Evaluation of the DCA Humanitarian Mine Action Programme in Lebanon, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo
DanChurch Aid

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We note in particular the pivotal roles played by DanChurch Aid (DCA) Copenhagen: Claus Nielsen – Head of Mine Action Operations, Signe Nørnose – Programme Coordinator for Libya and Head of Support, Søren Adser Sørensen Programme Coordinator for Lebanon and Annette Lüdeking, Programme Coordinator for the DR Congo. From DCA Lebanon: Craig MacDiarmid – Programme Manager, Charmen Rahal – Operations Manager, Tamer Said, Field Operations Officer and Mohammad Chour, Quality Assurance/Community Liaison Officer. From DCA DR Congo: Charlotte Billoir, Programme Manager, Melos Vula, Technical Advisor, Nsosha Tambwe, EOD Team Leader, Jean de Dieu Mateso Wenga, Team Leader NTS/CL, David Mihigo Sema wa Sema, OPS Assistant and all the dedicated staff in both Lebanon and DRC that supported our work and made our efforts a pleasure.

In preparing this report, the team has also benefited from input received from mine action partners at the Lebanese Mine Action Centre-Beirut, in particular from Brig. Gen. Imad Odeïmi, LMAC Director. At the Regional Mine Action Centre in Nabatiyeh - Lt. Col. Pierre Bou Maroum, Chief RMAC and in DRC at the Centre Congolais du Lutte Antimine (CCLAM) the National Coordinator, Sudi Alimasi Kimputu and Richard Derieux at the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), all of whom added important information and helped bring greater clarity to the process.

Finally, we must stress that the findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned contained in this report represent the views of the evaluation team. DCA, as well as any other key informants we consulted during the course of the evaluation, are not responsible for the content of this report nor are they bound by its recommendations.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AoR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCLAM</td>
<td>Congolese Centre for Mine Action <em>(Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines)</em></td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
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<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Confirmed Hazardous Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Community Liaison</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>EPSP</td>
<td>Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education <em>(Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire Secondaire et Professionnel)</em></td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo <em>(Les Forces Armées de la RD Congo)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership</td>
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<td>HMA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Mine Action</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPB</td>
<td>Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices, Beliefs</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMAC</td>
<td>Lebanon Mine Action Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Multi-Task Team</td>
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<td>NLCS</td>
<td>National Landmine Contamination Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Technical Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA/QC</td>
<td>Quality Assurance/Quality Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMAC</td>
<td>Regional Mine Action Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected Hazardous Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMACC</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>VfM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
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Key Recommendations

Lebanon
1. As a priority, work with the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC) to develop and apply a clearly articulated land release methodology.
2. Continue to work with the LMAC to refine survey information, tasking priorities and site selection.
3. A thorough and frank analysis should be undertaken jointly with LMAC to identify concrete capacity development needs and opportunities where DCA could facilitate support. This should include an analysis of the specific inputs EOD trained personnel have provided HMA operations, and the viability of including non-technical issues.
4. Explore possible complementarities between HMA priorities in Lebanon and needs of Syrian refugees.
5. It is important that while working with national authorities, DCA regularly reassesses the alignment between their respective priorities.
6. Continue to refine the pre/post clearance assessment and analysis process in order to better assess relevance to specific beneficiaries and determine impact.
7. Further strengthen human rights based approach, especially gender and participation, possibly through training of staff, review of current approach and strategic analysis of opportunities. Look into accountability as well.
8. Continue to link ERW to other relevant issues (Safer Communities).
9. Where possible, improve links and coordination between the DCA mine action Programme, other DCA programmes and other development actors (including the ACT alliance).
10. DCA Lebanon should, when conditions allow, continue to pursue the goal of developing a national partner to whom it can transfer certain operational responsibilities.
11. Thought should be given to a SMART exit strategy.

DRC
1. Continue to explore targeting of secondary school children/young adults as older age categories tend to be a higher percentage of ERW victims.
2. Integrate lessons learned from current programme in future activities (e.g. different groups motivations, capacity of Congolese armed forces (FARDC), spot-task modus operandi, importance of French), etc.
3. Continue to link ERW to other relevant issues (Safer Communities).
4. Continue to monitor school activity and perform analysis on risk taking profiles/school demographics vis-a-vis DCA’s interventions.
5. Develop structured staff development plans for employees that clearly articulate opportunities.
6. Strengthen KAPB surveys.
7. Continue to collect and strengthen analysis of pre/post clearance and KAPB impact data.
8. Streamline and strengthen reporting mechanisms including developing national authorities from the onset.
9. Explore developing relationship with a national partner that can perform the community liaison function in DCA’s absence.
10. Explore realistic avenues to strengthen the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM)’s capacity, within the realm of DCA’s mandate.
11. Thought should be given to a SMART exit strategy.

General
1. Develop an organised framework for ensuring institutional memory. This can be done through meetings, workshops (including lessons-learned sessions), intra-programme visits/exchanges and staff pre-deployment training.
2. Through a strategic analysis of the organisation’s capacity development ambitions and approaches, continue to promote capacity building of national staff and, where relevant national mine action institutions, but with enhanced focus on non-technical areas such as language, socio-economic analysis, quality management, etc.

3. Where possible, take earlier and more structured action to engage national partners with an eye towards eventual transition to local control.

4. Ensure socio-economic factors are at the forefront of operational planning, steering away from more traditional/technically heavy operations.

5. Take stronger steps to connect HMA with development through more effective and timely engagement with national development partners.

6. The move towards the Safer Communities approach will represent a fulfilment of DCA’s goal of remaining current with mine action best practice. This, by among other things, consistently incorporating and institutionalising core functional aspects such as the community based use of socio-economic analysis in priority setting and land release methodologies into field operations.

7. Further operationalise the move towards the Safer Communities approach and continue the role out of the HAP. These processes should focus on consistently incorporating and institutionalising core functional aspects such as the community based use of socio-economic analysis in priority setting and increased participation.
Executive Summary

DanChurchAid (DCA) has been providing mine action support since 1999 and has established itself as a competent and conscientious operator in the sector. In 2012 DCA applied for and won grant support from the Dutch Government as part of its published tender Call for proposals: Humanitarian Mine Action and Cluster Munitions. The multi-country programme emphasises three key elements, to improve human security, to reduce the risk for the affected populations and to assist in building long-term national capacities.

In July 2014 Tana Copenhagen was commissioned to evaluate DCA’s Dutch funded mine action programme. The evaluation was initiated on August 1st, 2014 and ran to the end of September 2014. The evidential core consisted of preliminary document review which was enhanced by pre-deployment meetings and interviews at DCA HQ in Copenhagen August 6th, 7th and 8th. This was followed by visits to two of the three countries supported by the DCA mine action Programme: Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The third, Libya, though planned was beset by sectarian violence immediately prior to the mission deployment and was deemed too insecure for evaluation field work to proceed.

DCA’s “Humanitarian Mine Action Programme in Lebanon, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo” is a contrast in the realities of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination; all three countries being quite distinct in degree of national capacity, programme ownership, quality of governance and commitment to development. Respecting these differences, the evaluation has strived to measure the impact of the programme on mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected communities, its contribution, directly and indirectly, to promoting sustainable livelihoods, and its attempts to develop national institutional capacity. It has done so from the perspective that it should be a lessons-learned exercise, intended to assist DCA Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) develop and improve.

Key Findings

In both the Lebanon and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) programmes, the evaluation found a strong corporate identity coupled with technically competent, highly motivated staff. The programmes enjoy good relations and coordination with national authorities and have strived to cooperate and assist them wherever possible. This has translated into smooth running operations that have to the greatest extent possible under their respective operating circumstances, positively benefitted at risk communities.

Both programmes have proven to be effective and despite challenges, especially in regards to the programme start-up in DRC, they have also demonstrated they have the ability to remain flexible and adapt to changes conditions. As such, both the Lebanon and DRC programmes are on track to achieving the desired results.

Impact of the Programme on Human Security

As DCA is doubtless aware, operational constraints in Lebanon and DRC have not always allowed the DCA programmes to reflect evolving mine action approaches such as embedding socio-economic analysis (pre and post clearance assessment, pre and post Knowledge Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviours Survey (KAPB), etc.) in the planning process, linking mine action activities to development and the systematic application of land release methodologies. Keeping pace with current industry best practice is critical for DCA as mine action specific budgets tighten. The transition towards the Safer Communities concept will be an important philosophical and methodological shift for DCA likely to further strengthen the programmes’ impact on human security (and access to livelihoods).
Risk Reduction through Community Liaison and MRE

Community Liaison (CL) and Mine Risk Education (MRE) have both played a pivotal role in building confidence in the community. In DRC for example, it has been responsible for developing vital tasking data and directly reducing risk through heightened awareness and understanding of the threat. DCA’s close working relationship with the affected communities in South Kivu, its professionalism and trusted position as an operator have given it great credibility in this regard. DCA’s ability to carry-out community liaison and MRE in Lebanon has been limited and sensitisation is currently done informally through presence in the field. Future opportunities to strengthen CL and MRE in particular, exist though and should be explored.

Capacity Development

The capacity building strengths of an organisation like DCA lie in mentoring and training national government institutions, its own staff or a local partner in the key operational skills that will ultimately contribute to improved efficiency, impact and sustainability of the programme. In both instances the Dutch funded DCA programmes have done a commendable job of developing these technical skills among their own staff and where possible, its partners.

In Lebanon for example, operational capacity development efforts have focussed on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training both internally to the organisation and externally among the national authority. In DRC the near absence of a functioning national authority has made any efforts in this regard difficult, though DCA’s own staff has benefited and further initiatives are in the planning. For a combination of institutional and security concerns attempts to develop national operating partners in Lebanon and DRC have been slow to take hold, though DCA’s efforts to develop these constructive, ongoing operational partnerships with local organisations will be a key feature in promoting sustainability.

Sustainability

Inexorably linked to the progress made in developing national capacities, is the long-term sustainability of the benefits DCA has worked so hard to provide in Lebanon and DRC. Through its various efforts, DCA has reduced risk from mines and ERW, created opportunities for improved livelihoods and increased social capital which will, in varying degrees, live on beyond the programme’s presence. However, in order to ensure that these benefits are maximised, both programmes may need to devote time towards developing more formal transition and exit strategies.
1 Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Background and Context

In July 2014 Tana Copenhagen was commissioned by DanChurchAid to evaluate their Dutch funded mine action programmes in Lebanon, DRC and Libya. Though not a specific donor requirement, DCA nevertheless incorporated an evaluation exercise into the programme as an effort to articulate and share lessons learned. The evaluation will form part of DCA’s next planning cycle.

1.2 Objectives of the Evaluation

DCA’s “Humanitarian Mine Action Programme in Lebanon, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo”, though ostensibly one over-arching programme is actually comprised of three very different national contexts that have either the legacy of old wars, are recently post-conflict, or are currently in the midst of conflict. These three distinct operational environments also exhibit widely different cultures, government capacity and donor environments. These different contexts also materialize in different outputs at programme level. Accordingly, the evaluation has approached the process as essentially three separate country programmes.

Through the examination of the challenges, good practices and lessons learned, the evaluation has specifically endeavoured to assess:

1. The relevance and coherence of the programme vis-à-vis:
   a. DCA policies
   b. Dutch policies
   c. National policies
   d. Beneficiaries

2. How effective the programme has been in translating its inputs into relevant outputs. i.e., clearance targets, MRE/Training targets, etc.

3. The operational efficiency of the programme regarding cost saving measures, human resources, reporting and communications.

4. The overall impact of the programme, especially vis-à-vis stated outcomes. This includes:
   a. Impact of Clearance
   b. Impact of Community Liaison/Survey/MRE
   c. Impact of Capacity Development (internal and external)

5. The sustainability of different outputs in accordance with the outcomes. This on three fronts:
   a. The sustainability of outcomes for beneficiaries,
   b. The sustainability of the capacity development efforts,
   c. The sustainability (longevity) of the operational programme as a whole.

The Team has endeavoured to approach the evaluation as an opportunity to document current practice, both negative and positive from each of the country programmes in order to:

- Make suggestions that might improve performance in-country,
- Publicise lessons learned for the benefit of both DCA’s mine action programmes as well as mine action at large,
- Add to DCA’s humanitarian mine action knowledge base and bolster institutional memory,
- Feed into DCA’s ongoing planning cycle.

The overall purpose of the evaluation has been to measure the achievements of the programme against the logframes and original project proposal. Further, as a lessons learned exercise it is intended to develop recommendations for future project development and improvement. In doing so the evaluation is also intended to confirm that the programme has been in adherence with the Netherlands Development Cooperation’s policy objectives.¹

¹ See Annex 2 for the evaluation Terms of Reference
2 Methodology

2.1 Evaluation Management

The Team Leader and the Humanitarian Expert have in tandem, been responsible for developing methodology, interview guidelines and schedules, while the Tana Project Manager has ensured that the overall contractual requirements were met. In addition, the quality assurance (QA) Expert has played a vital role in ensuring the delivery of an evaluation document that meets the specific needs of DCA in terms of size, format, scope, tone and usability.

Figure 1: Evaluation Management Structure

2.2 Research Workflow

The evaluation proper was initiated on August 1st, 2014 and ran through the end of September, 2014. The evidential core consisted of a preliminary document review which, enhanced by pre-deployment meetings and interviews at DCA HQ in Copenhagen between August 6th – 8th, and finally field work.

Field work in Lebanon commenced on August 9th and ran through August 16th, which was immediately followed by further field investigation in DRC, August 16th - 24th. The third country originally planned, Libya remained off-limits due to security concerns during this period. The field phase of the evaluation was followed by debriefing and report consolidation in Copenhagen August 25th - 29th.

2.3 Data Collection

The evaluation team applied a mixed methods approach centred on the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria\(^2\) and relied most heavily on qualitative data.

Desk review

An initial desk review was undertaken on the most relevant background material to ensure that the team had a full and up-to-date understanding of the strategic context for the mine action programme, its country-by-country objectives and activities, its outputs to date and the recommendations from any previous reviews. Please refer to annex 3 for an overview of the documents reviewed.

\(^2\) i.e. relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability
Consultations were conducted at headquarters and field level. They included individual, group, and telephone/Skype interviews depending on the preference of the consulted and logistical considerations.

Headquarters Meetings
In the finalisation of the evaluation methodology, DCA decided that the originally proposed inception workshop was not required. Therefore, following the preparatory and background activities, the evaluation proper began with initial meetings in Copenhagen between the Evaluation Team and key management, operations and support staff at DCA.3

In-Country Field Work
The field portion of the evaluation has accounted for the bulk of the data generated and has been key in covering the DCA programme activities, outputs and outcomes, as well as giving the team the opportunity to consult with key stakeholders and beneficiaries.

Field work in Lebanon began on August 9th and entailed meetings with the DCA Staff and the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) as well as visits to active demining sites in the Beirut area. This was followed by a visit to southern Lebanon to observe UXO clearance. The Evaluation Team also had the opportunity to meet with regional mine action authorities as well as beneficiaries in the different operational areas. The different operational sites visited represented mine action done to support release of agricultural land (pine nut, tobacco and banana cultivation) as well as presumed infrastructure rehabilitation.

In DRC, beginning on August 16th, the Evaluation Team met with DCA staff in Bukavu followed immediately by meetings with representatives from UNMAS and the Dutch Mission in Goma. The team also had the opportunity to speak with representatives from OCHA and the EPSP (Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education). This was followed by visits to operational sites around Mboko village (Fizi territory, South Kivu Province) where the team observed field operations including MRE, CL, non-technical survey (NTS) and UXO spot task demolitions (see Annex 4 for full mission itineraries).

