EVALUATION OF DANCHURCHAID’S 
HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN 
LIBYA, LEBANON AND BURMA/MYANMAR

Final Report

Prepared for DanChurchAid

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This report has been prepared by Channel Research as part of the evaluation of DCA’s Mine Action Programmes in Libya, Lebanon and Myanmar/Burma, as commissioned by DCA.

This report is public and may be disseminated.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Channel Research was contracted by DanChurchAid (DCA) to conduct an evaluation of its Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Programmes in Burma/Myanmar, Lebanon and Libya.

The purpose of this evaluation was twofold:

1) To evaluate DCA’s Mine Action programmes’ outcomes and impact in the three target countries;
2) To analyse and assess DCA’s management structure.

Through this two-tiered analysis, the evaluation sought to identify key lessons from the programmes in Libya, Lebanon and Burma/Myanmar in order to inform DCA’s Mine Action programmes worldwide.

DCA Mine Action intervenes in a variety of conflict and post-conflict contexts, where similar threats posed by explosive remnants of war are combined with country-specific needs. Overall, DCA’s HMA programmes in Myanmar, Lebanon and Libya reflect both a good understanding of the local contexts and the capacity to adapt to identified needs and opportunities. DCA has developed an array of programmes and activities specifically tailored to respond to beneficiaries’ needs while retaining enough flexibility to adapt to the needs of each programme environment.

The relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of DCA’s programmes were assessed based on a series of targeted questions, the answers to which are summarised in Section 4 of this report. The three programmes assessed demonstrated varying levels of advancement and of achievement. This is largely attributed to contextual differences, with variations in management decisions playing a lesser role. Overall, this analysis generated a positive general appraisal of the three programmes, with remaining challenges mostly addressed at programme and headquarters levels.

DCA’s policy for Humanitarian Mine Action had not yet been finalised at the time this evaluation was being prepared. Channel Research based its analysis on a draft paper, which was kindly shared during the final stage of the evaluation. This revised approach, entitled “Safer Communities”, reveals a broader understanding of Mine Action, which places communities at the centre of all activities and considers the longer-term effects of armed violence on local populations. There is strong emphasis on capacity building efforts to enable national entities and actors to assist communities affected by conflicts.

The shift towards the long-term effects of armed conflict and underlying causes of vulnerability will necessitate a transition from self-implementation to gradual empowerment of partners (with a possible exception for clearance) for DCA. This would be consistent with other DCA programmes, but reflects an ambitious step forward in the realm of Mine Action. To ensure that it is effective, this policy shift will require equally ambitious corporate restructuring.
The current structure of DCA Mine Action, unlike other departments, was conceived for self-implementation of programmes. Also, even when providing other services, the focus was generally on clearance and technical aspects. The new approach will require programme staff to adopt more traditional development perspectives. This is likely to be challenging, given the very different approaches between traditional humanitarian and development work and a field still largely dominated by ex-military personnel.

Based on the documentation review and on field observations, this report presents a series of general recommendations to DCA Mine Action for consideration. The recommendations are detailed in Section 7 of the report, and can be grouped in the following categories:

1) **Human Resources**: Staff capacity building and staff retention are two recurring challenges. DCA must therefore provide sufficient incentives (a clear personal development plan, salaries and benefits) and a sense of ownership for all involved staff, including administrative personnel (a shared understanding of DCA’s vision for Mine Action, and improved inclusivity in decision-making).

2) **Needs Assessment**: A more thorough assessment of actual needs before implementation will save a considerable amount of time and resources. This will identify the nature of services needed, as well as the primary targets for capacity building. If needs are to be determined by the local communities, funding needs to be sufficiently flexible to be adapted and reallocated to evolving priorities.

3) **DCA Mine Action Structure**: The current structure, both at country level and overall, is very flat. All programme staff report to a Programme Manager, which in turn reports to the Head of the Unit. The Head of Unit is also responsible for the Headquarters team. To ensure successful expansion into new areas, a more decentralised structure is needed. This report recommends separating administrative aspects from programmatic concerns. In particular, project coordinators should each refer to a relevant, thematic technical officer, similarly to what is currently set up for Clearance activities.

4) **Harmonisation of DCA’s programmes**: There are several levels at which Mine Action could realise financial and operational efficiencies through better integration with other DCA activities. These include sharing administrative resources for finances, procurement and human resources management, as well as using the same national partners to provide a wider spectrum of services to the same targeted communities.
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ACRONYMS

AVR  Armed Violence Reduction
BAC  Battle Area Clearance
CBO  Community-Based Organisation
CCM  Convention on Cluster Munitions
CSO  Civil Society Organisation
DCA  DanChurchAid
EOD  Explosive Ordnances Disposal
ERW  Explosive Remnants of War
FOO  Field Operations Officer
FSD  Fondation Suisse pour le Déminage (Swiss Foundation for Demining)
GFFO  German Federal Foreign Office
GICHD  Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI  Handicap International
IMAS  International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA  Information Management System for Mine Action (by GICHD)
IMSMA-NG  IMSMA - New Generation
INGO  International NGO
IS  Impact Survey
ITF  International Trust Fund
LAF  Lebanese Armed Forces
LDO  Lebanese Demining Organization
LEB  Lebanese Engineering Brigade (LAF)
LMAC  Lebanese Mine Action Centre
LMAS  Lebanese/Libyan Mine Action Centre (specified when necessary)
MMAC  Myanmar Mine Action Centre
MMAS  Myanmar Mine Action Standards
MRE  Mine-Risk Education
MVA  Mine Victim Assistance
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA  Norwegian People’s Aid
NTS  Non-Technical Survey
POD  Peace Generation Organisation for Demining
PSS  Psycho-Social Support
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure
TA  Technical Advisor
TL  Team Leader
TS  Technical Survey
UNMAS  UN Mine Action Service
UXO  Unexploded Ordnances
VA  Victim Assistance
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale, Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

Landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXO) have long-term effects on the lives and livelihoods of people in many of the world’s conflict and post-conflict areas. Their presence therefore constitutes both a serious humanitarian threat and a major barrier to development. DanChurchAid (DCA) has been active in Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) advocacy work since the 1980s. Since 1999, DCA has had its own HMA programme, covering a number of countries and including advocacy and awareness raising, mine surveying and clearance, Mine Risk Education (MRE), and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA).

Channel Research was contracted by DCA to conduct an evaluation of DCA’s HMA Programmes in Burma/Myanmar, Lebanon and Libya. The purpose of this evaluation was twofold. Firstly, we evaluated DCA’s Mine Action programmes’ outcomes and impact in the three selected countries. We also analysed and assessed DCA’s management structure. The outputs of these two aspects guided our analysis in order to identify lessons from the specific programmes in Libya, Lebanon and Burma/Myanmar for application across DCA’s Mine Action programmes globally. This evaluation aimed to generate recommendations that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all Mine Action programs across the world.

The evaluation covered all projects run as part of DCA’s HMA programmes in the three chosen countries, including land clearance, MRE and MVA (which includes in turn Psycho-Social Support (PSS) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)). Through the analysis of these diverse projects in varying contexts, our team produced a series of recommendations aimed at optimising the delivery of HMA activities globally.

1.2 Methodological Approach

In order to gather sufficient information for our analysis and to reach useful recommendations, the assignment was divided into the four following phases:

**Preparation**

During the first phase, Channel Research reviewed available documentation on the three countries of the study and DCA’s respective programmes, including programme strategies and reports, logframes and DCA’s policy papers. In parallel, a visit to headquarters in Copenhagen allowed Channel Research and DCA’s HMA unit to agree on the scope and stages of the evaluation. The agreed phases are outlined below.

**Country visits**

Channel Research visited each of the three countries specified by DCA. The purpose of the visits was to assess the preparation and delivery of HMA programmes in Myanmar/Burma, Lebanon and Libya. During the visits, Channel’s team interviewed DCA’s operational and support staff, as well as other main actors involved in HMA (including NGOs, authorities and beneficiaries). The team also observed DCA’s clearance teams (in Lebanon and in Libya) and
a Mine Risk Education workshop (in Myanmar). More details on the visits’ schedule are included at the end of the report (Annex 1).

Analysis
Following the field visits, Channel Research identified the key lessons from the countries for broader demining, and focused on recurrent themes as well as the unique characteristics of each programme. We then carried out a second visit to headquarters, in order to verify our field observations and address the second axis of the evaluation, organisational assessment.

Reporting
The last phase of the evaluation involved combining all information collected through the desktop review, field visits and headquarters interviews. A first draft final report was submitted end-July 2013, for DCA to provide feedback and comments before the final submission in September 2013.

1.3 Evaluation Criteria and Questions
The terms used in the following report are those defined by the OECD Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines, as follows:

- **Effectiveness**: the ability to match objectives with results achieved (outputs or outcomes).
- **Efficiency**: the ability to achieve maximum results with given resources.
- **Humanitarian Mine Action**: all actions to reduce the risk to non-combatants of incidents related to mines and unexploded ordnances.
- **Impact**: the changes that result in the condition of the population from a series of outcomes.
- **Objectives**: the intended results, stated in programme documents (i.e. for which there is material evidence), as evidenced by verifiable changed conditions in the population.
- **Outcomes**: the use by the beneficiaries of the outputs, as can be reasonably influenced by the agency (within its sphere of influence).
- **Outputs**: the deliverables provided by an agency, usually measurable in quantitative terms.
- **Relevance**: the relation of objectives to the needs of the population.
- **Results**: changes achieved through activities, whether outputs, outcomes or impact.
- **Sustainability**: the continuation of the outcomes after implementation has been completed.
As per the terms of reference and based on the definitions above, the evaluation included the following questions:

**Overarching question:**
“What can we learn from our existing programmes that can help us become more effective, efficient and improve our delivery when we implement mine action programmes?”

**Relevance**

*Key question:* To what extent are the programmes relevant to the identified needs, especially related to reducing the level of risks and socio-economic development potentials?

*Sub questions:*
- To what extent could programme adherence to relevant policy (International Mine Action Standards, DCA Gender commitment, rights-based approach and accountability) be improved, and how?
- How relevant are the programmes from beneficiary and other stakeholder perspectives, and what improvements can be made?
- What improvements are needed to gather relevant data from the programmes and learn from it?

**Effectiveness**

*Key questions:* To what extent were objectives achieved at outcome (and if verifiable at impact) level? Why and why not? Are there any unintended results of the programme?

