management and local knowledge) adequate for enabling collaboration with national authorities in addition to technical skills.

Lesson learned: Frequent personnel turnover limits continuity and the ability to build rapport with the local counterparts - obstructing programme efficiency.

Recommendation: Develop strategies to keep personnel changes to a minimum: continue the initiated review of international staff’s pay package and R&R policies; explore opportunities to have staff on roster with a retainer system and explore opportunities to utilize more local staff that are less prone to turnover. Be especially attentive to the succession plans of key staff in the program. Ensure long term (1-3 months) overlap to ensure that lessons and experiences are passed on.

More activities over a sustained period of time are needed in order for the programme to achieve long-term impact.

Recommendation: Within the Libyan context a focus on building institutional capacity locally rather than conducting activities directly (in-house technical operational competence) are more suited for ensuring long term sustainability.
8 Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Background information
DCA Libya has been implementing a two-year programme in Libya on “Security, Protection and Stabilization Programme in Libya” in a two-agency consortium with Danish Refugee Council (DRC). This programme has included mine action, psycho-social support to children, risk education, armed violence reduction and protection projects, taking place in Sabha and Misurata. This ToR is in reference to the final evaluation of the programme. The final evaluation will be conducted in April 2014. The 18-month programme (01 September 2012 to 28 February 2014) received approval from the European Union and started operations from September 2012. Following delays due to security concerns and delays in getting permission to operate, a no-cost extension was granted by the European Union, taking the project duration to 2 years and the end date to 31 August 2014.

The projects under evaluation are intended to benefit the population of Misurata, particularly children and Sabha, particularly minorities, displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.

Monitoring: Programme-level monitoring is conducted in Tripoli through the DCA Programme Manager, the DCA Programme Officer, the DRC Country Director, and the DRC Deputy Country Director, who meet regularly in a steering committee. Both organisations conduct monitoring operations, the results of which will be available for the consultant. Both have also conducted separate research, including statelessness research by DRC, the KABP survey by DCA, and a monitoring visit by Church of Sweden to the Psycho-Social Support programme for DCA.

Partners and Stakeholders: DCA is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC), the police and army, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior in Tripoli, the Ministry of Education in Misurata, the Military Council of Misurata, schools in Misurata and other NGOs working in Misurata. DRC is operating via direct implementation, but is giving sub-grants to seven local organisations. Other key stakeholders include the LMAC, the MoD and Army Engineers in Tripoli and Sabha, police and detention centres in Sabha, and other NGOs operating in Sabha.

Contract Purpose and Expected Results
Overall Objective: Support the conflict affected population by creating a safe and secure environment for the reconstruction of Libya

Specific Objectives: Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW); Capacity building of national authorities; Prevention and reduction of armed violence; Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities:

1. Security is enhanced among the general population through the physical removal of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The local and national infrastructure is rehabilitated and socio-economic growth facilitated through clearance of urban and rural areas.
2. The Libyan mine action authorities have established a strategy for mine action, and implement national standards and a quality management system. Existing national clearance capacity is enhanced through training and mentoring, operational procedures are standardized facilitating national ownership of quality management, and training processes are developed.
3. The number of accidents related to, and the visual presence of, small arms and light weapons (SALW) reduced. Increased awareness of risks related to SALW and ERW...
among civilian population relating to armed violence reduction. The local authorities implement weapons management.

4. Protection of vulnerable groups and minorities is increased through: Needs assessment of minority populations; improved access to education and basic health care with improved quality and capacity of local schools and clinics; acquisition of personal documents; repairs of dangerous houses; psychosocial support to children and knowledge/skills transfer to their teachers increased capacity of local NGOs/CBOs and other stakeholders and duty bearers on protection needs and responses.

DCA has implemented activities under all four results in Misurata and Tripoli:

- Result 1: Mine action, primarily in Tripoli
- Result 2: Training and Development work with the military and police in Tripoli, including EOD training, search training and first aid.
- Result 3: public information campaigns promoting armed violence reduction, and symbolic disarmament programme in schools, giving children Lego in exchange for toy guns, and research on attitudes to SALW through a KAPB survey.
- Result 4: psycho-social support in schools, giving children and teachers opportunities for self-expression through sport and creative activities, as well as leadership training and inter-school quizzes.

DRC has implemented activities under results 1 and 4 in Sabha

- Result 1: Mine action and risk education in Sabha
- Result 4: protection work focusing on minorities and migrants, including monitoring visits to detention centres, support to local CSOs, support to public services serving minorities, and distribution of NFIs to needy families.

Objectives of the consultancy

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to measure the achievements of the project outcome and impact where stated in the project proposal and Log frame, and give recommendations for future project development and improvement in risk education, armed violence reduction and psychosocial support.