In both Lebanon and DRC a verbal de-brief of the mission’s preliminary findings and recommendations was held with the respective programme managers. This was both an opportunity to give feedback to the programme and validate findings. This was in-turn followed by a debrief session at DCA Copenhagen on August 27th.

Evaluation Team
Field
1. Eric Filippino, Director, Mine Action Resources, Team Leader and Mine Action Expert
2. Dina Sinigallia, Tana Copenhagen - Humanitarian Expert

Copenhagen
4. Trine Barnøe, Project Manager, Tana Copenhagen

2.4 Limitations of the Evaluation
The team appreciates that this was a complex evaluation of a multi-country mine action programme carried out in fragile states. As a result, the team has strived to remain flexible in the

3 Following-on from the decision not to convene a formal Inception Workshop, Tana has not developed a stand-alone Inception Report. Any information gathered or key points addressed during the initial, pre-deployment phase have been captured in the main body of the evaluation report.
face of changing security, travel and operational realities. There were however, certain unavoidable limitations to fulfilling the original terms of reference.

First and foremost, was the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Libya, the third, of the planned evaluation countries. Beset by sectarian violence, the DCA operation was suspended and staff evacuated immediately prior to the evaluation deployment. As of this writing, it is still deemed too insecure for evaluation field work to proceed.

In addition to the actual violence present in Libya, the security restrictions placed on operations in Lebanon did reduce the Evaluation Team’s freedom of movement and ability to reach all of the desired interlocutors. This included our access to other operators and female beneficiaries.

In DRC, both security and logistical considerations made certain movement more complicated and time consuming. It further made meeting face-to-face with Kinshasa based interlocutors unrealistic. In addition, there has recently been an important turn-over in staff, meaning that the institutional memory is somewhat limited. Complicating the evaluation of school-based MRE was the fact that school was not in session when the team visited, thus limiting our ability to observe ongoing operations. As was the case in Lebanon, we were able to speak to fewer women than men.

That being said, with the exception of Libya, none of these factors has had a significant impact on the evaluation or its ability to develop its findings.

3 Programme Background
3.1 General Programme Framework
On March 15th, 2012, DCA submitted a proposal for some €14.7 million to the Dutch Stability Fund (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to carry out humanitarian mine action (HMA) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon and Libya. In June 2012, the organisation was awarded approximately €8.5 million. Funding was granted for four years, though at country level, it covers different periods: four years in Lebanon and two years in DR Congo and Libya. Budget details for Lebanon and DRC can be found in Annex 5.

The programme has been built around three outcomes:
1. To improve human security and establish the conditions for safe and sustainable livelihoods for war-affected populations in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya through clearance and survey of land contaminated by ERW.
2. To reduce the risk for the affected populations in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya through Community Liaison and Risk Education activities.
3. To assist in building long-term national capacities for mine action though support for national clearance plans and capacity building of national Mine Action Coordination Centres and partners.

These three outcomes materialise in different sets of outputs and activities at the country level (see Annex 6 for an overview of the programme’s country logframes). In November 2013, DCA revised the programme, making changes at output and activity level in all three countries.

Start Date of Dutch Funded Activities
- Lebanon: July 2012
- Libya: September 2012
- DRC: February/May 2013
3.2 Progress to date

Activities under this grant did not start simultaneously due to differing conditions in the three countries. Progress related to the outcomes (OC) outputs (OP) also varies. Table 1 below provides an overview of the realisation rate to date as indicated in the annual reports.

Table 1: Progress against outputs as reported by DCA (all countries)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Libya</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 2 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
<td>![Green](on track) ![Yellow](lower than planned) ![Red](significantly lower than planned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Continuing (no cost extension)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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- ![Green](on track);
- ![Yellow](lower than planned);
- ![Red](significantly lower than planned)

Given the challenges in its first year, DCA in DRC requested a no cost extension of its activities and is in the process of requesting another one. It is likely to surpass its objectives if this extension is granted. DRC activities hence continued beyond year two.

As indicated, DCA’s Libya operations were suspended in mid-2014 due to the deteriorating security situation.

4 Lebanon

4.1 Programme Background

Mine and UXO Contamination in Lebanon
Contamination prior to 1975, the civil conflict (1975-1990), two Israeli invasions and occupations of South Lebanon (1978, 1982 up to 2000) and the July–August 2006 hostilities have led to wide-spread contamination, primarily in two forms: (old) mine fields in the North and central regions, and cluster munitions contamination in the South.

Mine Action Actors
The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is a legislative body established in 1998 to enhance and facilitate coordination among different ministries in matters relating to mine action. The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), a part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), executes and coordinates the Lebanese National Mine Action Program on behalf of the Lebanon Mine

Legal Framework in Lebanon
- Not acceded to Mine Ban Treaty
- Party to Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
- Not party to Convention on Conventional Weapons
Action Authority. The LMAC, based in Beirut, manages all humanitarian demining activities, and has established a Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC-N) located in Nabatiyeh to plan, manage and monitor all demining operations in the South of Lebanon.

The LMAC is firmly in control of survey, priority setting, tasking demining teams, QA/QC, chairing the two National Steering Committees (one for Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance), and managing the database, amongst others. Most clearance work is carried out by NGO operators, though the LAF have two engineering companies for manual mine clearance, two mechanical teams, and seven mine detection dog teams. The UN, quite active in the past, now primarily provides assistance to the LMAC.

In September 2011, the LMAC adopted a Strategic Plan for 2011–2020. The plan calls for the complete clearance of cluster munition remnants by 2016 and the clearance of landmines (except for the Blue Line area) by 2021. LMAC has tasked HMA operators to work towards that end as shown in Table 2 below.

In September 2011, the LMAC adopted a Strategic Plan for 2011–2020. The plan calls for the complete clearance of cluster munition remnants by 2016 and the clearance of landmines (except for the Blue Line area) by 2021. LMAC has tasked HMA operators to work towards that end as shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Allocation of clearance teams in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>BAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central/Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DCA in Lebanon

DCA has been clearing explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination and carrying out mine risk education (MRE) in South Lebanon since 2007. In 2010, DCA started manual mine-clearance in central Lebanon at the request of the LMAC.

DCA’s humanitarian aim is to contribute directly to the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011-2021 and the support the country in its CCM obligations. As part of the contribution towards the Lebanon mine action strategy, DCA’s stated aim is to help build and support a sustainable national capacity that can respond to mine and ERW clearance needs.

The Dutch Grant

DCA initiated work under the Dutch grant in July 2012. In brief, activities can be broken down into three categories:

1. Mine clearance (in Mount Lebanon and central Lebanon) and battle area clearance (in South Lebanon)
2. Community liaison, and
3. Capacity building of the LMAC (informal and EOD Level III training).

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4 Presently there are four international NGO clearance operators: DCA, Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI). There is one national demining operator: Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD).

5 The UN Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) was established in 2000 to coordinate mine clearance operations with LMAC. It coordinated activities until 2008, when LMAC took over. In October 2011, it was renamed the UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST) and reduced its personnel significantly. UNDP provided LMAC with technical assistance from 2001-2010. It now finances a number of LMAC staff. There is also a demining capability within UNIFIL, however this does not fall under the jurisdiction of the LMAC and those assets are applied to “force protection” tasks and are not part of the humanitarian framework.

6 The following teams were deployed thanks to the Dutch grant: 1 BAC and 2 MMC in July 2012 and 1 BAC in September of that year.
In November 2013, DCA amended the programme’s original outputs and objectives. Changes (a reduction of objectives) were mostly related to the difficult working conditions and low clearance outputs. More on this point can be found in the section on effectiveness.7

4.2 Relevance/Coherence

Relevance and coherence are assessed against DCA’s vision and plan, human rights based approach as well as, to some extent, vis-à-vis the future orientation of Safer Communities. They are also assessed with regards to Lebanese policies and priorities, the Lebanese level of contamination, as well as, to the extent possible, vis-à-vis Dutch priorities (global and in Lebanon in particular). The issue of whether the programme responds to people’s needs, in line with DCA’s focus on the most vulnerable, will be considered as well.

It should be noted that given the strong direction provided by the Lebanese authorities (military authorities) in HMA in Lebanon, DCA’s margin of manoeuvre to closely align its interventions with its principles and priorities is limited. Taking this into consideration, the team also looked at the question of DCA’s coherence with humanitarian principles.

Relevance to and Coherence with DCA Priorities

The Dutch programme is generally coherent with DCA’s Vision and Plan especially its objective to work towards “the right to protection against the negative effects of landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war”. DCA coordinates closely with LMAC who defines most of the operational priorities. It is difficult to assess to which extent these priorities are always coherent with DCA priorities. While this may require the development of a number of checks and balances (see impact), this approach is relevant to and coherent with DCA’s humanitarian aims in Lebanon.

DCA policy stresses the importance of creating synergies and linkages between development and humanitarian response, though this type of synergy was not in evidence in Lebanon. The team notes that while the programme initially lacked a focus on socio-economic factors, the organisation is aware of the need to develop it and has initiated a process to do so.

DCA’s policies, including its human rights based approach stress a commitment to human rights, accountability, transparency, participation and a focus on the world’s most vulnerable. The programme in Lebanon shows mixed results when it comes to coherence with these principles in particular given the direction set by the Lebanese authorities. Indeed, by adopting a rather macro-level approach the LMAC, for instance, do not target the poor or vulnerable directly. They work with the understanding that they will benefit indirectly.

Gender considerations are not core to the priorities set by LMAC. DCA does strive to mainstream gender into its activities, though further efforts are required to include gender as for the time being, gender mainstreaming more or less equates to equal employment opportunities.

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7 See the programme’s detailed logframe in Annex 4.
Participation of beneficiaries is a challenging principle in Lebanon where security concerns are an ever-present limiting factor. Over the period under consideration, the programme has however made efforts to expand community liaison and hence enhance participation. For the time being, relations with beneficiaries (direct and indirect) however remain very hierarchical (channelled through local authorities), male dominated and often one way (HMA operators to beneficiary). While complaint boxes have been set-up on task sites, it could not be assessed to what extent beneficiaries feel free to use them (there have been zero communications through this mechanism to date) or are aware of these. It also appears that participation is restrictively understood in a negative sense of “complaint”. In this regard, DCA has been focusing on compliance with benchmark 5 of the HAP (handling of complaints) but less so with benchmark 4 (participation).

With regards to DCA’s commitment to accountability and transparency, DCA Lebanon is HAP accredited. A number of steps have been taken (including the complaints boxes mentioned above), both internally and externally, to ensure implementation of the HAP yet more remains to be done such as further adapting the sign-posts on sites as explained below under community liaison (effectiveness).

DCA’s neutrality and impartiality do not appear to be in question though as mentioned, its capacity to act independently is limited. The organisation feels it has the possibility to opt out should a task requested by the authorities contravene its principles. The changes witnessed throughout the programme’s life-span (resumption of community liaison and assessments) are a positive indication of DCA’s ability to work with the authorities on finding common ways of operating.

Relevance to and Coherence with Lebanese Priorities
There are relatively few actors engaged in HMA in Lebanon, and as such DCA’s activities are highly relevant to the Country’s efforts to deal with its contamination problem. As indicated above, Lebanese authorities exercise a strong control over HMA activities. The programme, especially its technical aspects (mine clearance and battle area clearance - BAC), is therefore both highly relevant and coherent. It is interesting to note that Lebanese and DCA priorities have influenced each other: while community liaison was initially not fully in line with the LMAC’s approach (particularly in South Lebanon), this changed throughout the first years of the programme. Conversely, while the study to identify a local partner was initially seen by both DCA and the LMAC as relevant and coherent with Lebanese (and international) strategies, the latter’s priorities changed over time, delaying potential progress in this area.

Regarding relevance vis-à-vis the contamination level, the difference between mines and cluster munitions should be highlighted. The mine contamination, as mentioned above, dates back to Lebanon’s civil war. While this residual contamination is important, it is not of the highest priority levels anymore (all level-ones having been cleared already). Furthermore, the task sites are technically challenging and the extent to which this residual contamination actually limits people’s socio-economic well-being is difficult to assess. The cluster munition contamination on the other hand is much more recent and with a greater impact clearly evident. An estimated 3,897 ha of land was indeed contaminated by cluster munitions as a result of the conflict in July-August 2006 and agricultural land 8 was the most widely contaminated type of land.

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8 The most heavily affected crops were olives, followed by cereal crops, tobacco and citrus fruits, all with over 400 ha of land contaminated.
Relevance to and Coherence with Dutch Priorities

The programme falls under the policy priority Security and Rule of Law, in particular the objective of “improving human security”. The Lebanese programme is relevant to this priority. It is also to some extent relevant and coherent with the objective of contributing to legitimate government with sufficient capacity as it fully supports the authorities in its efforts and strategies. Note that the effectiveness of the capacity building dimension is discussed further below. It is also relevant to socio-economic reconstruction priorities, especially in the South of the Country where the contribution to agriculture for instance is more evident.

It should be noted that the Dutch emphasis on the Syrian crisis and its support to neighbouring countries in their effort to receive Syrian refugees (covering both support to refugees and host communities), is an area where DCA’s programme is relevant and coherent as well. There is further potential for this link to be strengthened given the important number of Syrians having sought refuge in Lebanon. Many DCA tasks (especially in northern and central Lebanon) benefit local communities as well as Syrian refugees.

With regards to Dutch human rights principles and priorities, coherence is less evident; the same applies to the Dutch emphasis on connecting HMA and development interventions.

Relevance to Beneficiaries

There is little documentation of relevance to the needs of specific population groups affected by contamination. There is no evidence of such needs specifically being part of the authorities’ prioritisation/tasking. Moreover, the limited focus on participation and the most vulnerable, further compound the question of relevance to specific beneficiaries. In practice, the difference between the mine clearance done in central Lebanon/Mount Lebanon and the UXO clearance done in the South should be reiterated. The former being related to the legacy of an old conflict, where DCA is not always in a position to locate landowners. The UXO clearance on the other hand, appears to have a more direct link to beneficiaries’ needs. While the owners of the land are not always the most needy, a wider number of people’s livelihoods depend on that land (casual daily labour for instance) and benefit from its release.

4.3 Effectiveness

- To which extent are the intervention’s objectives achieved, or are expected to be achieved?
- What are the mine action programme’s outputs and outcomes at community level?
- What are the effects (impact) on women and girls in mine-affected communities and on issues of gender?
- Has the programme led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies? What are the benefits or constraints found in the programme’s support to national governments?

It is important to note from the onset this is a four-year programme and the evaluation was carried out between years two and three. While the team can therefore not discuss the extent to which objectives have been achieved, it will look at the likelihood of these being achieved looking at the achievement of yearly objectives.

This section will mostly focus on achievements at output level, which is also were most of the organisation’s reporting focus lays. Considerations about achievement at outcome level will be taken up under the section on impact.

Table 3 overleaf is based on DCA’s annual reports and provides an overview of the rate of achievement against outputs.
Table 3: Rate of achievement against outputs, Lebanon (as reported by DCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1: Mine and Battle Area Clearance, Pre/Post Clearance Assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ☐: on track;
- ☐: lower than planned;
- ☐: significantly lower than planned

* “On track” thanks to the finalisation of a task initiated before the Dutch funding.

As becomes evident in the table above, the rate of achievement changed significantly between year one and two. DCA now appears to be on track to achieve its objectives as planned.

Mine and UXO Clearance

In November 2013 DCA revised the level of its outputs under this outcome (see box). This reduction is not a negative reflection of DCA’s effectiveness in terms of clearance as DCA has indeed had the highest average daily clearance outputs in Lebanon throughout the past four years. The reduction in outputs is linked to the difficulty of tasks given by the LMAC, which is such that DCA could not meet the targets (square meters released by year) initially foreseen. While at the end of year one DCA argued that targets could still be met, it revised this statement in November 2013 and operated a reduction in square metres (43% and 30% respectively).