*Sub questions:*
- To what extent were the activities implemented according to relevant DCA policy on HMA and Armed Violence Reduction?
- To what extent did the crosscutting activities, particularly the capacity building and gender efforts achieve their objectives? Why and Why not?
- To what extent has the monitoring undertaken in the course of the programme provided management with sufficient information to follow progress towards the desired results? Did management act accordingly?
- Is DCA (Programme and HQ) an effective manager of this particular programme? (Strategic planning, staffing, resource management, monitoring, partnerships, etc.)

**Efficiency**

*Key question:* Has the programme approach, in case of the three selected programmes, been a cost-efficient way to implement mine action?

*Sub questions:*
- Could we have achieved the same with fewer resources? Or could we have achieved more results with the same resources?
- What are the overall costs of the programme compared to the number of beneficiaries?
Impact

Key question: What has been the impact at beneficiary (outcome) level? And at other levels that were supposedly addressed by the programme?

Sub questions:
• What are the most significant changes in the lives of the beneficiaries that can be attributed to the programme?

Sustainability

Key questions:
  a) Are the benefits brought about by the programme, especially at beneficiary level, likely to continue after the finalisation of the programme? Why and why not?
  b) Have the capacity building efforts (organisational development and development of individuals) in the programmes (DCA staff, partners and beneficiaries) proven to be useful and sustainable? Why and why not?

Sub questions:
• To what extent do the qualifications of the local staff enable them not only to carry out their assigned tasks but also to recruit and train new staff?
• Has a suitable and user-friendly information management system been put in place to aid MA operations and sharpen decision-making by DCA staff?

The questions above are presented per criterion and per country in chapter 4 of this report. The overarching question is addressed in chapter 7, as recommendations for the Humanitarian Mine Action unit globally.
2 CONTEXT

2.1 Contamination: origin and nature of the problem

2.1.1 Myanmar/Burma

In pre-colonial times, the territory of today’s Burma/Myanmar comprised three independent kingdoms, each populated by several distinct ethnic groups. Under British rule, which lasted from 1886 to 1948, Burma was unified. In 1948, the country gained independence as the Union of Burma. A successful coup by the military in 1962 has kept them in either direct or indirect control since then. Ever since independence, however, the country has been plagued by civil wars with both national dimensions (ethnic minorities fighting for independence, autonomy and equal rights) and international dimensions (linked to the Cold War and foreign influence on various armed groups).

These decades of conflict have left large areas contaminated with explosive ordnances and landmines. These UXOs were planted both by the Burmese Army and Non-State Armed Groups, and include a variety of factory and hand-made devices. The Burmese Army forcefully relocated many villages during the conflicts, and landmines were planted to prevent inhabitants from returning. Communities also started planting landmines to prevent the Army or other armed groups from approaching. No official figures exist, but it estimated that 10 States or regions are contaminated with landmines, mostly along the Thai, Chinese and Bangladeshi borders, and internally in Shan State. This poses a significant threat, both to local communities and to returning refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

2.1.2 Lebanon

With 18 state-recognised religious sects, Lebanon is the most religiously diverse country in the Middle East. Following French withdrawal in 1946, a confessional parliament was established with quota seats reserved to each main religious group. However, sectarian and political tensions in Lebanon gradually increased, exacerbated by a number of factors, among which: the arrival of 100,000 Palestinian refugees in 1948; the tensions between a pro-Western Government and movements aligned with the Soviet Union; the relocation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1960 and the ensuing militarisation of Palestinian refugee camps. A full-scale civil war broke out in 1975 and lasted until 1990, leaving large sections of the country contaminated with various types of landmines and other explosive remnants of war.

Following Hezbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, Israel launched a wide-scale bombing campaign against South Lebanon. During the 34-day war, the Israel Defence Forces dropped an estimated 4 million submunitions on south Lebanon. In many cases, Israel used cluster munitions containing submunitions with known high failure rates. These left behind homes, gardens, fields, and public spaces littered with potentially one million unexploded submunitions.¹

2.1.3 Libya

Modern Libya was born from the unification of the three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan during Italian colonial rule, which started in 1912. In 1941 British forces intervened against Italy, which later requested military assistance from Germany. This Desert War, which lasted until 1943, has left a number of explosive remnants of war that are occasionally still found in parts of Libya.

The second, more recent contamination is linked to the 2011 conflict, which opposed Muammar Gaddafi’s forces to NATO-backed rebels. After 42 years of totalitarian rule, protests broke out in January 2011, over widespread corruption and housing concerns. On the 15 February 2011, security forces opened fire on protesters in Benghazi. Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the protests spread throughout the country and rapidly escalated into an armed conflict between regime-loyalists and rebels. As the rebels took control of Tripoli in September 2011, while the fighting continued in other parts of the country. Gaddafi was captured and executed in Sirte on 20 October 2011, but clashes between the newly established National Transition Council and former loyalists continued to take place sporadically. The conflict has left parts of the country contaminated with explosive remnants of war, including large Arms Storage Areas. Another related, and maybe bigger threat, is posed by the widespread availability of weapons throughout the country.

2.2 Humanitarian Mine Action Actors

2.2.1 Myanmar/Burma

There are cases of clearance taking place by armed State and Non-State Actors (NSA), but no Humanitarian clearance is being formally carried out within Myanmar.

Since the ceasefire agreement in January 2012 with several NSAs, there is a will to formally allow and coordinate HMA in-country regarding Mine Risk Education (MRE), Victim Assistance (VA) and Clearance. Some of the signatories are engaged in the early stages of a broader peace process, while others only agreed to a ceasefire. In any case, the political situation remains fragile. Some NSAs therefore still perceive mines as a protection rather than a threat. Non-signing NSAs also wait to see whether the ceasefire holds before engaging in negotiations with the Government.

As part of the country’s opening to discussions on landmines, the President’s Office is overseeing the creation of the Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC), which constitutes one of the Myanmar Peace Centre’s (MPC) five pillars. The MPC is funded by the European Union and Japan, and supported by a number of International NGOs including NPA, Halo, Geneva Call, and others. The establishment of a well-recognised, legitimate Mine Action Centre, and the creation of National Mine Action Standards are seen as international best practice by many actors. Others actors, however support a more “bottom-up” approach and

\[2\] While we acknowledge the on-going debate on whether to use “Burma” or “Myanmar”, for simplicity, in the following sections of the report we have referred to this country simply as “Myanmar”.

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fear NSAs will be ignored. At the time of writing, the Centre was not yet operational, despite official opening ceremonies in late 2012.

In parallel, the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) leads MRE activities with UNICEF and DCA, outside the MMAC. The tension between the President’s Office’s and DSW (which reflects the choice of whether or not to engage directly with NSAs) may force INGOs to “pick sides”. It can be expected that this tension will increase once the MMAC is operational.

### 2.2.2 Lebanon

Between 1990 and 1998, demining activities were carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In 1998, the National Demining Office (NDO) was established to coordinate all Humanitarian Mine Action activities in Lebanon, supported by UNMAS. The UN subsequently pulled out and thus the NDO was renamed the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC, since 2007). The LMAC is run by the LAF and coordinates activities that include Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance. The LMAC is also responsible for Information Management and Quality Assurance.

The LMAC (or the Regional MAC in the South) coordinates all activities related to HMA in Lebanon. It collects data, prioritises and assigns tasks to national and international NGOs and to the Engineering Regiment. All HMA actors must be accredited by the LMAC and follow LMAS.

There are currently a number of International NGOs carrying out Battle Area Clearance (BAC) and Manual Mine Clearance (MMC) in Lebanon:

- **DCA**: BAC in Southern Lebanon since 2007, MMC in Central Lebanon since 2010.
- **NPA**: BAC in Southern Lebanon
- **HI**: MMC in Northern Lebanon
- **FSD**: BAC and EOD in Southern Lebanon since 2007 (with interruptions due to suspended funding)
- **MAG**: BAC in Southern Lebanon, MMC in Central Lebanon and provision of mechanical resources

The Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) Steering Committees coordinate MRE and MVA respectively. These fall under the LMAC’s authority and include Ministries of Social Affairs and of Education, and a number of national and international NGOs.
2.2.3 Libya

Mine Action was initially carried out informally by fighters during the Libyan Revolution. In May 2011, they established the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC) to clear mines and Explosive Remnants of War. In December 2011, the Minister of Defence appointed an LMAC management board and gave it a mandate to manage all MA activities in Libya.

The LMAC is currently only recognised in Tripoli, while parallel structures are developing in other cities, for example Misrata’s LMAC is run by the local Military Council with support by the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section of the UN Support Mission in Libya. The LMAC (Tripoli) suffers both from a lack of authority outside the capital and from a lack of internal capacity. Its management of reports, tasks and QA appears to be erratic and does not meet international standards. In 2013, NPA’s Country Director was appointed as special advisor to the LMAC. The Director has recently started providing support and advice in Tripoli, alongside UNMAS. Territorial divisions make it difficult to design and implement a national strategy. Each city has its own authorities and priorities, and in extreme cases, some cities have programmes that are wholly determined by a single person.

INGOs working in Libya include DCA, NPA, HI, MAG, and Santa Barbara Foundation, but the LMAC-Tripoli was unable to provide a full list of actors involved and tasks completed or assigned. This is in many ways indicative of the Centre’s current administrative shortcomings.
3  DCA’S HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES
The following section provides an overview of DCA’s Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Programmes in the three visited countries, based on the preliminary desk research and field observations.

3.1  DCA’s HMA Programmes – Description and Organisational setup

3.1.1  Myanmar
The map below illustrates the main areas contaminated by mines in Myanmar. As explained above, they cover most of the border with Thailand, Shan and Kachin States as well as parts of the Bangladeshi border. Although the official is Nay Pyi Taw City, DCA’s country (and regional) office and the Myanmar Mine Action Centre are located in Yangon (formerly Rangoon).
Along the Thai border:
DCA has been involved in humanitarian activities with Burmese refugees along the Thai border for over 20 years. Since 2006, it has carried out Mine Risk Education (MRE) programmes for minorities in border-States and with refugees in Thailand, through local Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). The MRE programme gradually expanded to other border-states, along the Thai, Chinese and Bangladeshi borders. Based on the identified needs, efforts were later re-focused on the Thai border.

The implementation is carried out through partner CBOs and faith-based organisations. Over 250 local MRE and survey field workers, from 10 local organisations, have been trained and are regularly deployed to conduct MRE.

Gradually, Victim Assistance (VA) accompanied MRE, with a restored clinic in the jungle for the production and provision of prosthetic limbs.