In addition, the final evaluation will document lessons learned, challenges and good practices of project implementation. Specifically, the final evaluation aims to:

1. Assess the Relevance of the programme objectives, and of the projects for achieving the programme objectives
2. Assess the outcome of the activities and outputs of the project.
3. Assess the effectiveness of the different strategies in achieving the expected outputs.
4. Evaluate the sustainability of the different outputs/outcomes.
5. Make a record of lesson learned, challenges, success, positive or negative experience etc.
6. Assess the effectiveness of the organizational structure and cooperation in achieving the programme goals and objectives.

Scope of Services

The final evaluation shall comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- Assess the effectiveness of the programme and component projects in reaching the stated objectives and outputs, including an analysis of possible constraints.
- Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the different strategies, with a view to assessing whether the interventions met the needs of the intended beneficiaries.
in the area of operation. Analysis should consider gender and the differential impacts on women and men.

- Assess the technical quality of the program activities and the effectiveness and appropriateness of methodologies and approaches applied.
- Assess the synergy/cooperation achieved at different levels between the different project areas.
- Review the quality and appropriateness of the monitoring and reporting system.
- Assess the degree to which financial resources (funds, expertise, time etc.) have been converted into results/outputs.
- Review the degree of cooperation and collaboration with organizations and government agencies / offices, including collaboration and networking mechanisms in the implementation of the program.
- Review the degree of beneficiary participation in programme design and implementation and the programme's overall accountability.
- Recommend strategies, modifications and improvements for future projects pursuing similar goals.
- Identify major concerns related to the sustainability of the program.
- Identify good practices within the program.

The Consultant(s) liaison from DCA will be Knut Furunes in country Programme Manager, who will be the focal person and will provide support for day-to-day administrative, logistic and program clarifications as well as Signe Normose Programme Coordinator based in DCA HQ in Denmark. The consultant(s) liaison with DRC will be Nigel Clarke, Country Director, who will be the focal point for DRC and will provide support for administrative and logistic clarifications in relation to Sabha, and for programme clarifications relating to the DRC part of the programme.

**Evaluation Questions**

The questions are intended to guide the consultant(s) in addressing the objectives of the final evaluation:

**Relevance**

The analysis of relevance will focus on the following questions in relation to the design of the project:

- the quality of the analyses of lessons learnt from past experience, and of sustainability issues;
- the project's coherence with current/on going initiatives;
- the quality of the problem analysis and the project's intervention logic and logical framework matrix, appropriateness of the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement;
- the extent to which stated objectives correctly address the identified problems and social needs, clarity and internal consistency of the stated objectives;
- the extent to which the nature of the problems originally identified have changed;
- the extent to which objectives have been updated in order to adapt to changes in the context;
- the degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances;
- the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender analysis and analysis of vulnerable groups) and of institutional capacity issues;
- the stakeholder participation in the design and in the management/implementation of the project, the level of local ownership, absorption and implementation capacity;
- the quality of the analysis of strategic options, of the justification of the recommended implementation strategy, and of management and coordination arrangements;
• the realism in the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources)
• the analysis of assumptions and risks;
• the appropriateness of the recommended monitoring and evaluation arrangements;

**Effectiveness**
The analysis of Effectiveness will therefore focus on such issues as:
• whether the planned benefits have been delivered and received, as perceived by all key stakeholders (including women and men and specific vulnerable groups);
• whether intended beneficiaries participated in the intervention
• if the assumptions and risk assessments at results level turned out to be inadequate or invalid, or unforeseen external factors intervened, how flexibly management has adapted to ensure that the results would still achieve the purpose; and how well has it been supported in this by key stakeholders including Government, European Commission (HQ and locally), etc.;
• how unintended results have affected the benefits received positively or negatively and how could have been foreseen and managed.;
• whether any shortcomings were due to a failure to take account of cross-cutting or over-arching issues such as gender, environment and poverty during implementation;

**Efficiency**
The assessment of Efficiency will therefore focus on such issues as:
• To what extent was the programme implemented in a cost effective manner? Could the objectives have achieved the same with fewer resources? Or could the objectives have achieved more results with the same resources?
• the quality of day-to-day management, for example in: operational work planning and implementation (input delivery, activity management and delivery of outputs), and management of the budget (including cost control and whether an inadequate budget was a factor); management of personnel, information, property, etc, whether management of risk has been adequate, i.e. whether flexibility has been demonstrated in response to changes in circumstances; relations/coordination with local authorities, institutions, beneficiaries, other donors; the quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders have been kept adequately informed of project activities (including beneficiaries/target groups); respect for deadlines;
• Extent to which the costs of the project have been justified by the benefits whether or not expressed in monetary terms in comparison with similar projects or known alternative approaches, taking account of contextual differences and eliminating market distortions.
• Commission HQ/Delegation inputs (e.g. procurement, training, contracting, either direct or via consultants/bureaux): have they been provided as planned?;
• Quality of monitoring: its existence (or not), accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it; adequacy of baseline information;
• Did any unplanned outputs arise from the activities so far?