The effectiveness of assessments has also improved since their initiation. An important step between year one and two was the disaggregation of data collected by sex and age categories. DCA is aware of the opportunities to strengthen the assessments (in particular with regards to socio-economic factors), capitalise on the information gathered and link them to operational steps. This is closely related to the discussion below on community liaison.

Community Liaison

DCA created a position of community liaison officer and in June 2014, a second community liaison officer (female) was appointed. The organisation made significant improvements in the way community liaison is carried-out though its margin of manoeuvre remains limited. As

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9 Annual Narrative Progress Report 1, p. 6: “DCA expects over the time span of the project to also receive tasks defined as medium and normal and is expecting the overall target set for the grant to be met.”
explained above the opportunity for community liaison was initially restricted in central Lebanon and non-existent in the South. Since June 2013 the situation has improved. The inclusiveness of community liaison and the capacity to reach members of the community however remains limited. LMAC’s approach targets first and foremost the local authorities (municipalities) that then, in turn where possible, contact with the owners of the land in question. There is little scope to engage with interlocutors other than adult males and though DCA’s effort to use a female community liaison officer is a positive step, it does not guarantee women and youth are more involved.

Efforts to pro-actively approach the community are limited and the degree to which community members feel they can approach DCA is hard to assess. DCA’s presence in the communities for extended periods of time is positive and gives people the opportunity to approach the organisation and ask questions if they so wish. The team was able to witness DCA’s interactions with local residents and was also provided with anecdotal evidence confirming this. DCA has set up a complaints box on most of its sites as well as put-up sign-boards providing basic information about the task, DCA and LMAC. The fact that the signs are currently in English only, could limit people’s understanding and should be looked into.

Community liaison was initially envisaged as also being linked to MRE. LMAC’s policy during the period was however to separate MRE from clearance tasks; MRE was considered an activity carried-out mostly on a routine basis within the school curriculum. This means that there was no opportunity for DCA to carry-out MRE even though a number of pre-clearance assessments indicated the respondents had not received any. It appears that the LMAC’s approach on this point is currently being reviewed and there may be a future opportunity for increased linkage between clearance of sites/community liaison and MRE. The information gathered by DCA during the assessments could be an important tool to gauge the need for MRE. An increased focus on MRE could also be important in light of the mass influx of Syrian refugees who not only fled to a new environment contaminated by ERW, but also are likely to eventually return to a heavily contaminated environment.

Community Liaison and pre/post clearance assessments are intimately linked and to some extent run the risk of being watered down and losing their distinct operational benefit. This is further compounded by the fact they are mostly carried out by the same staff members and by the new organisational focus on impact monitoring. While recognising the effectiveness and efficiency of carrying out these tasks at the same time, the organisation should reflect on their differences and respective goals in order to make sure their potential are maximised. Please find in Annex 8 a table that attempts to assist DCA in the analysis of the four tasks and their respective objectives with a view to improving their effectiveness. The organisation should also strive to continue working on creating a conducive environment for more comprehensive community liaison to be carried out.

Support to National Capacity
DCA initially set-out for three different interventions:
1. Participation of LMAC personnel in an EOD Level III course in Denmark,
2. Informal capacity building/mentoring of LMAC, and
3. The identification of a local partner, with a view to eventually transferring clearance activities to this partner.

DCA’s actual goals in terms of participation in the EOD training course are unclear under the logframe. Discussions indicate that DCA was aiming to provide four persons with the training, over the duration of the programme. This number was reached within the first two years, though the team could not meet people trained.
LMAC has been operational and in charge of coordinating and guiding HMA for many years and has benefitted from formal technical support and capacity development from a number of partners, most recently UNDP.\(^\text{10}\) This indicates that formal capacity building opportunities do exist and DCA could look into coordinating with other training suppliers to explore opportunities.

Informal capacity development/mentoring is more difficult to assess however, and under this programme has so far lacked clarity. Discussions indicate that by way of its operations DCA may have set an example of sorts that has been picked-up on by the LMAC, thus allowing them to better fit the needs and perceptions of the humanitarian community. Furthermore, though not attributable to this programme, DCA has been instrumental in facilitating the LMAC in setting up its assets sharing scheme (further discussed below under efficiency). Finally, it is important to note that DCA is a respected partner and that its advice and opinions are taken seriously.

Regarding the identification of a local partner, DCA, in accordance with LMAC, carried out an extensive study of potential partners. The concept of handing over clearance to a national partner however, no longer seems to fit national priorities. For the time being, it has met a dead-end and the possibilities for support to national partner organisations are currently non-existent given the authorities’ reluctance.

Effectiveness and Gender
As discussed above under relevance/coherence, DCA has only taken women into account to a certain degree. In the second annual report, beneficiary data is broken down between women and men, as well as adults and children, though there are no indications of specific effects on women and girls in mine affected communities.

4.4 Efficiency

- To what extent do the country programmes efficiently apply resources?
- To what extent have capacity guiding initiatives led to greater operational efficiency
- What is the value for money/cost effectiveness embedded in the delivery mechanisms?

Within the limits of its decision making authority, the Lebanon programme has developed into a cohesive, well established and professionally managed operation with the added benefit of being almost entirely nationalised. Its efficient operational capabilities notwithstanding, the operational realities of mine action in Lebanon do present a potentially serious obstacle to DCA’s attempts to maintain operational efficiency.

Mine and UXO Clearance
As noted, priorities are set and tasking done exclusively by the LMAC. The criteria employed to develop priorities is ostensibly based on the need to release agricultural land for production and in certain instances, allow for reconstruction/rehabilitation of infrastructure. Within this general framework it was reiterated to the Evaluation Team that DCA does have room to negotiate and amend/alter certain tasks if they do not appear to be in alignment with its principles or objectives.

Developing a clear and concise task polygon has in some ways been the bane of mine clearance’s existence. Reducing suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and then, through technical survey fine tuning the contaminated area to its barest minimum is not an exact science. All mine clearance operations have at one time or another allocated resources to tasks that turned out to be non-contaminated. In the case of Lebanon

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\(^\text{10}\) UNDP for instance is planning to support LMAC with strengthening impact monitoring.
however, the Evaluation Team has observed through both the literature and active operations, a number of task sites (in some cases quite large sites) that have consumed considerable time and resources only to reveal no contamination.

It is the view of the evaluation team that the number of non-contaminated areas cleared by DCA is above the norm and puts DCA at a difficult disadvantage in its attempt to maintain efficiency. This primarily stems from three factors:

1. Survey methodology and/or accuracy (currently beyond DCA’s control),
2. Lack of a formal land release policy in Lebanon (beyond DCA’s control, but within their sphere of influence),
3. Philosophical approach to contamination/remediation in Lebanon (currently beyond DCA’s control).

Again, all tasking comes directly from the LMAC and is based on its own survey and community liaison processes. This, combined with DCA's limited scope to engage in independent survey/CL, means that there is little chance for DCA to validate the tasks before they are given. The team questions whether the current brief pre-deployment phase is an adequate decision making period/framework for the organisation.

Large task sites could quite easily be reduced and large tracks of land released through standard technical survey/land release practices;\textsuperscript{11} practices well established in the mine action community and well known to DCA itself. As it stands, a process of negotiation is applied that leaves the decision making parameters to release or not release land somewhat arbitrary.

The philosophical position regarding landmine and UXO risk mitigation in Lebanon (of the authorities) is both one of commitment and dedication. Though on surface this is of course laudable it appears to have also led to a certain blasé approach to the use of assets and resources of international NGOs. The Evaluation Team was, for example, told on more than one occasion words to the effect; “it eventually all needs to be cleared anyway, so what’s the difference”.

Support to National Capacity

Internally, DCA’s capacity development efforts have focussed primarily on technical skills including EOD qualification, radio, site supervisor, team leader, medical and other field focused operational skills and in this regard DCA staff has attained a high level. Efforts at developing management, analysis and strategic planning skills have been less of a focus. Further, it is not possible to accurately assess what affect the support to national capacity, either informal or formal (\textit{i.e.} EOD Level III training) has had on Lebanon’s efficiency in mitigating the mine and UXO threat. The profile, role and eventual operational location of the trained individuals are not clear.

Internally, DCA’s capacity development initiative, namely the EOD training offered its own stand-out team leaders, has increased the operational efficiency and has enabled DCA to more quickly nationalise the programme. That being said, key non-technical managerial positions and “soft” skills such as CL/socio-economic analysis and gender inclusion remain outstanding.

\textbf{VfM}

Though the evaluation was not a financial audit as such, certain anecdotal evidence of cost reducing initiatives and operational arrangements to do represent a significant value for money. For instance, the Lebanon programme rather uniquely, has an asset sharing operational methodology that allows one operator to do manual mine clearance on a site that has been

\textsuperscript{11} For example, the task in Araya, central Lebanon which if full clearance is applied at current rates, could possibly require 18 months to complete. This, in a site where actual contamination is far from certain.
prepared by another organisation's mechanical or MDD assets. This arrangement, facilitated to a large extent by the LMAC has allowed DCA to share/reduce costs on different sites by allowing for MAG’s mechanical assets to be deployed prior to operations as site preparation.\textsuperscript{12} The attempt to keep costs to a minimum is also seen in DCA’s decision to maintain only a minimal office presence in the south and, as mentioned earlier a very favourable expatriate to national staff ratio. The organisation’s high rate of nationalisation mentioned above also presents high value for money.

4.5 Impact

- To what extent have outcomes of the project been achieved as intended, in particular the project planned objectives. Have those outcomes:
- Been facilitated/constrained by external factors
- Produced any unintended or unexpected impacts and if so how have these affected the overall impact.
- Have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders
- Have contributed to economic and social development
- Have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.

Mine and UXO Clearance

Developing an exact picture of the socio-economic impact of land returned to the community is somewhat of a challenge as the necessary baseline data is not available.\textsuperscript{13} However, the evaluation did find that in southern Lebanon the land cleared primarily for agricultural purposes is generally re-occupied within six months and put to use.\textsuperscript{14} This has clearly created a positive economic revival for both the local Lebanese population and also a number of Syrian refugees living in the area.\textsuperscript{15}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Impact (future or witnessed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>Araya (Central Leb.)</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>Ras Al Harf (Central Leb.)</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>Zahrie (Central Leb.)</td>
<td>Pine Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Baraachit (south Leb.)</td>
<td>Tobacco Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Siddiqin (south Leb.)</td>
<td>Banana plantation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{12} Somewhat coincidentally, an additional cross-fertilisation of assets in Lebanon is seen in how mechanical assets that are often applied by MAG to DCA’s operations are also funded by the Dutch Government, thus creating a symbiotic relationship between the two projects.

\textsuperscript{13} Though there appear to be informal control mechanisms, we failed to see a systematic approach. Furthermore, the lack of focus on socio-economic factors means that DCA is less in a position to identify impact.

\textsuperscript{14} Though generally positive, it must be noted that this is not necessarily the result of any direct link between DCA or the national authorities and development organisations. It is left to the communities to find solutions to developing cleared land.

\textsuperscript{15} Though unintended, a positive impact of the clearance done by DCA is that in the creation of economic opportunities for the rural Lebanese poor, the Syrian refugee population which is “integrated” into Lebanese communities also benefits from the income generated to a certain extent. They further benefit, however indirectly, from a raised awareness about mines and UXOs. This has in essence been a form of MRE that should have a positive impact when the security situation in Syria allows for their return.
In central Lebanon determining accurate impacts is even more of a challenge. With landmines (as opposed to UXOs) the tasking parameters and potential impact are less clear. In some cases (for example, agricultural areas used for pine nut production) the economic benefits are more readily identifiable, however in other, more urban settings it is less so. The team visited sites in Zahrie that showed a clear link between the mine clearance activity and a return to productive use. In another area, Araya (admittedly this is an ongoing task) the potential benefits were more difficult to determine as these areas were neither agricultural nor slated for infrastructure rehabilitation. The land in those areas was the property in some cases of absentee landlords who had not been resident in Lebanon for more than twenty years.

The Lebanon programme does not currently link or coordinate with other development actors operating in the area. Rather, it has adopted an operational philosophy of leaving post-clearance development/rehabilitation to be handled entirely by beneficiaries. Up until now this does not seem to have been too much of an issue, primarily due to the intense pressure for arable land and the general level of economic dynamism in Lebanon. That being said, it was recounted to the team that for a variety of reasons up to 30% of cleared land lays idle for up to six months after it is returned to the community. It seems clear that this current methodology will become less and less viable as tasks become lower and lower priority leaving DCA with no real way to ensure positive impact.

Community Liaison and Survey
The LMAC does engage in survey and elements of community liaison, however, security considerations in Lebanon currently make full scale community liaison by DCA impossible. What DCA has been able to do is to meet with the leadership of communities where a clearance task is planned. This aids in general understanding for the work that will follow and also affords DCA some opportunity to engage in non-technical survey (NTS).

The NTS serves to better define the task area, logistics for operational deployment and to generally inform the nearest inhabitants of their intentions. It also affords DCA the opportunity to engage in pre-clearance assessment of the site. Optimal use of the pre-clearance assessment data, such as feeding it back into DCA’s own planning cycle, is essentially moot since tasking decisions are taken exclusively by the LMAC. Nor does it create an opportunity to more generally contribute to impact information nationally.

Therefore, currently community liaison contributes to the reduction of risk for affected communities, but rather through its technical aspect as a first step to the actual clearance and not so much in the contact with the communities per se. This is all the more so as it has so far not been linked to MRE (even though the need was identified in a number of sites). Creating such a link will strengthen the impact on risk and is likely to be further warranted given the presence of Syrian refugees.

Capacity Development
There are a number of areas where the Lebanon programme’s capacity development efforts have had a positive impact.

The working relationship between the LMAC/RMAC and DCA is close (albeit somewhat top down), and has served to help create a bridge between civilian and military operators. Though on the surface this may seem of little significance it is not often the case that military managed and directed mine action has so seamlessly cooperated with humanitarian organisations: different organisational theories, different objectives and widely different backgrounds usually conspire to make working relationships between the two difficult. However, through DCA’s efforts (and staff) this has been largely eliminated.
In support of their primary national partner, the LMAC, DCA has facilitated EOD Level III training for selected staff. As with the DCA’s own staff this has been done in conjunction with the Danish Military through a course run each year in Skive, Denmark. Though the quality of the course is good and the benefits of enhanced EOD qualification in Lebanon considerable, the extent to which the participation of LAF personnel in the EOD training course strengthens national capacity to complete the national clearance plan will depend upon the use to which trained personnel are put and the uptake of the training provided. It is important to stress that participants were not necessarily LMAC personnel. The trainees were also from the engineer regiment of the LAF and though the engineers are indeed the natural recruiting pool for the LMAC, no systematic link exists between participation in the training and future engagement in HMA. In fact, a number of those trained are either not associated with the mine action programme at all or have rotated out as part of their regular duties.

DCA has faced a number of constraints in developing a constructive relationship with a national partner. Though a comprehensive feasibility study has been undertaken to select the most appropriate national partner with whom to cooperate, for reasons discussed above, operationalising the recommendations of that study has yet to occur.

The team has not observed any harm being done through the programme under consideration nor any other unintended impacts, though the general lack of operational independence limits DCA’s capacity to track unintended impacts and thus ensure it is in full compliance with its own “do no harm” principles.