Given the impossibility of addressing mine-related activities in-country until last year, and the difficulty in accessing most targeted areas, activities along the Thai border have been mostly coordinated from DCA’s office in Chiang Mai, Thailand. This office counts 9 DCA staff, of which 5 are shared with the regional office, and Staff from Partner Organisations in charge of coordinating and running MRE and VA programmes.

In-country:
DCA established its regional office in Yangon in 2011. Following the ceasefire agreement in January 2012, DCA was invited to work in-country on HMA, and started carrying out MRE and VA from Yangon.

MRE activities are implemented in partnership with UNICEF and the Department for Social Welfare. A series of workshops have been held with an increasing number of participants and increasingly moving from institutions towards local communities. DCA is currently leading a KAP survey in partnership with UNICEF, which should provide a clearer assessment of the current state of awareness and perception of risks related to mines and other explosive ordnances, and therefore of the remaining needs to be addressed by future activities.

An innovative VA programme was designed in response to victims’ difficulties in reaching remote clinics: a mobile prosthetic clinic, funded by the German Foreign Affairs, brings assistance closer to the beneficiaries and includes the production and fitting of prosthetic limbs, as well as re-education and physiotherapy sessions.

DCA is currently attending meetings aimed at establishing the Myanmar Peace Centre and the Myanmar Mine Action Centre, and providing recommendations, without adhering openly to these institutions’ activities.

DCA Myanmar has an office in Yangon, in which 4 people work specifically on HMA and 4 more are shared between HMA and other DCA activities.
3.1.2 Lebanon

The map below presents areas of contamination, as recorded by the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC). They are represented as small dots, and it can be seen that they are scattered throughout the country. The approximate location of DCA’s Central and Southern Lebanon offices is indicated by the red circles, in Bsous and Nabatiyeh. The LMAC is located in Beirut.
DanChurchAid (DCA) has been clearing cluster bomb-contaminated areas in Southern Lebanon since 2007. Three Battle Area Clearance teams are currently working in the South. They refer to DCA’s office in Nabatiyeh, and work under guidance from the Regional Mine Action Centre, which specifically focusses on Southern Lebanon.

In 2010, DCA started clearing mine fields in Central Lebanon. It currently employs three Manual Demining teams, which are coordinated by the office in Bsous, Mount Lebanon and refer to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre in Beirut.

Following the gradual nationalisation of DCA Lebanon, the teams currently count all-national members. Each team is composed of searchers or deminers, a Team Leader, and a Site Supervisor. Moreover, two Field Operations Officers (one based in Central and the other in Southern Lebanon) have replaced former international Technical Advisors.

3.1.3 Libya

The location of DCA’s current offices is indicated by the red circles over Tripoli and Misrata, where they operate under the authority of the local mine action authorities. The third indicated city, Benghazi, is where DCA first arrived, in 2011.
DCA’s HMA programme in Libya started in Benghazi, in mid-2011, as a response to the urgent need for Battle Area Clearance (BAC). DCA then moved to Misrata, where it pursued clearance activities, alongside Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) and Psycho-Social Support (PSS). Finally, in December 2012, DCA established a second office in Tripoli.

At the moment, DCA Libya counts two clearance teams (operating as one extended team) in Misrata, which refers to the local Military Council, and one in Tripoli, which carries out spot tasks assigned by the Libyan Mine Action Centre. Additionally, the office in Misrata hosts Dedicated Project Coordinators for AVR and PSS.

As DCA identified a strong need for capacity building, it has also developed a series of trainings targeted at different national authorities and security forces. These trainings have become an increasingly important component of DCA’s programme in Libya.

3.2 Main Technical and Operational Challenges

3.2.1 Myanmar/Burma

- The on-going peace process brings both opportunities and uncertainty regarding INGOs’ strategies and activities. It offers DCA an opportunity to reconsider the focus of its HMA activities in Myanmar and Thailand.

- HMA is a very recent arrival in Myanmar, and the work on National Standards and establishing a Mine Action Centre has only just commenced. It will take time before the Centre is operational and even more before it acquires legitimacy amongst NSAs.

- There is a strong disagreement between the President’s Office’s and the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) on whether or not to engage directly with NSAs, which may force INGOs to state more clearly on which side they stand. It can be expected that this tension will rise once the MMAC is operational and HMA activities are carried out more extensively.

- Following years of conflict, there is now a strong need for trust building between the State and NSAs. INGOs risk being caught between sides, or having to align with one or the other.

3.2.2 Lebanon

- Mines are laid with no pattern, and many minefield records from the Lebanese Civil War are either missing or incomplete. In addition to the incompleteness and sometimes unreliability of data, minefields are subject to change due to landslides and further bombings.

- A great variety of explosives (different types of mines, booby traps, UXO, Cluster Bombs, etc.) were used by different factions.
• New suspected contaminated areas are regularly reported. This is likely to result in the revision of the 2016-2021 objectives, which currently aim at having Lebanon entirely cleared by 2021. Furthermore, the on-going conflict in neighbouring Syria, which in several occasions extended to Lebanese territory, may further increase the surface to be cleared.

• Most accessible fields have been cleared. Remaining fields are more difficult to access and work in safely due to sloped terrain, rocky or unstable soil, or dense vegetation.

• The fragile security situation does not affect programmes themselves, but restricts movement between South and Central Lebanon.

• The LMAC and the RMAC are growing and have seen key staff changes. They are now functioning well, but further changes may threaten operational stability.

3.2.3 Libya

• Despite the end of open armed conflict in most areas, small-scale fighting still takes place regularly between rival armed militias. The situation remains fragile and politically unstable.

• The national Capital has only limited authority/legitimacy. The country is deeply divided by rivalry between city-states, which makes it difficult to simultaneously engage with authorities in different cities.

• A large variety of explosive ordnances were used during the conflict, including very rare devices that require special expertise to detect and remove.

• Some areas remain very difficult to access for security, logistical or political reasons.

• The LMAC suffers from very limited staff capacity and has no reliable database of Suspected Hazardous Areas. Issued tasks are, at times, outdated or poorly referenced.

3.3 Main Organisational Challenges

3.3.1 Myanmar

• The presence of DCA’s Regional Office in Yangon offers opportunities to integrate HMA into DCA’s strategy for Myanmar, but a significant shift in work focus will need to be carried out to develop areas of possible interaction between activities that have traditionally been run independently.
• Coordination and division of responsibilities between the offices in Chiang Mai and Yangon will also be challenging as activity increases in-country. Special attention must be paid in areas where DCA may intervene from “both sides”.

• Working through partners raises issues of accountability and monitoring.

3.3.2 Lebanon

• It is difficult to find educated staff willing to engage in and commit to “manual labour” with the physical exertions that characterise HMA. Further nationalisation will require additional training and incentives.

• The LMAC’s role leaves only limited scope for initiatives or prioritisation.

• The focus has long been on technical operations. Including support staff more systematically is a challenge that remains as yet unfulfilled. Some of them have limited understanding of HMA work, and could benefit from a “suggestions box” to express their concerns or issue recommendations.

• Continuity is crucial. For instance, both Finance and Operations Managers had to be replaced in September 2012 (although the Operations Manager became the Programme Manager, hence remaining within the organisation). Qualified and experienced national staff is particularly difficult to find, and staff retention is a recurring challenge.

3.3.3 Libya

• The initial structure was set up for emergency clearance activities. In addition, the departure of several Operations Managers within a few months left the remaining management staff overburdened. As a result, non-clearance programmes suffered and need additional resources and attention.

• DCA has faced two serious accidents, one of which was fatal. This highlighted the need for revised and adapted Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

• As DCA moved from Misrata to Tripoli in late 2012, it underwent a wave of new recruitments, which will require support and mentoring before additional responsibilities can be transferred to the national staff.

• Coordination between Misrata and Tripoli has proven to be a challenge, especially regarding logistics and administrative tasks.

• Qualified Libyans expect salaries at standard international rates, and will only reluctantly commit to relatively underpaid work. This important perspective was confirmed orally to the evaluator, and reflects a deeper challenge regarding the possible role of INGOs in this resource-rich country.
3.4 Opportunities

3.4.1 Myanmar

• DCA must capitalise on its long experience in the region and its good relations with various organisations along the border, while not jeopardising its chances to work with the State (and in particular under the President’s Office’s authority).

• Given its understanding of the reality in border-States and the amount of data collected (e.g. Jan. 2013 Needs Assessment, and through MRE), DCA could potentially play a leading role in steering the MMAC towards NSAs’ inclusion and working towards the MPC’s objectives.

• DCA’s collaboration with DSW and UNICEF can lead to an extension of the MRE programme, and gradual

3.4.2 Lebanon

• In line with the nationalisation efforts already undertaken, and given the long-term need for clearance throughout the country, DCA Lebanon is actively looking for a national partner in collaboration with the LMAC. A potential candidate has been identified in Lebanon Demining Organisation (LDO), but any decision will need to be taken with the LMAC’s approval.

• Once identified, this partner should be the focus of Capacity Building and Mentoring efforts in order to guarantee a sustainable hand-over, or exit strategy.

• DCA has already significantly reduced its international personnel, with the exception of two positions. As the internal capacity building effort continues, DCA has an opportunity to ultimately manage a qualified, entirely Lebanese team.

• The conflict in Syria has direct implications for Lebanon with, among other factors, the arrival of thousands of refugees. While Lebanese citizens tend to be aware of the presence of minefields in their area, newcomers may lead to increased risks of accidents, and to a revision of priorities for clearance.

• The enormous amount of explosive ordnances used in Syria will also constitute an opportunity for a future DCA programme, which can benefit from the experience gained in Lebanon.
3.4.3 Libya

- Clearance activities by internationals are not likely to be needed in the long run and, given the difficulties in obtaining meaningful tasks, DCA Libya should focus on strengthening other programmes, such as MRE, PSS and AVR, and on training and mentoring local capacity.

- A comprehensive survey would be useful to update the existing database and revise the national clearance strategy based on identified needs.

- The LMAC needs strong support to be able to effectively coordinate HMA in Libya. DCA cannot significantly help it be recognised nationally, but can continue playing a key role in the training of LMAC staff alongside NPA’s advisor.

- DCA’s Humanitarian MA mandate should be preserved. Unless the situation changes in Misrata, the two clearance teams currently in the city could be better used elsewhere, such as is Sirte or other places where Misrata searchers would be allowed to work.

- DCA’s Development and Relief and HMA offices are unnaturally isolated from each other. A closer collaboration would be beneficial to both departments, starting with a more integrated administration and logistics management.