**Impact**
At Impact level the final evaluation will make an analysis of the following aspects:
• Extent to which the objectives of the project have been achieved as intended in particular the project planned overall objective.
• whether the effects of the project:
  • have been facilitated/constrained by external factors
  • have produced any unintended or unexpected impacts, and if so how have these affected the overall impact.
  • have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by coordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders
  • have contributed to economic and social development
  • have contributed to poverty reduction
  • have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.

Sustainability
The final evaluation will make an assessment of the prospects for the sustainability of benefits on basis of the following issues:

• the ownership of objectives and achievements, e.g. how far all stakeholders were consulted on the objectives from the outset, and whether they agreed with them and continue to remain in agreement;
• policy support and the responsibility of the beneficiary institutions, e.g. how far donor policy and national policy are corresponding, the potential effects of any policy changes; how far the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies and priorities are affecting the project positively or adversely; and the level of support from governmental, public, business and civil society organizations.
• institutional capacity, e.g. of the Government (e.g. through policy and budgetary support) and counterpart institutions; the extent to which the project is embedded in local institutional structures; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the project ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?); whether counterparts have been properly prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially;
• the adequacy of the project budget for its purpose particularly phasing out prospects;
• socio-cultural factors, e.g. whether the project is in tune with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits; whether it respects local power-structures, status systems and beliefs, and if it sought to change any of those, how well-accepted are the changes both by the target group and by others; how well it is based on an analysis of such factors, including target group/ beneficiary participation in design and implementation; and the quality of relations between the external project staff and local communities.
• Financial sustainability, e.g. whether the products or services being provided are affordable for the intended beneficiaries and are likely to remain so after funding will end; whether enough funds are available to cover all costs including recurrent costs, and continue to do so after funding will end; and economic sustainability, i.e. how well do the benefits (returns) compare to those on similar undertakings, once market distortions are eliminated.
• technical (technology) issues, e.g. whether (i) the technology, knowledge, process or service introduced or provided fits in with existing needs, culture, traditions, skills or knowledge; (ii) alternative technologies are being considered, where possible; and (iii) the degree in which the beneficiaries have been able to adapt to and maintain the technology acquired without further assistance.
• Wherever relevant, cross-cutting issues such as gender equity, environmental impact and good governance; were appropriately accounted for and managed from the outset of the project.

Methodology and Approach
The evaluation will draw on existing sources of information including monthly reports, interim report, a report from a monitoring visit conducted by Church of Sweden, proposal,
budget, and proposal and budget amendment, as well as field visits and interviews with beneficiaries, DCA staff and government officials.

The Consultant is free to choose whatever methods are necessary to fulfil the evaluation objectives. However, it is expected that, wherever possible, participatory approaches should be adopted. The Consultant(s) should collect qualitative as well as quantitative data.

The evaluation approach will at a minimum include:

1. Desk review
   a. A review and analysis of project proposal, revisions and reports in order to analyse to what extent objectives and results have been reached.
   b. A review of other related documents such as project research materials, manuals, activity reports, mid-term evaluation reports, etc.

2. Interviews with key stakeholders including project beneficiaries, government officials and DCA.

3. Visits to project sites in Misurata and Sabha (security permitting)

4. Focus group discussions with key stakeholders (project beneficiaries, government officials, EU delegation)

5. Other methodologies as proposed by the evaluator

**Reporting**

The debriefing workshop prior to the Consultant(s)’ departure should present the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations. The purpose is to inform DCA and other stakeholders of the Consultant(s)’ observations, and to gather feedback to improve the final report.

The final evaluation report should be produced after incorporating feedback from DCA and their partners. The final report should not exceed 29 (1-3-25) pages (excluding annexes). A draft report should be sent to DCA by e-mail for comments within ten days after the debriefing workshop. The final report should be delivered to DCA, both as a hard copy and as a PDF file.

The evaluation report should be in DCA’s 1-3-25 format, namely:

- 1 page of recommendations for future action
- 3 page (maximum) executive summary
- 25 page (maximum) report. The report should include:
  - Introduction (Objectives, Methodology, ToR, etc)
  - Context analysis, Background, History
  - The evaluated project
  - Findings
  - Conclusions
  - Lessons learned

- Annexes and case studies may be included
### Annex 2: List of People Interviewed

#### Table 4: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabie Al Jawashi</td>
<td>Three Fields Foundation</td>
<td>Founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara Rijavec</td>
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<td>Luc Van Aken</td>
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<td>Lib-Mac</td>
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<td>Hassan Ali Eiblo</td>
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<td>Director of Administrative Affairs Unit</td>
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<td>Amal Ali Ebergaf</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Social specialist</td>
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10  **Annex 3: Bibliography**


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