4.6 Sustainability

Sustainability of Benefits Provided
The clearance of land and its return to the community is a lasting and sustainable benefit, given no new contamination occurs. The areas where DCA is working are generally stable and the ownership of the cleared land appears not to be contested. Therefore, in addition to the improved physical safety derived from clearance, the confidence derived from eliminating the landmine/ERW threat will continue to spill-over into the immediate future.

The reporting channels established in conjunction with DCA operations, and the response that those reports elicit, are mostly centred on LMAC and should hence continue to function even in DCA’s absence. The LMAC/RMAC networks will remain accessible and not only do they have the confidence of the local population, they have the ability to respond to EOD call-outs.

Sustainability of Capacity Developed
In one sense the capacity that DCA has developed among its own staff will be sustainable. In particular the EOD/Clearance capacity, as many of the DCA staff are highly experienced and well respected in the Lebanon mine action context. As such, they will likely matriculate into other EOD programmes either domestically or abroad when the DCA programme comes to an end.

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16 To date, a total of 18 LAF personnel have attended the DCA IMAS Level II EOD course in Denmark. Four of which have been funded through the Dutch Grant.
In regards to the EOD capacity developed within the LMAC, that too is a tangible and sustainable skill, however the EOD training that has been facilitated may not necessarily be a sustainable capacity at the disposal of HMA as the LMAC staff are regular LAF and will eventually rotate out of the HMA programme.

**Sustainability of the Programme as a Whole**
As of this writing the programme as a whole is only sustainable with the same, continued level of financial support. Certain operational elements such as non-technical survey, CL and/or MRE are relatively easily absorbed by a national partner given the right amount of capacity development. Clearance capacity however, is more challenging. The development of a viable operational national partner is still in its infancy and without such a partnership the programme will essentially have nowhere to go as there is no mechanism to which the clearance capacity of DCA can migrate. It is key that DCA continues looking into identifying a local partner and thus a viable exit strategy.

**Lebanon Summary of Findings and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance &amp; Coherence</th>
<th>Current Assessment</th>
<th>Recommended Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly relevant to and coherent with DCA priorities and policies</td>
<td>It is important that while working with and through national authorities, DCA regularly reassesses the alignment between respective priorities. There are furthermore a number of advocacy and influencing avenues at its disposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts ongoing towards increased coherence with DCA human rights based approach and humanitarian accountability</td>
<td>Further strengthen human rights based approach, especially gender and participation, possibly through training of staff, review of current approach and strategic analysis of opportunities.</td>
<td>Involving women and youth in pre and post clearance assessments for instance could be strengthened. DCA has started gathering beneficiary data disaggregated by sex and age and is cognisant of the fact that more can be done to analyse the data gathered and feed that data into operational planning. A slight change in focus under the Safer Communities approach if and when applied in Lebanon could also provide opportunities for greater relevance/coherence with Dutch human security priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant to and coherent with Lebanese priorities</td>
<td>Regularly assess coherence between Lebanese policies and priorities and DCA's and explore advocacy and lobbying avenues (in country and internationally)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance to contamination in South &gt; to contamination in Central and Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>Past changes of priorities have influenced relevance. Future changes likely to further influence.</td>
<td>Regularly monitor situation and (re-assess priorities and activities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Where the team believes that no follow-up on DCA’s part is either required or possible (i.e. required action falls outside DCA’s realm), the box has been left blank.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Generally relevant to and coherent with Dutch priorities (caveat on gender and human rights based approach as above). Opportunities for increased relevance exist.</th>
<th>Explore possible complementarities between HMA priorities in Lebanon and needs of Syrian refugees.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance to beneficiaries mixed.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen tools to assess relevance to beneficiaries (monitoring, community liaison and participation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On track to realise revised outputs under outcome 1. Insufficient planning when initially defining the objectives. Technically very effective.</td>
<td>On track and carrying out community liaison despite initial challenges.</td>
<td>Analyse reason for over-estimation of objectives in the first place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A challenging outcome to achieve given different views between DCA and LMAC on participation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Review current way community liaison is carried out, in relation to the assessments and impact monitoring. Strengthen operational dimension as well as strive to improve participation, accountability and non-discrimination (gender and youth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grasp opportunity represented by wealth of information gathered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Limited effectiveness with regards to capacity development: EOD training done but to whom and how many?</td>
<td>Study and assess work achieved to date and coordinate with other stakeholders to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some indications of effectiveness of mentoring/informal capacity development.</td>
<td>A thorough and frank analysis should be undertaken jointly with LMAC to identify concrete needs and opportunities where DCA could facilitate support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explore possibilities and needs of technical capacity development of LMAC (either directly by DCA or facilitated by DCA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutually beneficial trainings and lesson learning sessions could be identified and strengthen both LMAC’s and DCA’s effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Current tasking processes have the potential to cause DCA to use resources inefficiently.</td>
<td>Work with the LMAC to develop and apply a clearly articulated land release methodology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External capacity development initiatives have not had clearly defined outcomes.</td>
<td>Work with the LMAC to develop more clearly defined capacity development plans, objectives and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal skills development initiatives have led to greater operational efficiency and an accelerated process of nationalisation.</td>
<td>Continue to develop internal capacity development plans, objectives and activities that emphasise managerial/socio-economic skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VfM: sharing of assets very positive operational approach.</td>
<td>Conclusive VfM statements difficult to make in light of tasking, survey and land release currently being beyond DCA’s control.</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>The lack of baseline information/analysis makes quantifiable impact data scarce.</td>
<td>Continue to refine pre/post clearance assessment and analysis process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>The operational philosophy of leaving beneficiaries to their own devices will no longer ensure a positive impact as tasks become lower and lower priority.</td>
<td>Where possible, improve links and coordination between the DCA mine action programme, other DCA programmes and other development actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasking determinations are beyond DCA’s control, which has led to full clearance being done on a relatively high number of non-contaminated tasks areas.</td>
<td>Continue to work with the LMAC to refine survey information, tasking priorities and site selection and as above, work with the LMAC to develop and apply a clearly articulated land release methodology.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In terms of area reduction and relationship with the community within a given task site, the limited CL has a positive impact, though much less so amongst the population in general.</td>
<td>Continue to lobby the national authorities to delegate CL/survey responsibility to operational NGOs in a given AoR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No link between CL and MRE. Currently limits the impact and contribution to risk reduction.</td>
<td>Continue to explore the possibilities to carry out MRE, including in relation to tasks allocated (when relevant).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to assess the impact of EOD training for LAF Staff. Personnel rotate through and the “services&quot; they provide to HMA are not known.</td>
<td>Promote capacity building of relevant national mine action institutions to develop more clearly defined capacity development plans, objectives and activities. Strive to ensure that training is directly linked to current or future use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Sustainability** | Clearance of land – sustainable given no new contamination occurs, area is stable and ownership is not contested. |  |
| Reporting and information will continue through LMAC/RMAC channels. | Analyse the specific positive inputs trained personnel have provided HMA operations. |
| The sustainability of capacity development assistance given to the LMAC is limited where trainees do not necessarily work/stay within the MA framework. | Develop staff development opportunities in non-technical areas such as language, socio-economic analysis, quality management, etc. |
| DCA EOD/Clearance capacity – DCA staff will likely matriculate into other programmes. |  |
| Hand-over of clearance assets to a national, operational partner is on hold, though unlikely. | DCA Lebanon should, when conditions allow, continue to pursue the goal of developing a national partner. |
| Programme not sustainable without the same level of assistance. | Thought should be given to a SMART exit strategy that could include: |
|  | • Pursuing the eventual goal of turning over the programme to a national partner. |
|  | • Nationalising the DCA programme in its entirety (should conditions permit and, analysis demonstrate a potential benefit). |

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18 SMART – Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-bound.
5 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

5.1 Programme Background

Mine and UXO Contamination in DRC

According to the National Mine Action Strategic Plan, the mine and ERW contamination is inherited from previous armed conflicts. Though the mine problem is considered limited, contamination by ERW is thought to be more severe.

Logistic challenges and the size of the country seriously impact HMA including obtaining a clear image of the scale and scope of the issue. A National Landmine Contamination Survey (NLCS) was completed in early 2014. It estimates that the landmine contaminated areas are confined to 130 locations (1.8 million m²) in eight provinces, while five areas are suspected contaminated by cluster munitions. As of August 2013, UNMACC had recorded 1,464 ERW affected areas. Five provinces concentrate over 85% of all victims; the greatest numbers are found in South Kivu (followed by Equateur, North Kivu, Katanga and Oriental Province). Please refer to Annex 9 for an overview of SHAs in DRC.

Mine Action Actors

In mid-2011, the national mine action legislation and the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016 were adopted. The plan’s objective include the clearance of all areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines or unexploded sub-munitions by the end of 2016 (now extended to 2021) as well as transitioning the mine action program from the UN to national ownership.

UNMAS, established in 2002 (as UNMACC), initially coordinated mine action operations in the DRC. In 2008 the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) was established along with a National Commission. A progressive hand-over of activities between UNMACC and CCLAM was initiated and the current National Strategic Plan foresees that the hand-over should be completed in 2014. UNMAS is progressively reducing its presence in the country and will remain only in Goma. CCLAM for its part is planning to open provincial offices, but has not yet started doing so. The authorities’ capacity remains very limited. The plan is eventually for CCLAM to carry out coordination and accreditation activities and for the army to carry out technical activities including spot tasks.

There are four accredited international NGOs for the entire country. They have divided the responsibility for provinces amongst each other. Currently there are no national organisations accredited to conduct clearance activities. While seldom working in the same provinces, HMA actors coordinate formally and informally to the extent possible.

DCA in DRC

DCA started activities in DRC in 2004. It was initially based in Kalemie (Katanga) though activities were also carried out in other provinces, including South Kivu. DCA also had a presence in Kinshasa at this time. Activities were closed down in 2012 before re-opening later that year/ 2013 thanks to the Dutch grant.

DRC Legal framework

- Acceded to Mine Ban Treaty
- Signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions
- Not party to Convention on Conventional Weapons

DCA DRC August 2014

- 7 international staff, 55 national staff
- Bukavu and Baraka offices
- 2 MTTs (split in EOD/NTS and NTS/MRE)
- 1 demining team (MMC)

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19 MAG, HI, DCA, and NPA
The Dutch Grant

Funds cover a period of two years. The programme’s detailed logframe can be found in Annex 6. In brief, activities can be broken down into two categories: 1. Spot tasks, and 2. Mine Risk Education (MRE - in communities and in schools). DCA also carries out knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs surveys (KAPB) when and where relevant. It is important to stress that in the logframe, the MRE in schools had initially been foreseen as a tool to strengthen the capacity of local authorities. We will discuss this further below. For ease of analysis, the team has decided to consider it as part of an overall MRE effort with a view to reducing the risk to affected communities.

DCA moved back to DRC in September 2012 but clearance activities under the Dutch grant only started in May 2013. Between September 2012 and February 2013, the organisation concentrated on transferring the organisation’s assets from Kalemie to South Kivu (Bukavu and Baraka) as well as recruiting/training new staff and pursuing operational accreditation.

The start of DCA activities in South Kivu was seriously delayed because of a number of factors, so much so that very few activities were carried out in what should have been the programme’s first year of operation (July 2012-June 2013). All new staff members were recruited and training was carried out in February 2013. DCA was eventually given the authorisation to deploy in May 2013. In the first annual report under this grant, DCA requested a no-cost extension in order to make-up for this delay. Running costs having been covered from other sources, the delay had no budgetary implications. While the programme is scheduled to close at the end of 2014, DCA has requested another no-cost extension which is likely to allow the organisation to surpass its objectives.

Throughout the latter part of 2013, DCA carried-out a number changes, including restructuring its multi-task teams (MTTs), with a view to improving effectiveness and efficiency. In November 2013, DCA amended the programme’s outputs and objectives. Changes were as follows: 1. The restructuring of the teams and impact thereof, 2. Given the nature of interventions (spot tasks), initially foreseen pre and post clearance assessments were abandoned and 3. The methodology of the school MRE was revised.

5.2 Relevance/Coherence

- To what extent have the objectives of the DCA Mine Action Strategy been delivered in the mine action programme results?
- Is the DCA mine action programme in DR Congo, Libya and Lebanon coherent with the objectives of the Dutch MFA Mine Action Strategy?
- Is the DCA approach to mine action in DR Congo, Libya and Lebanon based on a coherent evidence based framework?
- To what extent do the objectives of the interventions fit the requirements of the beneficiaries?

Relevance is assessed against DCA’s Vision and Plan, human rights based approach as well as, to some extent, vis-à-vis the future orientation of Safer Communities. Relevance is also assessed with regards to Congolese policies and priorities, the level of contamination as well as, to the extent possible, vis-à-vis Dutch priorities (global and in DRC in particular). The issue of whether the programme responds to people’s needs, in line with DCA’s focus on the most vulnerable, will be considered as well.

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20 1. The change in accreditation procedure for HMA, as well as 2. Insecurity in November 2012, which led to the evacuation of international staff. Staff returned after the Christmas period in January 2013.
Relevance to and Coherence with DCA Priorities

The Dutch programme is relevant to and coherent with DCA’s Vision and Plan especially its objective to work towards “the right to protection against the negative effects of landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war”. Coordinating its work with UNMAS and CCLAM, DCA has a wide margin of manoeuvre to choose its axis of intervention as well as its approach.

Adopting a community based approach; the programme is also coherent with DCA’s focus on the most vulnerable and poorest. While not targeting the individual level, DCA has, over the life-span of the programme, improved its targeting of communities and is continuously striving to further do so.

DCA’s approach in DRC is coherent with the organisation’s human rights based approach, in particular with regards to participation and non-discrimination. The HAP is being rolled-out and significant efforts have been carried out to strengthen accountability. This work remains in progress and further avenues to strengthen gender perspectives and empower communities are being explored.

DCA’s policies stress the importance of creating synergies and linkages between development and humanitarian response. These types of synergies are absent from the programme under consideration though they become part of future considerations under the Safer Communities approach the DRC programme is moving towards.

Relevance to and Coherence with Congolese Priorities

The Dutch programme is relevant to Congolese HMA priorities as expressed in the National strategy. Given the lack of capacity and resources (both in terms of presence of HMA actors and in terms of national institutions), DCA is clearly covering a gap in the country’s reconstruction. It should be noted that while CCLAM has been created some years ago, it is only in the process of operationalising. As it takes over new responsibilities and deploys to the field, further opportunities for highly relevant DCA support could materialise.

The contamination level of DRC is not as serious as that of other countries. While not denying that DCA is covering a real gap, locating HMA in a broader approach (Safer Communities) is likely to increase relevance in this regard.

Relevance to and Coherence with Dutch Priorities

DCA’s Dutch funded programme is relevant to and coherent with Dutch priorities. The programme falls under the policy priority Security and Rule of Law, in particular the objective of “improving human security”. The programme is relevant to this priority. Though less evident than in Lebanon, the programme is also relevant to socio-economic reconstruction priorities (reiterating though the missing link with development response).

Dutch priorities in DRC also include SGBV; the Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC (2014-2017), puts an important focus on Eastern DRC and stabilisation. To the extent possible, the Netherlands align with the International Security and stabilisation Support Strategy (I4S) and the hotspots it targets. With DCA’s increased efforts to improve targeting (especially under Outcome 1), it has become increasingly relevant to the Dutch focus including its geographical hotspot focus. DCA’s foreseen shift to the safer communities approach is likely to increase its coherence and relevance for the Dutch priorities (including stabilisation and SGBV) for the future (outside of the life span of this programme).
Relevance to Beneficiaries

DCA’s initial work areas in Fizi Territory were determined using the national the IMSMA database. However, it soon became evident the information in the database was inaccurate and reflected little of the actual situation on-site. Though significant contamination existed, it was not in the locations expressed in IMSMA. DCA therefore adapted its approach, changing it from top-down (based on IMSMA) to more community based, informed by an analysis of the conflict history and current events at provincial level. This new approach makes the programme more relevant to the communities where DCA intervenes. The organisation is furthermore endeavouring to adapt to the actual requirements of the communities (e.g. MRE “light” vs. MRE “full”).