- Integration could then take place at programmatic level: HMA’s less controversial projects could open the door for gender activities. Conversely, CBOs collaborating with the gender programme could provide opportunities for HMA in new areas.
4 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The following section provides answers to the agreed evaluation questions, per criterion and per country. For the sake of readability, we have not repeated all sub-questions under each country’s section. For reference, the full list of questions and sub-questions per evaluation criterion can be found in Section 1.3.

4.1 Limitations

Although our team invested considerable effort to meet all relevant stakeholders and visit all areas where DCA programmes are run in the three countries, we were unable to access some locations and stakeholders for varying security, logistical and political reasons.

In particular, during our visit to Myanmar we could only stay in Yangon, as access is severely restricted to most border-States. This did allow us to meet relevant organisations involved in Humanitarian Mine Action and attend a preparatory workshop for the establishment of Myanmar’s Mine Action Centre. Our visit then included a Mine Risk Education workshop in Mae Hong Son, Thailand, delivered by DCA, Geneva Call and Norwegian People’s Aid.

In Lebanon, the uninterrupted presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese Intelligence prevented us from asking beneficiaries direct questions. We were, however, able to observe two clearance teams at work in Central Lebanon and meet a number of relevant stakeholders, including the Lebanese Mine Action Centre, Arbaniyeh Municipality, and NGOs. Furthermore, the availability of reliable data, both at LMAC-level and in available reports, provided us with the information we could not collect directly.

In Libya, we were able to observe clearance teams both in Tripoli and in Misrata. However, part of DCA’s staff were on leave at the time of the visit, and both the Psycho-Social Support and the Armed Violence Reduction Project Coordinators could only be met very briefly.

4.2 Overarching question

“What can we learn from our existing programmes that can help us become more effective, efficient and improve our delivery when we implement mine action programmes?”

This question is addressed in section 8, as a series of recommendations.
4.3 Relevance

To what extent are the programmes relevant to the identified needs, especially related to reducing the level of risks and socio-economic development potentials?

4.3.1 Myanmar

Relevance to identified needs – Risk Education

As a result of the volatile situation and the fragile ceasefire, many armed groups are still planting landmines. Some communities continue to perceive these mines as necessary protection and will refuse to have them cleared.

At the same time, population movements and expected returns of refugees and internally displaced people mean there is a clear need for further MRE, especially since the most significant movements are registered in the most contaminated areas.

In this context, and given the impossibility of working from Yangon in large parts of border-States, targeting ethnic minorities and pursuing the effort for MRE through local partners seems to be the only way to respond efficiently in terms of risk reduction, at least until mine clearance is made possible in these areas.

Relevance to identified needs – Victim Assistance

Available statistics show that over the last few years there have been fewer mine victims, however the accuracy and credibility of this data is unknown. Mines and explosive ordnances continue to maim civilians, and being able to identify and manage UXO risk is a significant improvement in the quality of life of direct beneficiaries.

At the same time, providing necessary assistance to mine-accident survivors is a way to address the hardships, stress and exclusion faced by people with mine-related disabilities, and allows them to contribute to the socio-economic development their communities.

For these reasons, and given the current advocacy work that is being carried out on the rights of disabled people in Myanmar, the rehabilitation of victims through the provision of prosthetic limbs and physiotherapy is a very relevant, though geographically limited, response to identified needs.

Adherence to National and International Standards

National Mine Action Standards are currently being drafted within the Myanmar Mine Action Centre. International Standards are being used as a reference, and adapted as necessary. However, there is no clear mechanism or body in place at this stage to verify
compliance with these standards, and the effectiveness of a national strategy will be severely limited by this constraint.

**Adherence to relevant policies**

Unlike other HMA programmes DCA delivers elsewhere, DCA’s programmes for Myanmar are mostly run through local partner organisations. Training and supporting local CSOs and CBOs is in line with principles of rights-based approach and empowering citizens, but transfers part of the responsibility for relevance-checks to these implementing partners.

As detailed in the “Safer Communities” approach (see Section 5), this is a significant change from the traditional approach to Mine Action, and Myanmar can represent a good example of what DCA would want to achieve through Mine Action programmes globally. It is also in line with DCA’s work outside the HMA unit. It requires, nevertheless, stronger and more systematic monitoring and capacity building systems to be put in place, as explained below.

**Improvements needed**

In terms of possible improvements, there is a need for closer monitoring of DCA’s partners. Over 250 MRE facilitators have been trained and are regularly deployed to provide MRE sessions throughout border-States. This grants DCA privileged access to areas otherwise inaccessible, and to information on contaminated areas and populations’ needs.

On the other hand, relying on another party for the delivery of programmes requires a strong monitoring system. Without this, it will be very difficult to assess DCA programme efficiency and impact at beneficiary level, and there will be little or inconsistent accountability.

The risks of poor data reliability resulting from data collection by non-professional partners is demonstrated by the following example, taken from a large survey conducted by Community-Based Organisations on landmines in Southeast Myanmar:

For instance, one report says the type of explosive to cause the accident was: “Burmese army mine”. This is very likely, but how do we know, since the victim knows little of mine-types, and stated earlier in the report, that he did not even see the object. No matter whether the mine was, or was not, planted by the Burmese army, this field in the report, should have just said ‘factory made blast mine’.³

This could be addressed by setting up dedicated, professional monitoring teams that would periodically visit target areas and monitor programme outcomes and impact.

³ Findings from the DCA CBO mine victim database, February 2013, p.4
4.3.2 Lebanon

Relevance to identified needs
The needs in terms of HMA in Lebanon are clearly identified. The widely recognised threat posed to the population by cluster bombs and unexploded ordnances has direct implications in terms of both risks and socio-economic development potential. The LMAC has a well developed and regularly updated database that keeps track of reported areas to be cleared. The Lebanese Armed Forces also have the capacity to verify and identify the most urgent needs, and subsequently deploy the necessary resources through their partners. The population is generally aware of the location and extension of contaminated land, and does not need to be further informed on mine risk. Victim assistance is provided by qualified organisations, and the need for international support is mostly limited to mine clearance. This need is justified by the extent of UXO contamination in the country, and the limited national capacity to take clearance efforts in its own hands.

Since clearance teams are assigned tasks by the LMAC/RMAC, with little room for negotiation, ensuring the relevance of assigned tasks could potentially become a risk over which DCA has very limited control. DCA mitigates this risk by systematically carrying out post-impact assessments. So far, most cleared land has been used by beneficiaries within three months following its release. As presented in the diagrams below, usage is mostly divided between agriculture and grazing, and in some cases also includes construction and infrastructure. This indicates that completed tasks were indeed relevant to the population’s needs, and not only reduced risks, but also opened the way for socio-economic opportunities.

*Land use after Battle Area Clearance tasks – February 2013 Report*
Adherence to International Standards

Regarding international standards, the compliance of DCA’s activities with IMAS is monitored thoroughly, both internally and by the LMAC, which runs regular Quality Control (QC) visits. Minor faults have been occasionally reported (such as protective equipment not being worn at all times by some of the staff) and appropriate measures were systematically taken to remediate the risks, including re-training when necessary. No major warnings have been reported by the LMAC.

Adherence to relevant policies

DCA’s Gender Equality Policy supports the third UN Millennium Development Goal, which is to “To promote gender equality and empower women”4.

Efforts in this regard have led to the extensive recruitment of female support staff, and the presence of female members among the clearance teams. Given the focus on operations, and the nature of the teams’ work (especially for MMC), gender equality efforts should not be limited to measuring the number of people employed by gender. Rather, gender equality activities should focus on providing equal access to all positions, involving men in promoting gender equality and eliminating all forms of gender-based discriminations. A noteworthy measure taken by DCA to pursue this objective is the regular re-shuffling of the teams. This ensures all team members are treated and treat each other equally, regardless of any dividing issues, including gender.

4 DCA Cross-Cutting Policy – Gender Equality Commitment, p.2
**Increasing socio-economic development potentials**

According to the interviewed Municipality staff, and to LDO reports, the programmes are well targeted and relevant. As mentioned above, most released land is rapidly used by the beneficiaries, and new plantations or buildings have been reported. In a few isolated cases, however, beneficiaries have complained that released land cannot be used because of the soil’s nature, or that the municipalities have not built needed infrastructure:

> The owners requested from the municipality to pave the road, but until now it is not paved.\(^5\)
> A part of the land is not used because it is rocky (...) it needs to be bulldozed and that requires renting a big bulldozer, and they do not have any financial support.\(^6\)

DCA’s control over how land is used is limited, but an effort could be made by Field Operations Officers in terms of Community Liaison, to support better coordination and information flow between beneficiaries and municipalities and hence mitigate risks of disappointment. An open dialogue before clearance could identify how beneficiaries intend to use the land, what their needs are to realise that objective, what resources are available, and whether the municipalities will provide any help.

**Data management and learning**

As far as data management is concerned, the new LMAC database (IMSMA) covers all identified needs for tracking, tasking and reporting. LMAC staff responsible for the IMSMA are well trained and further assisted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and UNDP. Within DCA, the database developed in Copenhagen should give a better overview of each programme and simplify information flow, which is currently complex and relies mostly on spreadsheets sent by email. A centralised database will greatly simplify data entry, verification and extraction for all staff involved in data management and for DCA to learn from the evidence collected.

**4.3.3 Libya**

**Relevance to identified needs**

Mines are not the main threat to Libyans, and DCA has diversified its programmes accordingly from a classic clearance programme to a variety of activities delivered under a broader understanding of HMA. Given the available financial resources in the country, the main challenge is to develop national capacity so that the Libyans can take care of clearance themselves. This will in turn address both the current risks posed by unexploded remnants

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\(^5\) LMAC Hazard Reduction pre/Post Clearance Survey PS-CBU 470, by LDO, p.4

\(^6\) LMAC Hazard Reduction pre/Post Clearance Survey PS-CBU 556, by LDO, p.4
of war and increasing socio-economic development potentials. DCA has therefore started looking for a potential national partner, to whom it could gradually transfer expertise and responsibilities. This partner has not been identified yet, so DCA has developed and delivered a number of trainings, notably to the Civil Defence. The LMAC is also in need of a strong investment in capacity building, and DCA has invited four staff to attend the EOD training to be held in Skive, Denmark in July 2013.

Apart from clearance and disposal of explosive ordnances, DCA’s activities in Libya include Armed Violence Reduction, through the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) programme, Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Psycho-Social Support (PSS), which are both complementary and relevant to identified needs. The SALW programme has faced difficulties regarding its implementation (cf. section 4.4.3), and has so far been limited to advocacy and sensitising on the danger caused by SALW. The civilian population has expressed considerable interest in the program, requesting that the DCA provide advice on how to dispose of their weapons. This is a good indication of the relevance of this project for beneficiaries in Libya.