It should none-the-less be noted that KAPB surveys as well as DCA analysis show that the communities’ priority needs lay elsewhere: armed violence, gender based violence, etc. The revision of DCA’s approach under the Safer Communities approach, and the related embedding of HMA in wider activities, is hence likely to strengthen the relevance to beneficiaries.

5.3 Effectiveness

The original Dutch grant was for two years though in the first year (July 2012-June 2013) DCA’s operations were, for a number of reasons, mostly paralysed. Activities really took off in what should have been the second and last year (July 2013-June 2014). A first no cost extension was approved to bring the programme to the end of 2014. Current discussions between DCA and the Dutch MFA foresee proceeding (with the same level of funding) into early 2015.

This section will mostly focus on achievements at output level, which is also were most of the organisation’s reporting focus lays. Considerations about achievement at outcome level will be taken up under the section on impact.

Table 4 below is based on DCA’s annual reports and provides an overview of the rate of achievement against outputs. It clearly illustrates the programme’s first year stand-still, though also that DCA is very likely to achieve its outputs and even exceed some. It should be mentioned that while year one’s ineffectiveness was to a large extent due to factors outside of DCA’s control, internal factors such as French speaking management and closer relations with relevant authorities could have mitigated some of the challenges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>1: Spot tasks (identification and clearance)</th>
<th>2: MRE (communities) + KAPB</th>
<th>3: MRE (schools)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>![ ]: on track; ![ ]: lower than planned; ![ ]: significantly lower than planned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>![ ]: on track; ![ ]: lower than planned; ![ ]: significantly lower than planned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>![ ]: on track; ![ ]: lower than planned; ![ ]: significantly lower than planned</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**EOD Spot-tasks**

The very low output in year one is mostly related to institutional and security issues, but also to problems with the selection of tasks. Initially, DCA took its tasks from IMSMA which proved to be incomplete and incorrect. After a period of trial and error, DCA decided to adapt its targeting. This change in approach significantly improved its effectiveness. At the time of the team’s field visit, DCA had achieved 102% of targeted tasks (65% completions and 37% cancellations) while visiting 94% of the foreseen number of communities. While the logframe makes a clear distinction between identification of contaminated areas and clearance of areas, de facto, DCA’s *modus operandi* means that there is only a few days difference between the two.

DCA’s effectiveness is to some degree challenged by other programmes and actors’ influence on the communities it is targeting: DRC’s experience with DDR programmes and the fact that beneficiaries get paid therein initially impacted people’s willingness to step-forward indicate the location of a UXO free of charge. Sensitisation and community liaison have been important tools in dealing with this challenge. DCA has also been affected by the FARDC’s lack of knowledge and skills with regards to UXOs, so much so that DCA has found itself dealing with situations which resulted from the FARDC’s attempts to decontaminate an area (*e.g.* putting grenades in people’s toilets or throwing UXOs in rivers). It is important that these lessons be integrated in DCA’s way of operating. Initiating sensitisation sessions with the FARDC (especially since strengthening their technical capacity is not an option on South Kivu as explained below) could be an activity to look into in the future.

**MRE in Communities**

According to DCA it is close to achieving the targeted 80,000 beneficiaries of MRE in the communities. A tally of 80,000 participants in such a short period of time is likely to be inflated however. It would amongst others mean that certain training sessions would have contained up to 1,000 participants, which could in no way be considered methodologically sound. Recognising this early on, DCA revised its MRE approach tailoring it more to the needs of the community and to the various at risk groups within the community. A number of the positive changes adopted include: the limitation of the number of participants at each session, the development of two types of MRE sessions (MRE “light” for communities that do not have a contamination issue and a full-fledged session for the others), the organisation of specific sessions for men and women respectively and the reflection around other groups with specific needs (*e.g.* pastoralists). These changes are also more accurately reflected in recent reporting.

The implementation of KAPB surveys is the one area where DCA is well behind (though no clear targets are set in the logframe).

Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent findings of current KAPB surveys (pre and post MRE) are sufficient to learn lessons and draw conclusions. DCA is aware of the fact that while 100% of the post-MRE KAPBs indicate an improvement in KAPB, this data does not allow for finer analysis and grasping of outstanding challenges. DCA is in the process of revising the KAPB survey approach and should also define what it considers a representative sample, both at baseline and secondary level. The KAPB survey offers an opportunity for DCA to learn a number of lessons and make its work even more relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KAPB surveys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communities visited at time of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPB baseline (pre-MRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPB secondary (6 months post-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linking community liaison to spot tasks and MRE in communities has been a key step in improving the effectiveness of the programme. DCA is also attempting to link this grass-roots approach to a strengthened strategic analysis at provincial level through increased coordination with key actors. Limited resources and logistical challenges compound this effort however.  

MRE in Schools

DCA also revised its approach to the MRE schools project (in Fizi territory) thanks to the support of a consultant. It refined its focus from schools (targeting 110 schools) to teachers (targeting 200 teachers/directors and inspectors, two in each school). The participants were trained over several days and then sent back to their respective schools with support material and the understanding that they would integrate MRE in their teaching (without defining how or when). DCA developed pedagogical material which it cleared with CCLAM and UNMAS in a collaborative and efficient manner. DCA furthermore sought to complement the activity initiated by the Dutch funding by producing an MRE leaflet with separate funding.

It is difficult for the team to further assess the effectiveness of this training of teachers as the mission was carried out during the summer holidays and only two teachers could be met (no pupils). The teachers met attested to the quality of the training and what the expectations were of them. A number of observations the team would like to share however include:

1. The lack of clarity as to how and when to integrate the MRE in the school curriculum limits the likelihood of effectiveness. This is outside the realm of DCA’s control. Having said that, certain teachers are said to have been very pro-active, trained other teachers, sensitised their communities and delivered MRE session to pupils. The extent to which this is the case could not be assessed.

2. It could not be measured to what extent teachers see this topic as relevant to them and their community. Though not a clear sign per se, requests for payment by teachers to carry out MRE are one type of indicator of their level of motivation. It is likely that merging MRE and broader safety considerations (i.e. the Safer Communities approach) will increase the degree to which teachers take ownership of the issue.

3. DCA initially thought it would train both primary and secondary school teachers. It noticed however that the teaching modules were not adapted to older audiences and hence no longer included secondary school teachers in subsequent sessions. The situation was further compounded by the fact that MRE is not part of the secondary school curriculum and secondary teachers hence proved to be more complicated an audience. Different approaches are indeed important for different age groups the team would like to encourage DCA to continue exploring targeting secondary school children/young adults as a high percentage of the ERW victims are actually in the older age categories.

Reporting of SHAs

Identification of suspected hazardous areas can be considered a cross cutting issue under this programme. It is often done by the MTTs, but DCA’s objective is also for it to be done by the communities directly using a number of reporting mechanisms such as DCA’s phone number distributed during community MRE sessions or a form developed for the school MRE sessions to be handed over to the school inspectors. The effectiveness of DCA’s attempts at developing a self-standing reporting mechanism (as in: initiated by the communities and not requested by DCA) has been limited to date. In a positive step, DCA has developed a data base, which should be strengthened. The question of the sustainability of this database is discussed further below.

21 Coordination forums and meeting of relevant stakeholders do not necessarily happen at Bukavu level. The staff furthermore has to travel long distances to carry out activities or monitoring, further limiting their availability to participate in coordination and strategy meetings.
Effectiveness and Gender
DCA is making efforts to ensure that women benefit to the same extent as men and that, where they are more vulnerable (such as the communities where the women work in the fields or collect fire-wood) they are targeted directly. The organisation is reassessing on a regular basis how this can be strengthened further also taking men’s particular vulnerabilities into account where relevant.

Effectiveness and Ownership/Capacity of Authorities
For the time being, the authorities’ involvement is limited due to their limited presence, resources and capacities. DCA is nonetheless ensuring they are kept abreast and involved to the extent possible, thereby contributing to their ownership and capacity. Current institutional changes are an opportunity to strengthen this support as mentioned above.

5.4 Efficiency

- To what extent do the country programmes efficiently apply resources?
- To what extent have capacity guiding initiatives led to greater operational efficiency?
- What is the value for money/cost effectiveness embedded in the delivery mechanisms?

The section below does not discuss the efficiency of capacity development of the national authorities as no such activities were carried out (see programme background). Instead, it will briefly discuss capacity development of DCA staff and how this relates to efficiency.

General Considerations
For the DRC mine action programme a confluence of events all conspired to create a number of obstacles to its smooth initiation. The shift in overall responsibility from the UN to the national authority, the decision to require documentation exclusively in French, non-French-speaking management staff and the decision to relocate the AoR from Kalemie to Bukavu all led to the programme’s initial delay.

Operations did not formally start until April 2013 – a full six months after the programme was due to begin yet this does in fact not necessarily been a long-term disadvantage. Though certainly undesirable, the programme has recovered and is showing marked improvement from last year. Improvements in staffing, team structures, reporting, warehousing, and logistics have all led to improved function. The DCA teams’ flexibility (both in terms of living conditions, areas of deployment as well as tasks carried out) has further contributed to efficiency. Efforts to cut spending and split costs across different funding sources have further increased efficiency. A no cost extension has been requested and granted by the Dutch, so though an unfortunate hiccup, this delay in accreditation and operational deployment has been overcome and not resulted in any lasting consequences.

DCA has made efforts to streamline processes, improve control and efficiency. A number of areas could benefit from further simplification, such as:
- Data management: DCA’s reporting to different databases (IMSMA, DCA global and DCA DRC) duplicates work.
- Language requirements: As an HMA programme in a francophone country, naturally key documents must be produced in French. As there is not the same level of French language ability among the Copenhagen staff, a burden is sometimes placed on the Congo programme in that it must translate and make available these key documents in English. On the bright side some of the normative references either developed in or

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22 EOD teams for instance carry out NTS when not working on a specific task.
translated to French will become part of DCA’s institutional reference and will be to the benefit of other programmes in French speaking environments.

- Reporting: the programme is aware of the fact that reporting should and could be further strengthened. As mentioned above, streamlining reporting mechanisms and identifying viable options in the absence of DCA’s physical presence and the very limited capacity of CCLAM is key.

**EOD Spot-tasks**

The programme has suffered a little from poor external and internal record keeping that have manifested themselves in a significant number of cancelled tasks (20%); tasks which had in fact been previously cleared by DCA and others (between 2006 and 2012). Clearance was not recorded in DCA’s internal database nor in IMSMA, and hence led to an unfortunate duplication of effort.

Start-up obstacles aside, the nature of EOD spot clearance does not lend itself to easy and predictable operations. Every day is a new challenge in a new location and in DRC, the sheer size of the operational area only compounds matters. To try and mitigate these constraints, the current operational model employed by DCA uses what it termed an “axis approach”: This primarily consists of concentrating assets along certain main route axes that indicate the potentially highest levels of contamination, as they are often the site of former fighting. Using a field camp arrangement the EOD Team deploys at strategic points along these main axes. From there it uses it’s community data gathering tools on a rolling basis to generate hazardous object reports on which its daily tasking is based. This is a logical approach to what otherwise would be an exercise in futility to “chase” individual objects far and wide as they are reported. As such, the approach allows geographically defined areas to be more thoroughly covered and represents an important improvement in efficiency of the operation.

**Community Liaison/NTS**

The logistical and infrastructure considerations in DRC make little about HMA easy. Contact with the community and the information they hold is vital to the axis approach, without which it would impossible to accurately generate EOD task information and ensure a particular area has been completed.24

This combined with the hierarchical information flow inherent in DRC (women to men to village chief in communities, children to teacher to school director in schools) demands a CL/NTS process that is rather labour intensive in which a considerable amount of back and forth between the CL Team and the community takes place. Involving pre-visits, actual CL/NTS visits and follow-up visits. The NTS, which is done as an adjunct to the community liaison, is rather rudimentary, but that being said through the use of community mapping and discussion has led to considerable tasking information and few false leads of inaccurate tasks. Though on the surface this may appear to be less than efficient, in the context of South Kivu this process runs smoothly and obtains the desired results.

**MRE in Communities**

Likewise the community based sessions require considerable travel and preparatory negotiation. The DCA MRE Team has developed a strong rapport with the community, is well trusted and as mentioned earlier, is well practiced and professional. They have also developed

23 Community Liaison, Non-Technical Survey and Mine Risk Education activities are all sources of vital contamination data.
24 Completed is a relative word. Completed in the sense that every effort has been made through NTS/CL/MRE and clearance to locate and destroy all hazardous objects in a given area. Though of course time and continued use of land in certain areas will undoubtedly uncover more hazards, the residual risk has been reduced to an acceptable minimum.
context and audience specific interventions that are more finely tuned to the community needs. Upon arrival at a village site the team can quickly and efficiently sub-divide that audience into different groups (i.e. men/adolescent boys and women/children) to whom they can deliver different and methodologically appropriate MRE. An informative, worthwhile MRE session can be delivered in 40 minutes or less depending on need. Considering the number of potential beneficiaries, plus the fact that MRE is an ongoing activity that must be repeated, the DCA approach does well to cover as much as it does.

MRE in Schools
The DCA pilot project in the schools shows the pitfalls of working within the national education system. Lack of funding, lack of motivation and conflicting agendas all conspire to seriously undermine the potential output of the teachers once they are trained. This, coupled with DCA’s lack of actual control over activities (it is left to the teachers discretion, where, when, how and how often to deliver an MRE session, if at all) makes any concrete assessment of its efficiency haphazard.

MRE in schools is a logical and in theory, almost obligatory step. For UNICEF, and quite a few others, addressing the MRE needs of children is part of their mandate and to an extent they “must” pursue this line with the Ministry of Education. Children in school are a “captive” audience, easy to get to and attentive, all of which leads to considerable resources being directed towards schools. The team wishes to mention that in certain contexts, though outwardly logical, careful analysis of school demographics and risk taking profiles does not always bare this logic out. On a global level, children are not usually the primary risk takers in contaminated environments (it tends to be middle-aged men) and when children are, they tend to be of secondary aged\(^{25}\).

The Evaluation Team is not aware of any analysis (by another actor or DCA itself) on risk taking in South Kivu (geography, demographics, behaviours, etc.) from which the decision was taken to prioritise MRE for primary versus secondary aged children.

It is apparent that DCA has taken a cautious and inclusive approach by focusing MRE resources largely on primary aged children (including with the expectation that by developing a “culture of safety” early on, this will by default further promote safety as the children grow older and become young adults). The team would however like to suggest that DCA engages in basic analysis on levels of victimisation and risk taking behaviours (their ongoing community Liaison function could quite easily approach these themes in their daily work) to determine if a continued focus on the primary school is the most beneficial use of resources.

The training of 200 teachers/directors and inspectors in Fizi territory, to act as multipliers, is on paper at least an efficient way to reach a portion of that particular demographic. Though as has been pointed out, the extent to which teachers actually perform these duties is not known. Compounding this is the inadequacy of the methodology adopted vis-à-vis secondary school pupils and the suspension of involvement of secondary school teachers.

Capacity Development of DCA Staff
What has admittedly been a steadily improving process has come at the cost of a rather heavy expatriate presence. Though technical UXO clearance activity does require specialised skills, the DCA programme has an expatriate to operational national staff ratio of approximately one to five. This has implications both for cost and for progress towards capacity development goals.

\(^{25}\) See the Landmine Monitor Country Profiles for Lebanon, DRC and Libya, the Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS), and Mine and ERW Risk Education: A Project Management Guide, (GICHD 2008) for more discussion on at-risk groups and MRE targeting.
VfM
Currently the Dutch programme budget is underspent. In some circles this would be indicative of poor planning, however in the case of DRC it is more related to the delayed start and restructuring of the operational framework which implies efficient cost saving measures and may lead to an additional two month programme extension.

5.5 Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent have outcomes of the project been achieved as intended, in particular the project planned objectives. Have those outcomes:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Been facilitated/constrained by external factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Produced any unintended or unexpected impacts and if so how have these affected the overall impact.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have contributed to economic and social development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.</td>
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UXO Clearance
Overall, the nature of the tasks achieved (i.e. spot UXO clearance) combined with the absence of any real baseline data make it difficult to make a categorical assessment of impact.\(^\text{26}\) Furthermore, the current \textit{modus operandi}, though necessary to ensure efficiency, limits the likelihood of impact at community level as DCA’s presence (and hence response capacity) is limited in time\(^\text{27}\).

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, performance targets have either been met or exceeded and that DCA is removing hazardous ERW and human security improved is quite clear. The team also observed tasks where UXOs have clearly impacted beneficiaries’ livelihoods by preventing them from using their fields. Demolition of these ERW had a direct impact of individuals’ access to more farming opportunities. While it is difficult for the time being to demonstrate trends based on data collected by DCA, a brief analysis of declared impact of tasks (based on DCA database) illustrates an impact on access to livelihoods (especially agriculture and livestock) as well as other services (access to water, communication etc.).

\textit{Figure 2: Impact of DCA tasks as indicated in DCA database}

\[1\% \quad 1\% \quad 4\% \quad 41\% \quad 10\% \quad 10\% \quad 20\% \quad 5\% \]

\[\text{access to education and leisure} \quad \text{reconstruction} \quad \text{access to daily facilities and water} \]

\(^\text{26}\) To their credit, DCA is attempting to collect more impact data, but have not yet fully developed it as a planning/analysis tool.

\(^\text{27}\) DCA will set-up base and remain about a month in a certain location, from where they will visit all villages in the vicinity. They will then gather everything and move to a new base. They do not usually return to a location.
Anecdotally, the Evaluation Team also recorded testimony that indicated a positive psycho-social impact at the individual level. Beneficiaries interviewed expressed relief that this particular danger had been eliminated and as such, were more confident in travelling within their community, and in working in their fields.

The extent to which UXOs are impacting human security to start with (mentioned under relevance) is a question which is outside the realm of this evaluation. The evaluation team does however know that DCA is considering this issue, informed by data gathered in its interaction with the community. Indeed, the latter indicate other elements within DCA’s competence, which further impact human security and warrant the adoption of the safer communities approach. Further improvement in targeting of axes, for instance alignment with other humanitarian actors’ priorities (such as targeting potential areas of IDP return), will also further strengthen the likelihood of impact on livelihoods and human security.

Community Liaison/ NTS
The community CL, NTS and MRE activities though distinct in objectives, are part of one larger holistic process and as such, are a vital element in DCA’s relationship with the affected communities. This in turn is essential to their ability to identify priority tasks.

As mentioned above, the CL/NTS process does require quite a bit of back and forth. This however has its benefits in contributing positively to the general understanding of DCA, UXO contamination, reporting and mitigation efforts in DRC. More concretely it is probably the primary source of actionable information regarding the presence of ERW and heavily influences the overall tasking of the DCA EOD Team. It therefore contributes to risk reduction, both in terms of increased awareness of the communities and concrete identification of hazardous areas.

MRE in Communities
The community level MRE done by DCA has shown a very high level of understanding and retention. In a similar fashion to the CL, the MRE efforts at community level are labour intensive in that they require multiple visits and sessions to meet the needs of the community. DCA respects this process and does tailor its presentations to better suit risk taking profiles among men, women and children. The MRE sessions, again, like the CL sessions, have led to reports of suspicious objects and examples of correct behaviour.

Though professionally implemented, DCA’s Congo MRE project suffers the same difficulties all MRE projects suffer in conclusively demonstrating a reduction in accidents that is a direct result of the MRE provided. Simply put, when people do the right thing and don’t have an accident it does not get recorded. Positive indicators such as increased reporting and other aspects of correct behaviour are too few in number to draw empirical conclusions. In DRC the lack of accurate baseline data also makes determining the MRE programme’s influence on pre and post-accident trends virtually impossible.

MRE in Schools
The impact of the teacher training is similarly less than clear. Monitoring of school-based activity and the distribution of MRE materials is behind schedule further limiting the evidence base from which to draw firm conclusions.

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28 This through a post-KAPB survey sample of 20%.
29 As an anecdote, a story was told of a young boy who spotted a suspicious object and reported it through the village head to DCA who in turn sent a team to investigate. Though it turned out to be a truck oil filter and not an ERW, it does demonstrate a pattern of thinking and information exchange that is precisely what the MRE/CL processes strives to achieve.
Capacity Development

Until now, the mandate for developing the capacity of the CCLAM has rested squarely with the UN. As the transition from UN control to national control is now well underway it has become evident that some areas still leave room for improvement. DCA has an operational presence in South Kivu, while the CCLAM, though technically responsible for the national as a whole do not yet have a presence outside of Kinshasa. Therefore, any opportunities for DCA to develop the capacity of the national mine action authority limited.

The CCLAM aside, DCA has, in the past, made attempts to work with national institutions where possible and feasible. For example, they have strived to include members of the Congolese Army (FARDC) in their operations in order to familiarise them with the humanitarian EOD/mine action process – this with an eye to the eventual assumption of operational control by the FARDC. As mentioned, they have also worked closely with the ESPS (Ministry of Education) training teachers as part of the MRE programme.

As in Lebanon (though under different circumstances), DCA’s internal capacity development efforts have focussed primarily on technical skills including EOD qualification, radio, site supervisor, team leader, medical and other field focused operational skills. The EOD Teams in particular that operate under Dutch funding present themselves as highly motivated, conscientious and professional all while working under challenging conditions, and should be commended as such. On the other hand, efforts at developing management, analysis and strategic planning skills have been less of a focus. Unfortunately, the likelihood of these capacities being eventually absorbed into the national capacity is limited and has hence only a limited impact on creating long-term national capacities.

The team has not observed any harm being done through the programme under consideration nor any other unintended impacts.

5.6 Sustainability

Sustainability of Benefits Provided

The removal of a particular ERW threat is a lasting and sustainable benefit, both physically and psychologically. However, the relatively unpredictable nature of roving or spot task EOD clearance, as opposed to more uniform Battle Area Clearance, means that often the removal of one device leads to increased confidence in movement and cultivation, which in turn can lead to the discovery of another device.

The MRE related Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and Behaviours that have improved as a direct result of the community level work done by DCA are certainly sustainable, though the absence of a national partner or institution in which the MRE can be embedded, will result in any positive message, attitudes and behaviours that have developed fading over time.

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30 Such a cooperation is not possible in the case of South Kivu given the involvement of the FARDC in combat and the potential risk an association with the FARDC would represent for DCA in certain areas.
Unfortunately, one of the benefits so clearly resulting from the DCA presence – confidence in reporting flow and reaction by a qualified authority will evaporate when DCA leaves a given area. As there is not a national or international partner that will assume the responsibility for, organising and managing reporting mechanisms they will simply cease.

The skills and knowledge imparted to the 200 school teachers is demonstrable, however their willingness and ability to apply it the classroom is tenuous without direct oversight and support from a third party.

**Sustainability of Capacity Developed**

This is also unfortunately true regarding the capacity that DCA has worked to develop among its national staff. The EOD/technical staff has progressed to a high standard and though it is possible some of them may find continued employment with DCA the vast majority will simply have nowhere to take their talents once DCA leaves or scales down in South Kivu. Some of the support staff that has developed non-HMA specific skills may fare better in their attempt to find employment with another NGO/humanitarian organisation.

**Sustainability of Programme as a Whole**

The Evaluation Team recognises that the relatively short programme time frame of two years is a tight window in which to achieve high levels of sustainability. As of this writing however, the team believes the programme as a whole will only be sustainable with the same continued level of technical and financial support. The difficulty the CCLAM has faced in operationalising its mandate means that for all intents and purposes the hand-over of clearance capabilities to a national partner or the institutionalisation of MRE within existing government structures seems unlikely. With this in mind, the need to migrate towards a *Safer Communities* approach becomes even more evident. As an operational framework, it will give mine action – certainly in DRC at least – a wider donor base, stronger, more varied and better established partners (national and international) and increased programmatic options to address the suffering caused by landmine and ERW contamination.

**DRC Summary of Findings and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance &amp; Coherence</th>
<th>Current Assessment</th>
<th>Recommended Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important changes to the programme over its existence – progressive increase in relevance, especially for beneficiaries.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevant to and coherent with DCA priorities, incl. participation and non-discrimination. HAP is being rolled out. Accountability, participation and gender work in progress.</td>
<td>Further strengthen accountability, gender and opportunities for community participation (see feedback mechanism).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevant to and coherent with DRC priorities, though HMA and institutions new. Little support to DRC to deal with ERW means DCA is covering a gap. As CCLAM develops, further opportunities to strengthen relevance for DRC.</td>
<td>Continued support to CCLAM and explore opportunities for future support to its operationalisation. Critical period ahead.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevant to and coherent with Dutch priorities especially since improved targeting. <em>Safer Communities</em> as opportunity for further relevance (e.g. SGBV and stabilisation).</td>
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</tbody>
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31 Where the team believes that no follow-up on DCA’s part is either required or possible (i.e. required action falls outside DCA’s realm), the box has been left blank.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved relevance to beneficiaries as programme adapted working methods (targeting and MRE) though communities place priorities elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective in first year due to a number of factors. Now on track to meet/surpass its targets in most areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spot task approach significantly increased DCA’s effectiveness. Lessons learned from current spot-tasks:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Payment received under DDR limits initial effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Lack of knowledge of FARDC creates further contamination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapting MRE in communities increased effectiveness (as well as non-discrimination, focus on perspective on particular groups at risks).</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAPB “below target” (target ill-defined) and potential for improvement in effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPB “below target” (target ill-defined) and potential for improvement in effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking community liaison to spot tasks and MRE key in effectiveness. Could be strengthened with a top down element.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slight change in approach in training of teachers against what DCA had initially set out to do. Training completed but hard to gauge effectiveness. Linked to question of ownership (and relevance) of issue by teachers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training of teachers as a pilot.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender is a priority and part of the organisation’s analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening ownership and capacities: not possible for the time being but an upcoming possibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Start-up issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clearance operations are logically organised and deployed, professional, safety-conscious and make good use of limited resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting mechanisms could be streamlined and viable options in the absence of DCA’s physical presence identified</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community MRE has made progress to become more accurate and useful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>School based MRE remains a question mark as to its benefits.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of external national capacities not possible under current CCLAM structure. Internal efforts, though showing some progress have been tentative.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The programme has shown good value for money and has demonstrated conscientious budgeting and cost saving initiatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
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### 6 Key Findings and Conclusions

The Evaluation Team has found well organised, well run programmes in both Lebanon and DRC. Working in challenging and at times restrictive operational environments, they have managed to remain relevant and coherent with country policies as well as those of the Dutch Government. They have also proven, by and large, to be effective and efficient in delivering results. Obstacles do remain regarding the transfer of competence and the programme's overall sustainability, though the institutional shift towards and overarching AVR framework will aid in mitigating these obstacles.

More specifically DCA has;

- Reduced risk from mines and ERW, created opportunities for improved livelihoods and increased social capital.
• Demonstrated a strong corporate identity and enjoyed good relations and coordination with national authorities.
• Strived to cooperate and assist national authorities wherever possible.
• Worked towards cost-effectiveness and represented good value for money.
• Encouraged staff that are highly motivated and technically competent.
• Begun to introduce the Safer Communities concept which, though not new, is a welcome and important methodological and philosophical shift, without which DCA would run the risk of lagging behind HMA sector developments.

A number of points requiring DCA’s attention were identified by the team. DCA has;
• Not established links with development actors (this for different reasons).
• Not demonstrated a robust mechanism to develop and retain institutional memory. Certain seemingly obvious miss steps were taken in the programme start-up in Congo that could have been avoided. This is also evident to an extent in Lebanon where the original planning outputs were set somewhat unrealistically high when the factors limiting these outputs were, or should have been well known.
• Defined capacity development in a rather narrow, short-term fashion. Focusing first and foremost on the technical/prerequisite skills of its own staff which, though important, do not necessarily extend beyond the confines of DCA's own operations or the lifespan of the programme.
• Thus far been unable to approach capacity development with a longer-term view, such as the development of a local partner's strategic management skills or those of the national authority. A strategic analysis of the organisation’s capacity development ambitions and approaches should be promoted.
• Not yet put socio-economic data (pre and post clearance assessment, pre and post KAPB, etc.) at the core of its planning and prioritisation.
• Yet to develop more formal transition and exit strategies.

Based on this analysis, the team formulated a number of recommendations, both general and country specific. In summary, these are32:

**Lebanon**
1. As a priority, work with the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC) to develop and apply a clearly articulated land release methodology.
2. Continue to work with the LMAC to refine survey information, tasking priorities and site selection.
3. A thorough and frank analysis should be undertaken jointly with LMAC to identify concrete capacity development needs and opportunities where DCA could facilitate support. This should include an analysis of the specific inputs EOD trained personnel have provided HMA operations, and the viability of including non-technical issues.
4. Explore possible complementarities between HMA priorities in Lebanon and needs of Syrian refugees.
5. It is important that while working with national authorities, DCA regularly reassesses the alignment between their respective priorities.
6. Continue to refine the pre/post clearance assessment and analysis process in order to better assess relevance to specific beneficiaries and determine impact.

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32 These recommendations are based on the recommendations formulated at the end of each country chapter.
7. Further strengthen human rights based approach, especially gender and participation, possibly through training of staff, review of current approach and strategic analysis of opportunities. Look into accountability as well.
8. Continue to link ERW to other relevant issues (*Safer Communities*).
9. Where possible, improve links and coordination between the DCA mine action Programme, other DCA programmes and other development actors (including the ACT alliance).
10. DCA Lebanon should, when conditions allow, continue to pursue the goal of developing a national partner to whom it can transfer certain operational responsibilities.
11. Thought should be given to a SMART exit strategy.

**DRC**

1. Continue to explore targeting of secondary school children/young adults as older age categories tend to be a higher percentage of ERW victims.
2. Integrate lessons learned from current programme in future activities (e.g. different groups motivations, capacity of Congolese armed forces (FARDC), spot-task modus operandi, importance of French), etc.
3. Continue to link ERW to other relevant issues (*Safer Communities*).
4. Continue to monitor school activity and perform analysis on risk taking profiles/school demographics vis-a-vis DCA’s interventions.
5. Develop structured staff development plans for employees that clearly articulate opportunities.
6. Strengthen KAPB surveys.
7. Continue to collect and strengthen analysis of pre/post clearance and KAPB impact data.
8. Streamline and strengthen reporting mechanisms including developing national authorities from the onset.
9. Explore developing relationship with a national partner that can perform the community liaison function in DCA’s absence.
10. Explore realistic avenues to strengthen the Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM)’s capacity, within the realm of DCA’s mandate.
11. Thought should be given to a SMART exit strategy.