Although three clearance teams are still operational, the shift from the initial programme to the current array of services provided and the focus on capacity building clearly is responding to identified needs. This shift has also facilitated more targeted activities, which are likely to improve both efficiency and effectiveness of the Libyan programme overall.

**Adherence to International Standards**

The Libyan Mine Action Standards (MAS) are still under development, and are complemented by the International MAS. UNMAS is in charge of Quality Control, and verifies compliance with both IMAS and each organisation’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Discrepancies have been reported between different MA organisations. This occasionally leads to discussions with UNMAS on technical aspects such as the quantity of explosive needed for disposal, but no major inconsistencies have been reported.

Following the two serious accidents suffered by DCA, SOPs were revised to ensure they were adapted to the specificities of clearance in Libya, including how to deal with specific ordnances that are uncommon elsewhere.

**Adherence to relevant policies - Gender**

In terms of gender, DCA Libya employs a majority of female support staff (administration, finances, logistics), but no female deminers are part of the clearance teams. This is due to the sociocultural context and to the nature of the work carried out by the teams. DCA’s HMA programme has little influence over these factors. Trying to shift the gender balance further would contradict the fundamental principle of equal opportunities.
4.4 Effectiveness

To what extent were objectives achieved at outcome and, if verifiable, at impact level? Why and why not? Are there any unintended results of the programme?

4.4.1 Myanmar

Extent to which objectives were achieved

The overall objective is to have “Myanmar free from the threat of Landmines and ERW, where IDPs and refugees have safely returned home to safe environments and where development is unimpeded by mines/UXO.”

This objective will not be achieved before clearance is formally allowed and accepted by both the Government and Non-State Actors (NSAs), a Mine Action Centre is operational and recognised, and the International Community can properly fund and support relevant HMA activities. The underlying assumption for this to happen is not only that the ceasefire holds and the peace process advances, but that the State establishes a Mine Action authority and grants the International Community permission to support HMA, access contaminated areas and engage with NSAs. Despite international support for establishing the Myanmar Peace Centre and the Myanmar Mine Action Centre (notably through EU and Japanese funding) and NPA acting as a coordinator and technical advisor, these conditions are not being met at the moment, and are beyond the scope of DCA’s activities.

Similarly, the first Specific Objective of releasing land impacted from mines/ERW contamination through NTS, manual clearance and EOD spot tasks is not currently something DCA can pursue.

DCA is however actively engaged in both Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA), the second and third Specific Objectives of the programme, respectively. The exact extent to which the programme has achieved its goal is difficult to establish, since there are no official, reliable figures available on contamination, and therefore on the extent of the risk to be addressed through MRE. There is also no reliable data nor on the number of mine-related accidents, and therefore on the number of victims in need of assistance. Due to the sensitivity of all issues related to landmines and conflicts in Myanmar, DCA has to rely on data collected through its partners, which cannot be disclosed or used openly.

Based on an extensive survey conducted by a number of Community-Based Organisations (CIDKP, KBC, KDHW, KRDC, KSWDC, LDU & PSLF) in Southeast Myanmar between 2006 and 2012, it appears that the number of victims has decreased over the last few years (cf. figure below). One of the factors behind this trend could be that communities are effectively more
aware of risks. This is only an assumption, however, and a more reliable assessment of populations’ awareness will be provided by the KAP survey that DCA and UNICEF were finalising at the time of writing.

The general nature of the objectives and the general evolution of incidents in the country make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the programme beyond the output level. DCA was able to effectively deliver specific outputs and, at least at that level, has achieved its objectives.

DCA’s MRE programme in Myanmar is run in cooperation with UNICEF and the Department of Social Welfare. This has implications as regards available human and material resources. At the time of the visit, MRE sessions had recently been suspended due to UNICEF’s insufficient personnel to handle the on-going Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey and additional trainings simultaneously. DCA could have carried out further trainings alone, but would subsequently not have satisfied the requirement of working with officially approved partners. In light of this, the longer-term objective of establishing solid relationships with State Authorities and gradually engaging with NSAs justified putting MRE activities on hold temporarily. The KAP survey should also provide useful data in terms of the beneficiaries’ use of MRE and therefore whether, and to what extent these activities have had an impact.

As far as Victim Assistance is concerned, the mobile prosthetic clinic has allowed victims in remote areas to receive limbs and physiotherapy/rehabilitation sessions that would
otherwise be inaccessible. This seems to be a very effective way to reach beneficiaries. The objective was not reached at output level, due to an underestimation of the time needed for beneficiaries to adapt to their new limbs. This must be taken into account in future definitions of objectives in order to measure progress against realistic targets. At outcome-level, however, the additional time dedicated to each area where DCA intervened has ensured higher quality of the service provided and better utilisation by the beneficiaries.

**Capacity Building**
Running these programmes through partners has implied a strong effort of capacity building by DCA. The information available indicates that the efforts made to enhance partners’ capacity have been successful, since they are able to pursue training activities.

**Monitoring**
On the other hand, reliance on local partners implies that a stronger monitoring system than is currently available should be set up. This could be implemented through simple measures such as pre-and post-training questionnaires for MRE participants, periodic (re-) trainings of trainers, and regular post-activity impact assessments.

**Programme Management**
Overall, the programme management was found to be well-aware of progress made and difficulties encountered, and able to adjust the planning accordingly. When necessary, such decisions are discussed with and supported by headquarters, in agreement with the Regional Office. The relationship between the national programme management, the regional office and headquarter appears to be well-balanced and constructive, and is reflected in the decisions to appoint an HMA Programme Manager to be based in Yangon at the Regional Office, and to include HMA activities within the Regional Office’s strategy.

4.4.2 Lebanon

**Extent to which objectives were achieved**
DCA has regularly surpassed its objectives at output level, in terms of cleared square meters, regardless of the number of explosive ordinances actually found. It was confirmed by the LMAC and NPA that DCA scores very well compared to other HMA NGOs. This is partly due to DCA’s strong relationship with the LMAC, which allows DCA to use LAF equipment when needed. The rate of clearance is expected to decrease, due to increasingly difficult work conditions (e.g. mountains instead of flat land). Output-level objectives may have to be revised for the coming years depending on the nature of tasks assigned. Nevertheless, the LMAC reported satisfaction and confidence in DCA’s work in the near future. No unintended results were reported.
There are two outcome-level objectives: the first is to *increase the possibilities of land use and to alleviate risk through clearance of cluster munitions and land mines contaminated areas*. This was achieved where DCA’s clearance teams intervened, as confirmed by involved municipalities and the extensive survey carried out by LDO with beneficiaries. All land cleared by DCA’s teams was validated by the LMAC and released to its legitimate owners. This satisfies both concerns, and the extent to which possibilities for land used are fully exploited falls beyond the scope of DCA’s work.

The second outcome-level objective is to *build national capacities for the Lebanese clearance efforts*. This is understood in two ways: the presence of national staff in decision making positions, the extent of collaboration with a national partner.

The first criterion is well reflected by DCA’s gradual reduction of international staff, and transfer of responsibilities to national staff. The positions still occupied by international staff are limited to the Programme Manager (PM), the Finance and Administration Manager (FM) and the Development Manager (DM). The nationalisation of the Operations Manager position was a significant step in this direction. Internal discussions over gradually nationalising the finances and administration were on-going at the time of our visit. This would only leave an international PM, together with the DM, whose role is seen as temporary and mostly dedicated to reinforcing the Capacity Building Plan, therefore directly contributing to the objective’s achievement.

As regards partnerships, DCA Lebanon is looking for a national partner who could ultimately take over all activities, including clearance. For a smooth transfer to take place, this needs to be done in agreement with the LMAC, and DCA can therefore not push for it unilaterally, nor set a definitive deadline.

The ensuing impact-level objective to *assist Lebanon in restoring the conditions necessary for the security of its population and its economic and social development* can therefore also be considered achieved in areas where DCA intervened. The contribution of DCA’s programme towards the achievement of this objective cannot be isolated from other efforts by both national and international organisations. We cannot, therefore, measure to what extent the objective was reached at national level, but three impact-level achievements can be observed where DCA intervened: a) the population is safe from explosive remnants of war; b) socio-economic development can take place; c) by working with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), DCA contributes to strengthening a national entity that is ultimately responsible for the population’s security and one of the only non-partisan, non-confessional institutions in an otherwise deeply fragmented society.
**DCA Policy on AVR**

DCA’s Armed Violence Reduction Prevention and Reduction Programme Policy states that: *DCA will emphasise support to interventions at the national and sub-national levels that target a measurable reduction in armed violence.*

Armed violence and the availability of arms to non-state actors pose a serious threat to Lebanon’s stability. As recent conflicts in Tripoli, Saida, the Bekaa valley or Beirut’s suburbs reminded us, peace in Lebanon is fragile and deeply related to the events unfolding in Syria. The State’s capacity to prevent armed violence is clearly limited, but this remains its ultimate responsibility. DCA’s mandate and objectives are, for the time being, limited to clearance and only if explicitly requested by the LAF could it then develop a specific programme line for AVR.

**Capacity Building**

Capacity building efforts have allowed for the nationalisation of the operational part of DCA’s programme in Lebanon and for some staff to rapidly progress. This process has included assistance from international staff and training periods for national staff within other DCA programmes. The Development Manager’s role appears to be crucial in pursuing this effort further, by organising and helping implement Personal Development programmes. There has however so far been a focus on Operations, while support staff need further capacitation, especially in terms of finances and administration. This is currently being addressed: DCA is training national support staff to increasingly take on responsibilities, and the Finance and Administration Manager position is expected to be nationalised as soon as feasible (in terms of both capacity and commitment).

**Gender Efforts**

Female staff are an integral part of DCA’s programme in Lebanon. They represent a large share of the support personnel, and are integrated into the clearance teams. It is however difficult to further shift the gender balance, as support staff have been reduced to a minimum and clearance activities, especially for MMC, are physically very demanding.

**Monitoring and Data Management**

Several people monitor the daily progress made by all teams: Radio Operators, Field Operation Officers, and the Operation Manager. This ensures that any relevant issue will be reported quickly to management level. Quality Assurance is also systematically covered, both internally and by LMAC visits. As confirmed by the LMAC, QA visits have only occasionally signalled small infractions, which were immediately addressed by the programme management.