**General**

1. Develop an organised framework for ensuring institutional memory. This can be done through meetings, workshops (including lessons-learned sessions), intra-programme visits/exchanges and staff pre-deployment training.
2. Through a strategic analysis of the organisation’s capacity development ambitions and approaches, continue to promote capacity building of national staff and, where relevant national mine action institutions, but with enhanced focus on non-technical areas such as language, socio-economic analysis, quality management, etc.
3. Where possible, take earlier and more structured action to engage national partners with an eye towards eventual transition to local control.
4. Ensure socio-economic factors are at the forefront of operational planning, steering away from more traditional/technically heavy operations.
5. Take stronger steps to connect HMA with development through more effective and timely engagement with national development partners.
6. Further operationalise the move towards the *Safer Communities* approach and continue the role out of the HAP. These processes should focus on consistently incorporating and institutionalising core functional aspects such as the community based use of socio-economic analysis in priority setting and increased participation.
Annex 1 - List of interlocutors

Denmark

07/08: Copenhagen
1. Signe Normøse, Head of support, Programme Coordinator Libya, DCA Mine Action
2. Claus Nielsen, Head of Operations DCA Mine Action
3. Monty, Security officer DCA Libya

08/08: Copenhagen
4. Søren Adser, Programme Coordinator Lebanon, DCA Mine Action
5. Annette Lüdeking, Programme Coordinator Democratic Republic of the Congo, DCA Mine Action

Lebanon

10/08: Bsous
6. Craig McDiarmid, Programme Manager DCA HMA Lebanon

11/08: Beirut/Bsous
7. Brig. Gen. Imad Odeimi, LMAC Director
9. Charmen Rahal, Operations Manager DCA HMA Lebanon

12/08: Arayia & Bsous
10. Captain Wassim Louis, LMAC operations officer
11. Arayia Municipality representative (male)
12. Tamer Said, DCA FOO
13. Rana Aboud, DCA reserve team leader/deminer
14. DCA Demining team (5 staff, 4 male, 1 female)
15. Hassan Mowanes, DCA site supervisor
16. Abou Alhassan Chaanini, DCA site team leader
17. Mohamed Chour, DCA quality assurance / community liaison officer
18. Mira Saad, DCA programme officer /QA/CLO

13/08: Ras Al Harf, Zahrie
22. Robert Haj Moussa, LMAC Community Liaison Officer
23. Hussein Jaafar, DCA site team leader
24. Mohammed Jedeed, DCA site team leader
25. DCA demining team (6 staff, 4 male, 2 female)
31. Beneficiaries (6 male)

14/08: Nabatieh, Baraachit, Siddiqin
37. Lt. Col. Pierre Bou Maroum, Chief Regional Mine Action Centre
38. RMAC chief QA
39. Major Bayan, RMAC Chief operations
40. Rachad Sibli, DCA FOO
41. Lt Hussein Chamseddine, RMAC Ops
42. 5 Beneficiaries (3 men, 2 women)
47. Burj el Shamali municipality (3 male representatives)

15/08: Beirut
48. Hester M.J. Somsen, Ambassador Kingdom of the Netherlands
Democratic Republic of Congo

18/08: Goma
49. Joseph Mobert N. Senga, chargé de programme Est de la RDC, Dutch Embassy
50. Richard Derieux, Regional coordinator UNMAS
51. Claude Kodjo, Operations Associate UNMAS
52. Kambale Vagheni Elie, Operations Assistant UNMAS
53. Aurélie Fabry, UNMAS MRE specialist, phone interview
54. JP Botha, MAG Ops Manager, phone interview

19/08: Bukavu
55. Charlotte Billoir, Programme Manager, DCA Bukavu
56. Pierre Shabani Mpangaza, Inspecteur Principal Provincial Adjoint (primaire) – Ministère de l’EPSP Sud Kivu
57. Gilbert Sengamali, Assistant humanitarian Affairs officer, OCHA Bukavu
58. Marina Romiti, Finance and Administration Manager, DCA Bukavu
59. Emmanuel Ruvuna, Administrator, DCA Bukavu
60. Thea Lacey, Partnerships Officer, DCA Bukavu

21/08: Mboko
61. Jean de Dieu Mateso Wenga, Team Leader NTS/CL
62. David Mihigo Sema wa Sema, OPS Assistant
63. Florent Mwekwa Watukalusu, Team Leader NTS/CL
64. Three MRE beneficiaries, Lusenda village (3 women)
65. Four former clearance beneficiaries, Mukewezi 1, (2 women)

22/08
71. Melos Vula, Technical Advisor, DCA
72. EOD spot task beneficiary (1 male)
73. NsoshaTambwe, Team Leader/ EOD
74. Martin Mbungu Vangu, Team Leader/ EOD

24/08
75. Two School project beneficiary (2 male)
77. David Wasolu Djuma, AdminFinLog Assistant DCA
78. DCA Baraka Radio Room operator
79. Spot task beneficiary/chef de secteur (1 male)
80. Kachungwe village (MRE and spot task beneficiary) village chief + advisor (2 male)

29/08
81. Maître Sudi Alimasi Kinputu, Coordonnateur National CCLAM
Annex 2 – Evaluation Terms of Reference

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
DCA has been implementing a four-year programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon and Libya titled “DCA Humanitarian Mine Action in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya”. This programme has included mine action, risk education, and training and development of government actors. This ToR is in reference to the external evaluation of the programme. The external evaluation will be conducted in August 2014. The four-year programme (01 July 2012 to 01 July 2016) received approval from the Dutch Government in June 2012 and started operations from July 2012.

The projects under evaluation are implemented to benefit the population of DR Congo, Lebanon, and Libya.

Monitoring: Programme-level monitoring is conducted in Tripoli, Beirut and Bukavu through the DCA Programme Manager in each country, and coordinated at HQ level by the Programme Coordinator. All countries conduct monitoring operations and submit regular reports to HQ (on a monthly basis) and the donor (annually); the latter will be available for the consultant.

Partners and Stakeholders: DCA Democratic Republic of Congo is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the government of DRC, the provincial governments of Eastern DRC, UNMACC, village leadership, local communities, beneficiaries, schools and school inspectors, and other NGOs working in Eastern DRC. DCA Lebanon is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC-Lebanon), local authorities in Lebanon and other NGOs working in Lebanon. DCA Libya is operating via direct implementation, with key stakeholders including the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC-Libya), the police and army, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior in Tripoli, the Military Council of Misurata, the Civil Defence of the National Safety Authority and other NGOs working in Libya.

CONTRACT OUTCOMES
The programme has the following outcomes:

1. To improve human security and establish the conditions for safe and sustainable livelihoods for war-affected populations in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya through clearance and survey of land contaminated by ERWs.

2. To reduce the risk for the affected populations in DR Congo, Libya and Lebanon through Community Liaison and Risk Education activities.

3. To assist in building long-term national capacities for mine action though support for national clearance plans and capacity building of national Mine Action Coordination Centres and partners.

OBJECTIVES OF THE CONSULTANCY
The overall purpose of the evaluation is to measure the achievements of the project outcome where stated in the project proposal and Logframe, and give recommendations for future project development and improvement in mine action, risk education and local capacity development. In addition, the evaluation should confirm adherence to policy objectives of the Netherlands Development Cooperation policy and the objectives outlined in the Call for Proposals published on December 15th 2011.
In addition, the external evaluation will document lessons learned, challenges and good practices of project implementation. Specifically, the external evaluation aims to:

1. Assess the Relevance of the programme outcomes for the beneficiaries and stakeholders,
2. Assess the relevance of the outputs for achieving the outcomes
3. Assess the effectiveness in converting inputs to outputs
4. Evaluate the sustainability of the different outputs in accordance with the outcomes.
5. Make a record of lesson learned, challenges, successes, positive and negative experiences etc.

SCOPE OF THE SERVICES
The external evaluation shall comprise but not necessarily be limited to the following:

1. Assess the effectiveness of the programme and component projects in reaching the stated outcomes and outputs, including an analysis of possible constraints.
2. Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the different strategies, with a view to assessing whether the interventions met the needs of the intended beneficiaries in the area of operation. Analysis should consider gender and the differential impacts on women and men.
3. Assess the technical quality of the program activities and the effectiveness and appropriateness of methodologies and approaches applied.
4. Assess the synergy/ cooperation achieved at different levels between the different project areas.
5. Review the quality and appropriateness of the monitoring and reporting system.
6. Assess the degree to which financial resources (funds, expertise, time etc.) have been converted into outputs.
7. Review the degree of cooperation and collaboration with organizations and government agencies / offices, including collaboration and networking mechanisms in the implementation of the program.
8. Review the degree of beneficiary participation in programme design and implementation and the programme’s overall accountability.
9. Recommend strategies, modifications and improvements for future projects pursuing similar goals.
10. Identify major concerns related to the sustainability of the program.
11. Identify good practices within the program.

The Consultant(s) liaison from DCA will be Signe Nørmose Head of Support based in DCA HQ in Denmark, who will provide support for day-to-day administrative, logistic and program clarifications. The consultant(s) liaison in-country will be Charlotte Billoir, Programme Manager in Democratic Republic of Congo, Craig MacDiarmid, Programme Manager in Lebanon, and Knut Furunes, Programme Manager in Libya. They will be the focal points for administrative and logistic clarifications in relation to each country, and for programme clarifications relating to each country’s part of the programme.

TIMING, LOGISTICS AND FACILITIES
The Contract duration will be 50 days between 01 August 2014 and 19 September 2014. The field visits are expected to take place during the month of August. During the field visit elements of the contract, the contractor will be based in, Beirut, Bukavu and Tripoli with significant travel to project implementation sites in DR Congo, Lebanon and Misurata.
The Contracting Authority will provide office accommodation (desk and internet).
The consultants should expect to visit all three project locations and plan for at least three weeks of time in the project locations in total.

Practical considerations:
DCA can assist with the local part of visa arrangements for Libya
If required, DCA can assist with booking of hotels and travel.
DCA can arrange travel by road to field sites and local travel.
Security will be managed by DCA in each country.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS
The questions are intended to guide the consultant(s) in addressing the objectives of the external evaluation:

Relevance - The analysis of relevance will focus on the following questions in relation to the design of the project:

1. the project's coherence with broader strategies e.g. national clearance and development priorities
2. the quality of the problem analysis and the project's intervention logic and logical framework matrix, appropriateness of the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement;
3. the extent to which stated outcomes correctly address the identified problems and social needs, clarity and internal consistency of the stated outcomes;
4. the extent to which the nature of the problems originally identified have changed
5. the extent to which outcomes have been updated in order to adapt to changes in the context;
6. the degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances;
7. the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender analysis and analysis of vulnerable groups);
8. the stakeholder participation in the design and in the management/implementation of the project, the level of local ownership, absorption and implementation capacity;
9. the quality of the analysis of strategic options, of the justification of the recommended implementation strategy, and of management and coordination arrangements;
10. the realism in the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources)
11. the analysis of assumptions and risks;

Effectiveness
The analysis of Effectiveness will therefore focus on such issues as:

1. whether the planned benefits are being delivered, as perceived by all key stakeholders (including women and men and specific vulnerable groups);
2. if the assumptions and risk assessments at output-level turned out to be inadequate or invalid, or unforeseen external factors intervened, how flexibly management has adapted to ensure that the outputs would still achieve the purpose; and how well has it been supported in this by key stakeholders
3. how unintended outputs have affected the benefits received positively or negatively and how could have been foreseen and managed.
4. whether any shortcomings were due to a failure to take account of cross-cutting or overarching issues such as gender, environment and poverty during implementation;
5. whether the programme complemented other initiatives (by other NGOs, national organisations, local government)
Efficiency

The assessment of Efficiency will therefore focus on such issues as:

1. To what extent was the programme implemented in a cost effective manner? Could the outcomes have been achieved with the use of fewer resources? Or could the outcomes have achieved greater outputs with the same resources?

2. operational work planning and implementation (input delivery, activity management and delivery of outputs), and management of the budget (including cost control and whether an inadequate budget was a factor);

3. whether management of risk has been adequate, i.e. whether flexibility has been demonstrated in response to changes in circumstances;

4. relations/coordination with local authorities, institutions, beneficiaries, other donors;

5. the quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders have been kept adequately informed of project activities (including beneficiaries/target groups);

6. Quality of monitoring: its existence (or not), accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it; adequacy of baseline information;

7. Did any unplanned outputs arise from the activities so far?

Impact

At Impact level the final evaluation will make an analysis of the following aspects:

1. Extent to which the outcomes of the project are likely to be achieved as intended, in particular the project planned objectives.

2. whether the effects of the project:

3. have been facilitated/constrained by external factors

4. have produced any unintended or unexpected impacts and if so how have these affected the overall impact.

5. have been facilitated/constrained by project/programme management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders

6. have contributed to economic and social development

7. Have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.

Sustainability

1. Are the benefits from the project likely to continue after the project has ended? Why and why not?

2. Has the programme provided policy support and have donor and national policy been aligned?

3. The extent to which the project is embedded in local institutional structures; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the project ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?); whether counterparts have been properly prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially;

4. the adequacy of the project budget for its purpose particularly phasing out prospects;

5. socio-cultural factors, e.g. whether the project is in tune with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits; whether it respects local power-structures, status systems and beliefs, and if it sought to change any of those, how well-accepted are the changes both by the target group and by others; how well it is based on an analysis of such factors, including target group/beneficiary participation in design and implementation; and the quality of relations between the external project staff and local communities.
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
The evaluation will draw on existing sources of information including monthly reports and interim reports, proposal, budget, and proposal and budget amendment, as well as field visits and interviews with beneficiaries, DCA staff and government officials.

The Consultants are free to choose whatever methods are necessary to fulfil the evaluation objectives. However, it is expected that, wherever possible, participatory approaches should be adopted. The Consultants should collect qualitative as well as quantitative data.

The evaluation approach will at a minimum include:

1. Desk review
   - A review and analysis of project proposal, revisions and reports in order to analyse to what extent outcomes and outputs have been reached.
   - A review of other related documents such as project research materials, manuals, activity reports, mid-term evaluation reports, etc.
2. Interviews with key stakeholders including project beneficiaries, government officials and DCA.
3. Visits to project sites in Libya, Lebanon and DR Congo (security permitting)
4. Focus group discussions with key stakeholders (project beneficiaries, government officials, EU delegation)
5. Other methodologies as proposed by the evaluator

REPORTING
The debriefing workshop prior to the Consultants’ departure should present the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations. The purpose is to inform DCA and other stakeholders of the Consultants’ observations, and to gather feedback to improve the final report.

The external evaluation report should be produced after incorporating feedback from DCA and their partners. The final report should not exceed 29 (1-3-25) pages (excluding annexes). A draft report should be sent to DCA by e-mail for comments within ten days after the debriefing workshop. The final report should be delivered to DCA, both as a hard copy and as a PDF file.

The evaluation report should be in DCA's 1-3-25 format, namely:
- 1 page of recommendations for future action
- 3 page (maximum) executive summary
- 25 page (maximum) report. The report should include:
  - Introduction (Objectives, Methodology, ToR, etc.)
  - Context analysis, Background, History
  - The evaluated project
  - Findings
  - Conclusions
  - Lessons learned
- Annexes and case studies may be included
Annex 3 – Document Review

Prior to field deployment, the team relied most heavily on the following data sources:

1. The Dutch MFA Mine Action Tender,
2. The initial and revised DCA bids,
3. DCA annual reports,
4. DCA Safer Communities policy,
5. DCA’s Vision and Plan.