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7 DCA Programme Policy – Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction, p.1
4.4.3 Libya

Extent to which objectives were achieved
DCA’s programme in Libya has several components, which together contribute to reaching the impact-level objective, which is to support the conflict affected population by creating a safe and secure environment for the reconstruction of Libya. The extent to which this long-term objective can be attained largely depends on dynamics beyond the scope of DCA’s programme, as well as on progress made under each of the programme’s four specific objectives, as detailed below.

The first specific objective is the Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and is pursued by three teams (one EOD team in Tripoli and two BAC teams in Misrata). These teams respond to Tripoli and Misrata’s Mine Action Centres respectively, who assign tasks to the different INGOs involved in clearance. As a resident of Dafniyeh said, referring to the explosion of an ammunition storage area that left the surroundings heavily contaminated with various types of explosive ordnances: “We were used to the fighting, but this was something different. We didn’t leave our house for several days. After the clearance, thank God, everything went back to normal.” Interviews by DCA’s Community Liaison Officers reveal that local residents feel indeed safer and were able, within a few days, to return to their daily lives, go to school, re-open their businesses, and so on. Where DCA’s teams were able to clear and release land, the objective can be considered to have been systematically achieved.

The second specific objective is the Capacity building of national authorities. All national actors involved require strong capacitation efforts in order to ultimately take care of the threats posed by ERW and armed violence themselves. DCA has therefore designed and delivered a number of trainings, notably for the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior. The growing number of requests for additional trainings suggests the beneficiaries targeted so far were satisfied with the quality of the activities delivered. Furthermore, DCA has invited four staff from Tripoli’s LMAC to take part in the EOD Level 2 training in Skive. Although these activities’ impact will only be visible in the long run and if they are followed by appropriate mentoring or follow-up trainings, the fact that DCA has become a reference for trainings on EOD in Libya shows it was successful in this crucial component of its Libyan HMA programme.

The third specific objective concerns the Prevention and Reduction of Armed Violence through the procurement of gun boxes, trigger locks and gun cabinets to collect and safely store personal arms. The Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) / Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) component of DCA’s programme has suffered from a combination of internal and external factors. At the time of Channel’s visit, local authorities in Misrata had still not
granted DCA a formal authorisation for the project’s implementation. In the meantime, DCA has carried out awareness-raising activities through billboard campaigns, leaflets distribution, symbolic disarmament activities in schools and a series of other targeted actions as part of the International Mine Awareness Day, on 4 April 2013. These events have involved hundreds of children and will resume with the new school year, in September 2013. Contacts from citizens willing to dispose of their weapons indicate DCA’s activities have reached out to at least part of the population, preparing the ground for the actual implementation of the planned project. This will not be possible, however, until DCA is granted both the necessary authorisations from the authorities in Misrata and guarantees regarding the treatment of personal data and the disposal of collected weapons.

The fourth specific objective regards the Protection of Vulnerable Groups. This is being addressed by Psycho-Social Support (PSS) activities, which have included trainings for parents, teachers and social workers, support to the AVR component in organising the 4th of April event, a quiz organised with partner schools in Misrata, and the preparation of a special song on the risks of mines, a PSS film, and other communication material aimed at reaching out to the community. The PSS programme was initiated under DCA’s Humanitarian and Relief Programme and subsequently integrated into HMA activities. It has however suffered from insufficient attention compared to clearance activities, and as a result reached a smaller number of beneficiaries than initially planned, with delays. Despite a lower level of achievement at output level, the overall response appears to be very positive, and the wide network of partners is encouraging for potential future phases of the programme.

**DCA Policy on AVR**

As stated in DCA’s policy on AVR, DCA is able to promote AVR only in countries, regions or cities where rights holders can realistically expect the state to uphold its duty to providing public security and where its monopoly on the legitimate and non-abusive use of violence is both a desirable and feasible goal.\(^8\) This implies having a deep understanding of the local context, working with recognised authorities and supporting local initiatives. In Libya, DCA cannot currently push unilaterally for people to surrender their weapons, since it is unable to guarantee how collected personal data will be treated and by whom. Given the already complicated relationship with Misrata’s Military Council, DCA has no choice but to wait for proper authorisation to deliver its SALW programme. This is the most appropriate and only possible course of action at the moment. It is however noteworthy, and still consistent with the policy, that DCA has been preparing the ground for such a programme through its awareness-raising campaigns and activities.

\(^8\) DCA Programme Policy – Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction, p.4
Capacity Building
As stated above, significant capacity building efforts have been and are being produced by DCA in Libya. Internally, this has meant training and supporting DCA staff, both for technical operations and for support. DCA has put together a national team and has provided it with appropriate international support, despite several destabilising events that occurred over the last year. These include the conversion of staff in Misrata into deminers and the opening of the office in Tripoli in late 2012/early 2013, and several departures. A large portion of the staff has only been with DCA for a few months and will require further support for the coming months, especially regarding administrative positions. Externally, capacitation has included a series of trainings to relevant Libyan authorities and the search for a national partner. Whereas the trainings have already produced results, which will bear fruits in the long run, the potential national partner has not yet been identified.

Gender Efforts
There are clear limitations to female involvement in clearance teams in Libya. The increasingly conservative Libyan society would not easily accept women taking part in what is considered manual labour, as part of male-dominated teams. In all other positions, however, women are well represented. This includes support positions in general administration, logistics, human resources. An important element is the presence of a woman as Community Liaison Officer. This role is of crucial importance in gathering relevant information from beneficiaries, and in ensuring communities are placed at the centre of DCA’s work overall. If Libyan women can be supported to efficiently carry out such roles, this will have significant indirect effects in promoting gender equality. If we understand gender commitment as providing equal opportunities to men and women, and as fighting to remove all forms of discrimination, DCA Libya’s programme can be considered having achieved its objectives.

Monitoring
In terms of monitoring, each team reports daily to the management. Issues can therefore be dealt with rapidly. An excessive focus on clearance in the first phases of the programme has meant that other programme lines have suffered and have not progressed as planned. This, however, was mostly due to a lack of available management resources to follow all programme lines simultaneously, and to the context (e.g. authorisations still pending for the SALW programme) rather than to deficient monitoring. 2013 has seen the reorganisation of DCA’s structure in Libya, staff arrivals, and a new, refined strategy that should allow programmes other than clearance to receive the attention and resources they need.

Programme Management
DCA’s HMA programme in Libya started as an emergency response to the immediate need for clearance while the conflict was still on-going. It then gradually integrated other
dimensions of HMA, such as AVR and PSS. The evolution of DCA’s strategy for Libya shows a deep understanding of the local context, needs and possibilities for intervention. The programme has faced a number of challenges, including recruiting and retaining staff, adapting to specificities of each area of intervention, and managing two offices with several separate programme lines. These challenges now appear to have been clearly identified, and relevant responses have been integrated in the revised strategy for 2013. The staff in Libya reported receiving sufficient support from both the Programme Coordinator and Headquarter. As for other programmes visited, joint country/headquarter decision-making processes appear to be effective, especially regarding strategic planning and the provision of additional resources.

4.5 Efficiency

The Terms of Reference request an enquiry about the programmes’ cost-efficiency. Whereas cost-effectiveness is related to achieving pre-determined outcomes at the lowest possible cost, cost-efficiency is based on the achievement of maximum outcomes with a given, pre-determined amount of resources. The difficulty with this question is that the outcomes of a Humanitarian Mine Action programme are extremely varied. As mentioned in previous sections, HMA can simultaneously contribute to economic development (access to markets, access to land), to social development (access to education and health facilities), to the enjoyment of rights (by empowering people with skills and information) and to peace-building (through the creation of a climate of confidence). Moreover, the achievement of outcomes is not solely dependent on a programme’s implementation. Other factors will have a direct impact on the number of beneficiaries reached, or the way these beneficiaries use delivered outputs.

Given the variety of desired outcomes and the difficulty in assessing a programme’s contribution at that level, assessing a programme’s cost per beneficiary would not provide reliable or comparable data. In order to compare different programmes and draw useful lessons overall, the following section therefore focusses on the identification of areas where available resources were either efficiently managed to achieve the desired objectives or, on the contrary, where resources were “wasted” and more results could have been obtained.

*Has the programme approach, in case of the three selected programmes, been a cost-efficient way to implement mine action?*
4.5.1 Myanmar

When suitable local organisations can be identified, choosing to implement HMA activities through partners is a very efficient way to reduce the costs that international staff would incur. This is particularly clear in the case of MRE in Myanmar, where one person trained over 250 MRE trainers, through a growing network of partner organisations. These trainers in turn can deliver sessions to larger numbers of beneficiaries, and potentially train further partners.

Sharing facilities and some members of staff with the Regional Office is also an important cost-cutting measure.

4.5.2 Lebanon

As far as technical operations are concerned, DCA’s good relations with the LMAC and other INGOs ensure expensive equipment/resources are made available when needed, without incurring in extra costs. This is at least part of the reason why DCA has so far achieved more results than other INGOs (cf. Effectiveness section).

As mentioned previously, international personnel currently fills three positions, out of a staff numbering over a hundred: Programme Manager (PM), Finance and Administration Manager (FM) and Development Manager (DM). DCA is currently working on nationalising the FM position, and the DM position is not intended to be maintained in the long run. In the meantime, the DM’s contribution, in coordination with the PM and Logistics, has already led to significant cost-cutting measures and is expected to further increase cost-efficiency by establishing clearer procedures for all operational aspects of the programme. These are the main two remaining cost-cutting measures DCA Lebanon can take.

Another area where DCA’s investment has led to increased efficiency is capacity building. The capacitation of national staff is not only a direct way to reduce costs, but provides additional tangible advantages. For example, DCA’s Field Operations Officers, apart from supervising the clearance teams, play a role of Community Liaison Officers. As interviews with the teams and with the Municipality of Arbaniyeh revealed, FOOs’ regular contacts with local communities and their own personal skills allow them to obtain detailed information regarding mines’ actual location, from the very persons who laid them during the civil war. This of course contributes to saving time and resources.
4.5.3 Libya

The Libyan programme has undergone significant changes since its inception, both in its thematic and geographical scopes. This evolution was justified, as described above (cf. Relevance and Effectiveness sections), but has entailed an under-utilisation of available resources, and some programmes have not been implemented at full capacity.

From a cost-efficiency point of view, the mobilisation of three clearance teams, with the logistical and administrative support they require, seems inefficient if one looks at the tasks currently being assigned in Misrata and in Tripoli. This is largely due to local authorities’ unwillingness to encourage HMA and lack of capacity, respectively. Nevertheless, in order to remain efficient DCA Libya will have to either reduce the number of team members or find them other areas in which they are permitted to work.

DCA’s HMA programme in Libya could also increase its cost-efficiency in some of its administrative tasks, in particular finances and logistics. Having two separate management lines for HMA and DCA’s gender empowerment programme appears widely inefficient. These programmes are very different in nature and respond to different DCA offices (Headquarter and the Regional Office in Palestine, respectively). There are nevertheless certainly a number of tasks that could be carried out by one person for both programmes, especially since they share the same bank account anyway.

From a human resources perspective, the setup of DCA’s HMA programme in Libya is relatively “expatriate-intensive”. This is justified by the need for local capacity building and the lack of long-term perspective for international intervention in Libya. If DCA were to stay beyond its current funding, however, it would have to gradually nationalise its activities, which would reduce staffing costs.

If we look at results achieved and available resources (understood as a combination of finances, time and human resources), there are certainly areas where more could have been achieved. Most importantly, a stronger needs assessment in the early stages of the programme could have highlighted the need for capacity building and the potential for non-clearance activities in general, including PSS and AVR, which could have been allocated the necessary resources earlier. This has been addressed now, and we can expect the programme to be run in a more efficient way in the coming months.
4.6 Impact

What has been the impact at beneficiary (outcome) level? And at other levels that were supposedly addressed by the programme?

4.6.1 Myanmar

Given the difficulty in meeting direct beneficiaries of DCA’s programme in Myanmar, the following observations are based on hypotheses, relevant meetings held with other stakeholders, and the one Mine Risk Education (MRE) workshop Channel’s team attended in Mae Hong Son, Thailand. The enthusiastic participation in the workshop’s group works suggests a strong interest in activities delivered by DCA, and participants showed a good understanding of the content. Given DCA’s experience in delivering MRE trainings, and the growing requests for such activities, we can assume that they have been well-targeted and well-received overall. However, Channel Research’s team was not able to assess to what extent the delivered activities contributed to a greater awareness of risks posed by landmines and other explosive ordnances, or to a better understanding of how to recognise and deal with such threats. This increased understanding can in turn stimulate the reflection among communities on the weighted benefits and risks posed by the use of landmines, and (if the ceasefire holds and circumstances allow) ultimately contribute to the peace process overall. In this regard, working in partnership with the Department for Social Welfare can also contribute to restoring trust in the Government among targeted minorities.

Mine Victim Assistance (VA) has a clear direct impact for beneficiaries and their communities. As victims are rehabilitated and enabled to take part in socio-economic activities, they will no longer be perceived as “disabled”, or burdens for their families and communities, but as an integral component. The involvement of some mine victims in the production and provision of prosthetic limbs indicates how important rehabilitation is, and how positive the programme’s impact is.

DCA’s choice to support Community-Based Organisations in delivering HMA programmes in Myanmar also has an impact in terms of strengthening local organisations, and developing capacities to run such activities.

4.6.2 Lebanon

Following clearance, beneficiaries are able to safely access and use previously contaminated land. As impact surveys show, released land is mostly used for agriculture and grazing, and for construction. These activities have a direct impact on beneficiaries’ livelihoods. Additionally, some municipalities have built or renovated roads and public infrastructure, benefiting the whole community.
Another important difference DCA has made through its programme is the capacitation of local staff. Thanks to a strong personal development plan and a clear nationalisation strategy, DCA has allowed competent staff to rapidly progress and acquire new skills.

An indirect impact, related to working under the Lebanese Mine Action Centre, and therefore the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), is the strengthening of the population’s perception of the Army as an enabling presence. In Lebanon’s complex mosaic, the LAF remain one of the few symbols above the confessional and political divides. Although this is not directly linked to DCA’s programme objectives, it is an important aspect, which contributes to strengthening national unity.

4.6.3 Libya

The multiple components of DCA’s Libyan programme have produced several outcomes that affect the beneficiaries’ lives. It is however too early to measure any lasting changes at impact-level. Although clearance directly provides beneficiaries with safe access to and usage of previously contaminated areas and roads, other activities will require more time to produce any change: it remains to be seen how trained authorities will use acquired skills to gradually and eventually take Humanitarian Mine Action into their own hands; the Small Arms and Light Weapons project has prepared the ground for wider armed violence reduction measures, which have not taken place yet; Psycho-Social Support also contributes to awareness-raising, and to capacitating a network of actors involved in supporting people affected by the conflict and violence in general, but changes cannot at this stage be observed.

Another way in which DCA is indirectly contributing to change is by providing employment opportunities for women, hence contributing to the fight against discrimination based on gender and to women’s empowerment in an increasingly conservative society.
4.7 Sustainability

a) Are the benefits from the programme, especially at beneficiary level likely to continue after the finalisation of the programme? Why and why not?

HMA overall provides benefits that are expected to be maintained long after a programme’s completion. This applies to clearance as well as to victim assistance and to MRE sessions. Unless a new conflict erupts, hence potentially annulling all HMA impact, benefits from completed activities should continue.

At programme level, however, funds cannot be guaranteed until all contaminated land is cleared, or all victims have received assistance, nor should affected countries rely on permanent international intervention. The only way to ensure sustainability until the ultimate goals are achieved is therefore to ensure gradual transfer of responsibilities to local authorities, with appropriate support for capacity building. This leads to the second key question for sustainability:

b) Have the capacity building efforts (organisational development and development of individuals) in the programmes (DCA staff, partners and beneficiaries) proven to be useful and sustainable? Why and why not?

4.7.1 Myanmar

a) Sustainability of benefits

To what extent the information provided through MRE sessions produces lasting changes in beneficiaries’ behaviour remains to be assessed. Nevertheless, we can expect such activities to have long-term effects for local communities and for returnees. Similarly, mine victims who have been provided with prosthetic limbs and physiotherapy are expected to be able to reintegrate their communities and participate to long-term socio-economic activities. Whether similar programmes can continue should DCA withdraw will depend on local organisations/national entities’ ability to attract necessary funding and their capacity to maintain the activities on-going. As long as peace doesn’t materialise, however, it is unlikely that an inclusive national effort can take place.

b) Sustainability of capacity building

DCA’s reliance on partners for the implementation of HMA in Myanmar is aligned with the objective of enabling local actors to eventually take care of HMA activities themselves. During our brief visit in March, we were unable to assess the extent to which local staff, including DCA and partners, had benefited from capacity building efforts. This would need to be clearly assessed before planning an exit strategy for DCA, together with an evaluation
of local capacity to recruit and train new staff and manage information to plan new activities and monitor on-going ones.

4.7.2 Lebanon

a) Sustainability of benefits
Released land has been permanently cleared, unless new conflicts erupt in the same areas. This provides long-lasting opportunities for beneficiaries’ livelihoods, at individual and community levels. Given the extent of explosive remnants of war contamination throughout the country, additional clearance efforts are likely to be needed for years, if not decades. In the long run, however, HMA activities are expected to be run entirely by national bodies, which have been increasingly enabled to pursue this effort.

b) Sustainability of capacity building
DCA has provided its staff with a series of trainings and continuous guidance. As progress in the nationalisation of operations shows, these efforts have proven to be both useful and sustainable. Efforts have been, and continue to be made to transfer more and more responsibilities to Lebanese staff, with remaining gaps in terms of finances and accountability. At the national level, since the UN withdrew, the LMAC has also increasingly developed its competences, and is now an efficient coordinating entity. Local organisations are already taking care of VA and MRE programmes, and at least one Lebanese NGO is carrying out BAC activities in Southern Lebanon. DCA is currently looking for a national partner that could also be involved in clearance. As the nationalisation of DCA’s activities continues, further progress is expected in ensuring sustainability after international involvement. For this to happen, however, attention must be paid to staff stability (frequent turnover has affected DCA operations in the past), and personal development efforts maintained.

4.7.3 Libya

a) Sustainability of benefits
Benefits regarding cleared and released land are likely to continue. During our visit, we observed that some of the tasks handed out to the Tripoli clearance team were out of date, and that the local population had already cleared and rebuilt on areas reported as contaminated. This indicates that access to land is a priority for the population, and clearance activities now provide safe access and usage. The benefits of MRE also provide direct, long-lasting benefits, even after completion of DCA’s activities. Other programmes, such as AVR and PSS will have to be assessed in the long run and still need further efforts before considering finalisation. The awareness-raising activities run under these two
programme lines have already provided benefits that are likely to continue, but it is unlikely that similar activities would continue to take place if DCA were to pull out.

**b) Sustainability of capacity building**

DCA’s national staff has benefited from the necessary trainings, especially as far as the clearance teams are concerned. Support staff, of which many were recruited in 2013, still needs further capacitation and support. Unlike the Lebanese programme, the lack of clear perspectives for a long-term engagement of DCA’s HMA programme in Libya has limited the effort made so far in terms of personal development for DCA staff. The revised strategy for DCA in Libya suggests that it could, based on the identified needs, pursue the capacity building efforts, while shifting the focus from clearance to MRE, AVR and PSS activities. In this regard, the partnerships already established locally could ensure sustainability, if partners are provided with sufficient trainings and mentoring. As far as local partners for clearance are concerned, no suitable organisation has yet been identified, but DCA is investigating this issue, and discussing it with the LMAC. Local authorities will also require [further] extensive capacity building efforts if they are to coordinate, task and monitor HMA in the country. Without this, efforts are likely to remain very inefficient as soon as the international community leaves Libya.
5 THE “SAFER COMMUNITIES” APPROACH

DCA’s approach to “Mine Action and Related Work” clarifies how it intends to address its work with communities to reduce the threats and consequences of conflict and armed violence. As the paper explains, this goes beyond the traditional understanding of what Mine Action entails. The main concept is effectively summarised in the title “Safer Communities”. This implies communities – and their needs – will be the focal point of all Mine Action (and Related) work provided by DCA, rather than the weapons. This will be true throughout all the stages of each programme, from the needs assessment to the measurement of achieved results.

This refined approach stems from the experience gained in a variety of contexts where DCA Mine Action has operated over the last two decades, and has clear links to some of our field observations (which were made before the Safer Communities paper was shared with us). These include the need for systematic, thorough and concerted needs assessments prior to any activity, the wider scope of “Mine Action” and its links to long-term improvement of communities’ livelihoods, the central role of Community Liaison Officers, and the opportunity of working through implementing partners.