At country level the following documentation was added:

6. Host country national mine action strategy/policy/survey documents,
7. DCA operational planning documents,
8. Project logframes,
9. Pre and post clearance assessment reports,
10. DCA SoPs, training plans.
### Annex 4 - Mission Itineraries
#### Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sun 10-08-2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collection from Airport</td>
<td>Beirut Airport</td>
<td>Fleet Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 10-08-2014</td>
<td>10:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Programme Presentation</td>
<td>Bsous Office</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 10-08-2014</td>
<td>12:00 – 13:00</td>
<td>Open Discussions</td>
<td>Bsous Office</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 11-08-2014</td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>LMAC Director</td>
<td>LMAC</td>
<td>OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 11-08-2014</td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>LMAC OPS</td>
<td>LMAC</td>
<td>OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue 12-08-2014</td>
<td>8:00-14:00</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Field Trip</td>
<td>MF 28 Araya Meeting Municipality</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 13-08-2014</td>
<td>8:00 - 11:00</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Field Trip</td>
<td>MF-95 Ras Al Harf Meeting beneficiaries</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 13-08-2014</td>
<td>11:00 - 14:00</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Field Trip</td>
<td>MF 429 completed task – Zahrie - (meeting beneficiaries)</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 14-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00 – 09:00</td>
<td>RMAC Visit</td>
<td>RMAC</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 14-08-2014</td>
<td>09:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>BAC Clearance Field Trip Meeting Municipality on site</td>
<td>CBU – 368 Baraachit</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 14-08-2014</td>
<td>12:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>Meeting beneficiaries on completed site</td>
<td>CBU – 256 Siddiqin</td>
<td>OM-QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri 15-08-2014</td>
<td>All day</td>
<td>Impact Monitoring Presentation/ Dutch Embassy</td>
<td>Bsous Office</td>
<td>PM – OM - QAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 16-08-2014</td>
<td></td>
<td>Departure</td>
<td>Beirut Airport</td>
<td>Fleet Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>Time:</td>
<td>Agenda:</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Attendance:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 16-08-2014</td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Collection from Airport and night in Bujumbura</td>
<td>Bujumbura Airport</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun 17-08-2014</td>
<td>09:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Travel to Bukavu</td>
<td>Bujumbura – Bukavu via Rwanda by road (Dina to apply for Rwanda transit visa)</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:30 – 15:30</td>
<td>Installation and review of schedule</td>
<td>Bukavu Office</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon 18-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00 – 11:00</td>
<td>Travel to Goma and collection from Goma harbour</td>
<td>Bukavu-Goma by boat</td>
<td>Ihusi Boat + Goma taxi driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy meeting</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy office</td>
<td>No DCA staff – 1st Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>UNMAS meeting</td>
<td>UNMAS office</td>
<td>No DCA staff – UNMAS Eastern Congo coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Phone interview with UNMAS MRE Specialist</td>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>Aurélie Fabry UNMAS MRE Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Phone interview with MAG</td>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>JP Botha MAG OM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue 19-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00-11:00</td>
<td>Travel to Bukavu and collection from Bukavu harbour</td>
<td>Goma-Bukavu by boat</td>
<td>Ihusi Boat + DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11:00-12:00</td>
<td>Security brief and Programme presentation</td>
<td>Bukavu Office</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Ministry of Education meeting</td>
<td>EPSP office</td>
<td>DCA Ops Assistant + Rep EPSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>OCHA meeting</td>
<td>OCHA office</td>
<td>No DCA staff – OCHA South Kivu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15:30-17:00</td>
<td>Meeting with Bukavu key staff</td>
<td>Bukavu Office</td>
<td>FAM, Admin.? Fundraiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Phone interview with CCLAM</td>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>CCLAM Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed 20-08-2014</td>
<td>7:00 - 12:00</td>
<td>Travel to Mboko</td>
<td>Bukavu-Mboko by road</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00 - 16:00</td>
<td>Meeting with MRE/NTS and EOD teams</td>
<td>Mboko – Fizi territory</td>
<td>PM-TA-MRE&amp;EOD teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu 21-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00 – 15:00</td>
<td>Evaluation of ongoing MRE/NTS activities (MRE sessions + survey)</td>
<td>Mboko – Fizi territory</td>
<td>PM-MRE team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri 22-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>Evaluation of ongoing EOD activities (demolition + discussion with local authorities and beneficiaries)</td>
<td>Mboko – Fizi territory</td>
<td>PM – TA - EOD team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00 – 16:00</td>
<td>Travel to Baraka</td>
<td>Mboko-Baraka by road</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat 23-08-2014</td>
<td>08:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>Evaluation of School project + post KABP + discussion with local authorities and beneficiaries</td>
<td>Baraka- Fizi territory</td>
<td>PM – School project Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00 – 16:00</td>
<td>Debrief session</td>
<td>Baraka office</td>
<td>PM</td>
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<td>Sun 24-08-2014</td>
<td>07:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Travel to Bujumbura</td>
<td>Baraka-Bujumbura by road</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>Departure</td>
<td>Bujumbura Airport</td>
<td>DCA driver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5 - Budgets by Country
Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>Budget (DKK)</th>
<th>Budget (€ - Approx.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>11,066,530</td>
<td>1,484,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1.1.1</td>
<td>11,066,530</td>
<td>1,484,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>15,337,189</td>
<td>2,056,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1.2.1</td>
<td>15,337,189</td>
<td>2,056,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3</td>
<td>1,013,001</td>
<td>135,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1.3.1</td>
<td>660,704</td>
<td>88,600</td>
</tr>
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<td>Activity 1.3.2</td>
<td>352,297</td>
<td>47,243</td>
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<td>Outcome 2</td>
<td>174,274</td>
<td>23,375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
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<td>Activity 2.1.1</td>
<td>89,732</td>
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<td>Activity 2.1.2</td>
<td>84,542</td>
<td>11,337</td>
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<td>Outcome 3</td>
<td>898,019</td>
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<td>352,400</td>
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<td>Output 3.2</td>
<td>545,619</td>
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<td>Activity 3.2.1</td>
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<td>Activity 3.2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>3,820,377</td>
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**DRC budget (initial and revised)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Revised budget (€)</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
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<td>Output 1.1</td>
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<td>Activity 1.1.1</td>
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<td>Output 1.2</td>
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<td>Activity 1.2.1</td>
<td>712,470.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1.3.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity 1.3.2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
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<td>Activity 2.1.1</td>
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<td>Output 2.12</td>
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<td>Activity 2.2.1</td>
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<td>Activity 2.2.2</td>
<td>88,271.00</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
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<td>Output 3.1</td>
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<td>Output 3.2</td>
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<td>Activity 3.2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,202,917.00</td>
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### Annex 6 - Country logframes

#### Lebanon Logframe

**Outcome 1: To improve human security and establish the conditions for safe and sustainable livelihoods for war-affected populations in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya through clearance and survey of land contaminated by ERWs.**

| **Output 1.1:** | 320,000m² of land contaminated by cluster munitions in South Lebanon cleared and released in coordination with the LMAC |
| **Indicators:** | Annually, team will clear and release 80,000 m² of land through surface and sub-surface clearance activities |
| **Activity 1.1.1:** | One BAC team and medical staff trained, equipped and operational in South Lebanon throughout the project period |

| **Output 1.2:** | 300,000 m² of land contaminated by land mines and cluster munitions in Central Lebanon cleared and released in coordination with the LMAC. |
| **Indicators:** | Annually, the two teams combined will clear and release 75,000 m² of land contaminated with landmines. Annually, 5,000 people will benefit from DCA clearance activities in Central Lebanon |
| **Activity 1.2.1:** | Two MMC teams and medical staff trained, equipped and operational in Central Lebanon throughout the project period (1 team: 46 months; 1 team: 46 months) |

| **Output 1.3:** | Pre and post-clearance assessments conducted documenting the socio-economic impact of the clearance in South and Central Lebanon and shared with relevant national and international development partners |
| **Indicators:** | Annually, at least 10 pre-clearance assessments conducted and five post-clearance shared with relevant development partners |
| | Pre-clearance impact assessment survey reports are produced for prioritisation, planning, and documentation of demining tasks and shared with other development actors |
| **Activity 1.3.1:** | Training and deployment of staff in pre and post clearance assessments. |
| **Activity 1.3.2:** | Monitoring of staff |

**Outcome 2: To reduce the risk for the affected populations in DR Congo, Libya and Lebanon through Community Liaison and Risk Education activities.**

| **Output 2.1:** | Visits by DCA community liaison officers to 15 communities in South and Central Lebanon document a documented decline in the number of incidents involving ERWs |
| **Indicators:** | LMAC accident reports show that no ERW accidents are occurring in areas where DCA has performed Community Liaison activities |
| **Activity 2.1.1:** | Meetings with population in local communities in 100% of tasked areas |
| **Activity 2.1.2:** | Meetings with LMAC to determine need for Risk Education |

**Outcome 3: To assist in building long-term national capacities for mine action though support for national clearance plans and capacity building of national Mine Action Coordination Centres and partners.**

| **Output 3.1:** | Effective support to the LMAC-Lebanon enabling completion as per national clearance plan, and support to national partner organisations assessed and competence development plans developed |
| **Indicators:** | Annually, DCA will assist four LMAC and national partner staff participating in EOD level 3 course run by DCA through lobbying donors for funding and ensuring a minimum of two spots on the course reserved |
for LMAC
DCA receives LMAC tasking for task with high and medium priority according to the national clearance plan.

**Activity 3.1.1: Participation and continuous coordination through attending meetings with the LMAC and development partners**

**Output 3.2:**
Possibilities for support to national partner organisations assessed and competence development plans initialized.

Indicators:
By the middle of 2013, possible national partners have been assessed and agreement reached with the LMAC if any should be assisted by DCA.
If suitable and interested national partners are identified, capacity building plans for transfer of knowledge in clearance activities will be developed by mid-2014.

**Activity 3.2.1: Survey and assessment of potential partner organisations**
**Activity 3.2.2: Coordination meetings with the LMAC to assess suitability**

---

**DRC logframe**

**Outcome 1: To improve human security and establish the conditions for safe and sustainable livelihoods for war-affected populations in DR Congo, Lebanon and Libya through clearance and survey of land contaminated by ERWs.**

**Output 1.1**
DCA MTTs assist the government of DR Congo and the UNMACC complete the GMAS of South Kivu. Large mined areas or battle/cluster strike area in Eastern DR Congo are identified and marked for clearance tasks and the IMSMA database is updated in preparation for later clearance.

Indicators:
360 spot task completion reports
Survey reports document identification and marking of areas
A total of 350 communities surveyed by DCA MTTs in Eastern Congo
IMSMA database is updated

Activity 1.1.1: Two (2) MTTs Survey/EOD, two Community Liaison (Survey/MRE) teams and one School Project team will be trained, equipped and operational in Eastern DR Congo throughout the project period.

**Output 1.2**
Land cleared and released in Eastern DRC through survey and EOD spot task activities in coordination with the UNMACC.

Indicators:
Annually each MTT perform a least 90 EOD spot tasks
At least 350 communities have been surveyed by the MTTs in Eastern Congo
By the end of the programme period, all tasks given to DCA by the UNMACC have been cleared and reporting for IMSMA completed

**Outcome 2: To reduce the risk for the affected populations in DR Congo, Libya and Lebanon through Community Liaison and Risk Education activities.**

**Output 2.1**
Risk Education provided to 350 communities previously not surveyed in Eastern DR Congo.

Indicators:
Annually 40,000 people in affected areas receive Risk Education.
Number and name of the communities recorded and reported to UNMACC.

Activity 2.1.1: MRE sessions will be conducted by the community liaison teams

**Output 2.2**
KABP survey reports conducted, documenting improved knowledge, attitudes, behaviour and practices of the communities in Eastern Congo after having received Risk Education by DCA staff.

Indicators:
KABP reports document improved knowledge, attitudes, behaviour and practices of the communities. UNMACC accident reports show a reduction in ERW related incidents in the areas where DCA has been operating.

Activity 2.2.1: KABP survey reports made by DCA MTTs  
Activity 2.2.2: Conduct follow-up Risk Education based on KABP reports  

**Outcome 3:** To assist in building long-term national capacities for mine action though support for national clearance plans and capacity building of national Mine Action Coordination Centres and partners.

| Output 3.1 |  
| --- | --- |
| School-centred Risk Education and ERW reporting leaflets and training materials developed and distributed to selected schools in Eastern DR Congo. |  
| Indicators: |  
| Material and leaflets distributed to 110 selected schools |  
| Activity 3.1.1: Development, production and distribution of leaflets and training materials to 200 selected teachers, school directors and school inspectors |

| Output 3.2 |  
| --- | --- |
| Training provided to selected school-teachers and inspectors in DCA area of operation in Eastern DR Congo. |  
| Indicators: |  
| Training reports document that teacher and inspectors in 110 selected schools have participated in MRE and landmine/ERW reporting |  
| DCA receives landmine/ERW reports from school inspectors |  
| DCA follow-up visits and reports from selected schools show that school teachers provide Risk Education to their pupils |  
| Activity 3.2.1: DCA Community Liaison staff provides training to 200 school teachers, school directors and inspectors |
Annex 7 – Lebanon Contamination

Landmine contamination as of May 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
<th>Area of SHAs (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>15.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster Munition contamination as of May 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
<th>Area of SHAs (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>13.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Mine contamination in 2006 and 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Member in charge</th>
<th>Current use (Objective)</th>
<th>Tools used</th>
<th>Challenge/opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Liaison Officer, now senior programme and programme officer</td>
<td>Know the land owner and neighbours.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explain work/organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce HAP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre clearance assessment</strong></td>
<td>Verify information in task dossier.</td>
<td>Contacts created through CL. Fill out questionnaire by talking to direct beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Mechanical (fill out questionnaire) Involvement of women and youth in assessment? Define what the ambition is? Opportunities: Draw operational conclusions for the specific task: is MRE required? Will beneficiaries be able to use the land released? Can they be etc. Gather socio economic information. Follow-up on information gathered (link land user to livelihood projects?).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Liaison Officer, now senior programme and programme officer</td>
<td>Assess number of beneficiaries. Gather basic information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post clearance assessment</strong></td>
<td>After 6 month of clearing site. Verify use of land.</td>
<td>Fill out questionnaire by talking to same direct beneficiaries (mostly men; 2-5 people).</td>
<td>Define the ambition of the assessment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Liaison Officer, now senior programme and programme officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Opportunities: Verify relevance and impact of DCA work. Work toward focus towards vulnerable groups. Link it to impact monitoring.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact monitoring</strong></td>
<td>Measure impact of DCA’s work.</td>
<td>Data gathered by assessments.</td>
<td>In its infancy. To be defined Opportunities: A lot of useful information is already being gathered in the assessments. Avoid duplication of efforts/questionnaire fatigue of communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 9 - DRC contamination

Table 4: DRC contamination - mines (2014 survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Nbre ZSD minées</th>
<th>m²</th>
<th>Surface moyenne m²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>593 596</td>
<td>17 459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>463 699</td>
<td>14 491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>159 827</td>
<td>15 983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Orientale</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>193 371</td>
<td>8 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord Kivu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 166</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud Kivu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 254</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Occidental</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>404 959</td>
<td>25 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1 823 292</td>
<td>14 025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: DRC contamination - cluster munitions (2014 survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Nbre ZSD ASM</th>
<th>m²</th>
<th>Surface moyenne m²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 340</td>
<td>3 085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 250</td>
<td>5 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17 590</td>
<td>3 518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Other suspected hazardous areas - DRC

Number of SHAs in the DRC database as of August 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Suspected Mine Fields</th>
<th>Other Hazards</th>
<th>Total Hazards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Kivu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Orientale</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Kivu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai-Oriental</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai-Occidental</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas-Congo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandundu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: suspected mine field areas out-dated (new figures in 2014 survey)
Figure 4: DRC contamination map (02/2014)