This revised strategy reflects DCA’s vision for the future of Mine Action, and is a good indicator of how – beyond theoretical considerations – information flows from the field to Headquarters. Indeed, it shows that the Headquarters are well aware of issues faced and potential solutions found by field staff. The new approach seems to provide answers to many questions raised at programme level, and can contribute to integrating Mine Action more systematically into DCA’s work overall. It remains to be seen, however, how it can be effectively implemented.

The Libyan programme presents a good example of needs to be addressed. Project Coordinators for the psycho-social support and the small arms and light weapons projects found themselves relatively isolated, and couldn’t find the support they needed a) in Libya, because the programme management was overburdened due to several departures and focussed on other issues that seemed more urgent; b) from headquarters, as available staff did not have the necessary expertise in these new fields.

This ambitious new strategy will therefore require an equally ambitious restructuring of DCA Mine Action. Notably, new activities will need their own technical officers, either at country or at headquarters level, and operations and administration will need to follow more clearly defined and possibly separate lines of management.
6 CONCLUSION

Overall, DCA’s HMA programmes in Myanmar, Lebanon and Libya reflect a deep understanding of the local contexts and a capacity to adapt to identified needs and opportunities. Unlike other HMA actors that may be tempted to provide the same set of services globally, DCA has developed an array of programmes and activities specifically tailored both to respond to beneficiaries’ needs and that allow DCA’s teams to work in different environments. This does not only apply to the types of programmes implemented (clearance, risk education of victim assistance), but also to the way they are implemented (by DCA itself or through local partners).

Furthermore, DCA’s understanding of Mine Action, as presented in the “Safer Communities” paper was found to be significantly broader than other organisations’. It places a strong emphasis on enabling national entities and actors to assist communities affected by conflicts. This includes the disposal of explosive remnants of war but also all other effects of armed violence on the local populations. Similarly, victim assistance is not limited to mine accident victims, but includes the psychological dimension of damage caused by conflict.

This approach reflects an ambitious step forward in the realm of Mine Action, which is still regarded by many as a purely technical field and where progress is to be measured in cleared square meters or in prosthetic limbs provided. However, such a shift entails a number of challenges, which will have to be duly considered before implementing new mine action programmes or addressing existing ones.

The programmes selected for this assignment show different levels of advancement and of achievement, partly due to management decisions and to a large extent to the context. However, they share a number of similarities in terms of challenges and of opportunities, which have been summarised in the recommendations below.

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9 This is particularly evident in Burma/Myanmar, where other INGOs seem to focus exclusively on setting up National Mine Action Standards in order to start clearance activities. This is however unlikely to happen in the near future. Moreover, an excessive pressure on authorities to allow clearance before the peace process produces tangible results could potentially lead to a stalemate. DCA’s approach therefore appears to be more constructive and more grounded in reality.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the field observations in the three visited countries and the review of available documentation, the following general recommendations are intended to answer the evaluation’s overarching question:

“What can DCA learn from its existing programmes that can help it become more effective, efficient and improve delivery when implementing mine action programmes?”

The recommendations are drawn from the three specific programmes DCA has been implementing in Burma/Myanmar, Lebanon and Libya. They can be applied beyond those specific contexts, both for future phases of on-going programmes and for new, future programmes. However, they may not all be relevant everywhere, and DCA should ultimately decide how to apply them based on its local needs and feasibility assessments.

1) Needs Assessment: All three visited teams show a good understanding of local needs and how DCA can address them. In some cases, however, a thorough needs assessment at an early stage would have allowed DCA to draft a more relevant strategy from the start, ensuring a more appropriate allocation of resources. E.g. instead of procuring equipment for a potential national partner (that remains to be identified and may not be), the Libyan programme could have focussed straight away on trainings and developing projects such as the Small Arms and Light Weapons and Psycho-Social Support. This will be particularly true following emergency responses, at the time of setting up more permanent structures and programmes.

2) Capacity Building: If programme resources are insufficient to address all capacitation needs at once, the initial needs assessment must inform DCA on the most urgent recipients of capacity building efforts. This will allow DCA to target the most relevant actors in terms of programme implementation, between DCA’s national personnel (including administrative staff), potential partners among beneficiaries’ communities and national entities.

3) National Entities: The different levels of national capacity for coordinating and managing Mine Action in the three visited countries provide a spectrum of different scenarios with direct implications for DCA’s ability to provide HMA services. DCA therefore needs to consider, from the initial needs assessment, how it can effectively engage with and support relevant national entities until they are fully operational.
4) **Ownership and inclusivity:** All involved DCA staff must “own” their Mine Action programmes. A tendency to focus on technical operations has in some cases left support staff on the margin. A better understanding of risks posed by explosive remnants of war and armed violence will ensure deeper involvement, even by administrative staff. This will also help address the staff retention challenge. Although all interviewed staff reported confidence in their respective Programme Managers if they faced any work-related issue, this seems to be based on good personal relations rather than a systematic way to express concerns or make suggestions. Providing such a space could also further increase the staff’s feeling of belonging to DCA.

5) **Community Liaison:** Where DCA has Community Liaison Officers, their role must be fully integrated into other areas of work. They will have primary access to information on the communities’ needs, and should be the favoured channel to consult with the communities throughout the programmes. There are already examples of this happening in each visited country\(^{10}\). Nevertheless, this should be systematised, and better understood by other staff. This also implies a targeted capacity building effort for CLOs in terms of facilitation, representation and restitution in English.

6) **National Partners:** As part of the concern for creating sustainable national capacity, DCA should consider – from an early stage of the programmes – transferring capacity and responsibilities to local partners for the delivery of Mine Action activities. Where access is made difficult for international staff, this may be the only way to reach beneficiaries. In other cases, this may allow DCA to limit its intervention to the necessary support, mentoring or funding, hence increasing the programmes’ relevance, efficiency and sustainability. Whenever running projects through partners, however, DCA must set up strong monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure accountability.

7) **ACT Network:** DCA is the only Mine Action agency within the ACT Alliance, and is therefore expected to contribute to strengthening of the alliance by working through ACT partners. Although the ACT network can provide a good basis to establish partnerships, it can also be problematic where churches have limited local authority or have overtly taken sides in the conflicts (e.g. in Lebanon or Syria). In identifying suitable local partners, the priority should be given to the representativeness and competence of Community-Based Organisations, whether they are faith-based or

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\(^{10}\) E.g. Burmese CLOs help identifying partners and opportunities for MRE sessions; Lebanese Field Operations Officers gather detailed information by the people who laid mines during the Lebanese civil war; Libyan CLOs collect information on potential spot tasks or MRE opportunities.
not. The ACT network should hence be only used as one potential source of collaboration, and not present a required set of stakeholders that the programme has to work with.

8) *Interaction with other programmes:* Where other DCA programmes are being carried out, potential synergies must be sought for. These can be at an administrative level, by harmonising financial and procurement tasks, or at programmatic level. This must be done on an ad hoc basis, but there are certainly areas where DCA’s different programmes can strengthen each other. E.g. conveying a broader message as part of risk education sessions; linking clearance activities to ensuing development programmes; or sharing national partners.

9) *Programme Managers (PMs):* Although interviewed PMs reported good and regular communication with both their respective Programme Coordinators and Headquarters, there seems to be limited interaction between PMs in different countries. The annual PM seminar is reportedly a very fruitful gathering, and should be complemented by more regular virtual meetings to share lessons learned and ensure coherence among DCA’s HMA programmes.

10) *DCA MA Structure:* DCA Mine Action’s structure is very flat, with all PMs reporting directly to the Head of DCA MA, who is also in charge of all MA staff at headquarters. This represents a significant workload for a single person, even though PMs will often refer to the Technical Officer for technical matters and to their respective Programme Coordinators (PCs) for many other issues, including HR, financial and operational decisions. Roles and responsibilities do not always appear to be clear. Formally transferring more responsibilities to Technical Officers, PCs and other headquarters staff clearly would reduce the Head of Unit’s workload, and facilitate coordination among different countries.

11) *HMA Structure for Safer Communities:* In line with the previous point, a more holistic approach to Mine Action, as presented in the “Safer Communities” paper, will require specific expertise and support for programme staff. Different Project Coordinators must find relevant technical support, either in-country or at headquarters level. It is unlikely that one single person will be able to effectively provide advice on such different activities as clearance, psycho-social support or risk education, especially since many of these activities are relatively new to DCA. Each thematic area of intervention must have its own line of operational support, even if ultimately reporting to the same management line.
ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS MET DURING THE COUNTRY VISITS

Myanmar

- Channel Research visited Burma/Myanmar and Thailand in March 2013. During the visit, we met and interviewed a number of actors involved in HMA in Burma/Myanmar:
  - DCA Programme Manager
  - DCA Consultant for the on-going KAP Survey
  - DCA Regional Representative
  - UNICEF

- The visit also included a session with the Myanmar Peace Centre’s Technical Working Group (Including NPA, Halo Trust, Geneva Call, FSD, the US Embassy, the Ministries of Health and of Defence, UNICEF and the Department of Social Welfare).

- In Thailand, we attended an MRE workshop jointly organised by DCA, NPA and Geneva Call.

N.B. Due to security/logistics, our team could not access direct beneficiaries in Myanmar.

Lebanon

During the visit, carried out in March 2013, Channel met and interviewed

- A number of DCA Lebanon’s staff:
  - Programme Manager
  - Operation Manager
  - Development Manager
  - Field Operations Officer
  - Site Supervisors, Team Leaders and Deminers
  - Data Management Officer
  - Finance and Admin Officer
  - Radio Operator

- Other Actors involved in HMA in Lebanon:
  - LMAC
  - Other NGOs involved in HMA: NPA, LDO, Vision
  - Arbaniyeh Municipality
  - UNDP

The visit also included two field visits to the Arbaniyeh municipality, where Channel met and observed 2 MMC teams.

For security and administrative reasons, no field visit could be organised to the South.
Libya

During the visit, carried out in May 2013, Channel Research:

• Met and interviewed a number of DCA’s HMA staff in Libya:
  o Programme Manager
  o Operations Manager
  o Programme Officer
  o Project Coordinators
  o Technical Advisors
  o Team Leaders and Searchers
  o Medical Staff
  o Admin/Logistics Officer and Assistants
  o Human Resources Officer

• Met and interviewed representatives of other actors involved in HMA in Libya:
  o LMAC (Tripoli)
  o UNSMIL / UNMAS (Tripoli and Misrata)
  o NPA

• Carried out a field visit in Tripoli and another in Dafniyeh (Misrata), with DCA’s BAC teams.